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The ideal way through life for each of us is a journey, where we can control our own lives 
and make our own decisions.  For some this is not possible, and for these people decisions 
need to be made on their behalf.  Healthcare decisions are of fundamental importance, and of 
these, the most acute are about life and death.  This thesis discusses the tragedy of the 
incompetent patient, for whom such a life or death decision must be made. The difficulty of 
these sorts of decisions has necessitated decision-making on behalf of these incompetent 
patients by the judiciary.  The case may have gone to court because of differences of opinion 
between the medical profession and the families, or it may be because it is unclear whether 
the proposed action is even legal.  Regardless of how it came within the court’s domain, the 
judges then become the decision-makers for the incompetent patient.   
To make these difficult decisions the judge uses the best interests of the patient as the 
decision-making principle.  Best interests is a complicated term, as it necessitates the 
involvement of other values, which are compared and evaluated.  To understand how well 
judges are using this principle, this thesis analyses cases from four Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, concluding that the best interests test has been applied in a way that is less 
consistent than can be expected from a common law jurisdiction focused on predictability.  
Specifically, there is little agreement on the definition of best interests, nor is there a common 
formula for the weighting and balancing of the various interests which are inevitably at stake.  
What counts as interests, and which interests a permanently incompetent person is attributed 
with also varies.  Additionally, the focus on the individual, which is fixed in its centrality to 
the best interests test, has become its primary goal, to the detriment of recognising a wider 
interpretation of interests that the patient may have, including the interest that he or she may 
have for others, such as their family.  This thesis discusses all of these issues, and concludes 
with a list of recommendations for the consideration of the best interests test when applied to 
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 “The time has come to redirect the focus of bioethics toward the problem of 
the incompetent patient.”1 
Anne Blythe was 58 years old when she suffered a devastating medical event that 
changed her life irrevocably.  She had lived what she considered to be a good life, 
had a husband and three children to whom she was close.  Whilst the doctors saved 
her life after the initial trauma, afterwards she showed no signs of comprehension or 
deliberate movement.  She was then put on various life supports, including ventilation 
and artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) to keep her alive.  Eventually she was 
able to breathe unassisted.  Her loving family were convinced that she was improving, 
that they could see her respond to their voices and their touch.  But her medical 
carers told them no, she is not able to respond to anything, it is just spontaneous 
movement.  They gently told the Blythe family that Anne was effectively ‘gone’ and 
that, to give her a dignified death, ANH should be removed, or if that was not 
acceptable to the family then if Anne got an infection she should not be treated with 
antibiotics.  Anne’s family refused to consent to this treatment plan.  They said “Anne 
would not give up at this stage and neither are we”.  Anne had left no document 
behind that had set out her wishes should something like this happen to her.  There 
were many family conferences, many medical opinions sought, much attempt at 
persuasion by the doctors, who did not want to prolong Anne’s life needlessly.  The 
doctors were convinced that it was in Anne’s best interests for treatment to be 
withdrawn or withheld, just as Anne’s family were convinced it was in her best 
interests to continue treatment.  They had reached an impasse, and eventually the 
only way forward was to seek an answer from the only institution who could provide a 
declaration as to which treatment options were in Anne’s best interests – the courts.   
This is a hypothetical case, setting out some of the many issues to be explored in the 
subsequent chapters.
2
  The patient has been diagnosed as being in a permanently incompetent 
state.  Treatment decisions need to be made for her, and everyone wants the right decision to 
be made.  It would seem that identifying her best interests will reveal the right thing to do, but 
there may be disagreement about what those best interests are.  The body with the authority 
to resolve this disagreement is the court, and so it must make the decision.   
This thesis analyses cases from four common law jurisdictions in which a person is unable to 
make a decision for themselves, and a decision is required about treatment which may mean 
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continuation of life, or imminent death.  The decision the judge would need to make about 
Anne Blythe would determine her future treatment; treatment that would determine (to a 
reasonable degree of likelihood) whether she lives or dies in the near future.  To reach a 
decision the judge has to make a determination as to whether continuation of treatment is in 
Anne’s best interests.  How does the judge do this?  What value does the judge place on the 
family’s assertion that Anne would want to have treatment continued?  More problematically, 
what value should be placed on the family’s own views?  How does this balance with advice 
from the medical profession that treatment should be withdrawn, with the inevitable 
consequence that this would hasten her death?  This thesis is an endeavour to understand how 
judges are making these end-of-life decisions concerning incompetent patients, and contends 
that best interests, used as a decision-making tool by multiple jurisdictions, is not being 
applied as consistently and transparently as expected in a common law tradition relying on 
precedent.  All of the data is drawn from judgments from four common law countries.  Each 
case involved judges making decisions on behalf of incompetent patients, and this thesis 
shows that there is no general agreement regarding: (1) a definition of best interests; (2) a list 
of what counts as an interest; and (3) a formula for the weighting and balancing of the various 
interests that inevitably are at stake.  Judges are using the test of best interests inconsistently, 
and while it is concluded that it is, of course, necessary for there to be some level of 
discretion, the lack of transparency and consistency that sometimes occurs can, and should, 
be modified.  
Thesis Overview 
Thousands of articles have been written concerning the cases that are examined in this thesis.  
Many of these discussions focus on the merits of the outcome of the cases, however fewer 
commentators have taken a step back from considering whether the judge reached the right 
decision, and discussed the way in which the judge reached the decision.  Firstly, how do 
judges make decisions for incompetent patients in end-of-life cases?  The answer to this, at 
least ostensibly, is that they focus on that individual’s interests.  In most of the jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis, a best interests test is the primary decision-making tool for substitute 
decision-making.
3
  However, all judges accommodate, to differing degrees, the prior views of 
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the patient if they were previously competent.  How does prior competency affect the way in 
which the decision was reached?  In this thesis it is shown that the focus on the individual can 
take two forms: (1) the epistemic question of how can it be known what a person’s interests 
are, when they cannot tell us themselves; and (2) the substantive question of what interests 
the courts actually take into account.  The thesis then broadens this question to include all 
incompetent patients, asking what interests should be taken into account by the courts.  
In order to properly evaluate the epistemic and substantive questions, the legal and ethical 
framework for substituted decision-making needs to be understood.  Chapter Two examines 
the concept of best interests – what does this term mean?  As presented in the hypothetical 
case of Anne Blythe, best interests can be used by doctors to justify withdrawing treatment, 
and it is also used as a legal test by the courts.  It also has some roots in bioethical literature.  
How can the approaches of these disparate disciplines best be appraised?  The analysis of the 
cases reveal certain themes in end-of-life cases, themes which are then utilised to explore the 
complexities of the concept of best interests.  These themes persuasively display three major 
contentions: (1) that end-of-life decision-making is difficult because of the complex 
relationship between law and ethics; (2) best interests is a multi-layered and complex term; 
and (3) that the legal framework is inadequate, or inadequately applied.   
Before the question of what interests should be taken into account can be addressed, the 
question of what interests are, and what interests could be taken into account is discussed in 
Chapter Three.  This topic is explored by discussing accounts from Dworkin, Sperling and 
Feinberg, arriving at the conclusion that two broad categories of interests, self-regarding and 
other-regarding, can be used to enhance the understanding of interests by judges.
4
  Self-
regarding interests are defined as consideration for one’s own interests; these can be either 
experiential or non-experiential.  Other-regarding interests are defined as consideration for 
others’ interests; the ‘others’ of this definition has two categories, those closest to the patient, 
namely family and friends, and society as a whole, usually the community that the patient is 
living in.  The exploration and recognition of other-regarding interests could benefit the 
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patient in end-of-life cases, and ignoring them could mean failing to adequately apply the 
best interests test. 
An individual’s views, their beliefs, and even their personality prior to becoming incompetent 
are at the very least discussed, and often prioritised, by the courts (and legislation).  This is 
one way of answering the epistemic question: “what are an incompetent adult’s interests?”  
Prior views and beliefs immediately denotes that the individual was able to formulate and 
demonstrate an identity with cohesiveness, and this often excludes minors and adults with 
severe cognitive impairment.  Chapter Four explores the concept of incompetence, discussing 
the specific terms competence and capacity and subsequently arriving at the position that they 
are interchangeable.  To further the understanding of what it means for a patient to be 
incompetent, the focus of the chapter is a categorisation of incompetent patients and whether 
they have been previously competent or not.  Subsequent chapters show that this is a crucial 
distinction, as is the further distinction made within previously competent patients; those who 
expressed a view, when competent, on possible future choices should they become 
incompetent, and those who did not do so.   
Chapter Five comprises a discussion of the prior views of the patient, using the distinction 
between previously competent patients established in Chapter Four.  In this chapter it is 
argued that, if the question is framed only in relation to what the patient would want 
themselves, there can be no definitive answer to the epistemic question of “what is an 
incompetent patient’s best interests?”  Chapter Five also identifies that the way in which the 
prior views of the individual are being utilised by judges is problematic; this utilisation is not 
satisfying the most important question in relation to these views: are we sure that they are 
valid?  Validity is linked to the extent that the views can be safely relied on as the patient’s 
own view.  A proposal is set out to determine the veracity of the prior views which are taken 
into account in making a best interests determination, and analyse specific cases employing 
this proposal.   
The substantive question, regarding the range of interests that the courts take into account 
when focusing on the individual, can be discussed in terms of a range of particular 
applications of best interests.  There are three main narrow approaches identified in the 
judgments investigated in Chapter Six: (1) a person has no interests if they cannot experience 
anything; (2) medicalisation of best interests, which posits that only the medical condition 




the circumstances.  There are a range of reasons why the courts focus on these narrow aspects 
of the best interests test, and these are explored, before the conclusion is drawn that a 
qualified-objective approach is the one most commonly utilised, and this also optimises the 
application of the best interests test.  This approach takes into account the patient’s prior 
views, but also evaluates a wide range of interests, including objective interests.   
An alternative to the narrow applications of best interests considered in Chapter Six, is a 
wider method which includes all possible interests that a substitute decision-maker could 
attribute to another person.  Such interests may be discussed in terms of whether they are 
self- or other-regarding, and include such interests as the patient’s family having an interest 
in how the patient is treated, or an interest in being remembered (or even well remembered) 
after death.  In Chapter Seven the broader approach to best interests is discussed, 
necessitating that an evaluation of the weighting of all the possible interests is made on some 
level.  Many times the cases demonstrate conflicting interests, and sometimes confluent 
interests, and in Chapter Seven these are addressed.  The focus is on common manifestations 
of these conflicts: (1) sanctity and quality of life; (2) parental views and child’s interests; and 
(3) prior views and other interests.  From this discussion a question as to the importance of 
other-regarding interests emerges, and this informs the last chapter.   
In the concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, guidelines are proposed for the weighting of 
interests; these provide a transparent hierarchy of interests from which it can be determined 
that consistent decision-making is possible.  These are based on four categories: sensate and 
non-sensate with a prior self, and sensate and non-sensate with no prior self.  This is the 
denouement of all previous discussions.   
Prospective, End-of-Life Cases with an Incompetent 
Patient 
“This case presents us with a tragic yet increasingly common conflict.  A patient is 
unconscious.  He is on life support — support that may keep him alive for a very long 
time, given the resources of modern medicine.  His physicians, who see no prospect 




wish to withdraw life support.  His wife, believing that he would wish to be kept 
alive, opposes withdrawal of life support.  How should the impasse be resolved?”
5
 
The concept of best interests is invoked by judges in a range of situations (for example, when 
making decisions for minors in custody disputes).  Court cases dealing with best interests in a 
medical setting are often where the patient is incompetent, the decision has life or death 
consequences, and the decision is being made prospectively.  Identifying these cases from 
four common law countries has provided a rich resource for a number of observations.  These 
observations have provided a base on which to establish a number of general contentions 
regarding the way in which these courts have made decisions for incompetent patients.  
Unsurprisingly, these observations lead to a conclusion that substitute decision-making for 
the incompetent patient is a difficult, complicated and challenging process.  More 
specifically, I advance a thesis in response to these difficulties which argue that the test for 
best interests has been applied inconsistently; different (and sometimes opposite) interests 
have been attributed to the same patient, both narrow and wider approaches as to what counts 
as interests have been used, and at other times the emphasis on the individual has manifested 
in disingenuous ways.  The following sections outline the parameters of this thesis; a 
discussion is provided about how the cases were chosen and their country of origin, and 
guidance is provided on how certain terms, such as incompetent and patient are to be used 
throughout the thesis. 
End-of-life 
“It is a platitude that we live our whole lives in the shadow of death; it is also true that 
we die in the shadow of our whole lives.  Death’s central horror is oblivion – the 
terrifying, absolute dying of the light.  But oblivion is not all there is to death; if it 
were, people would not worry so much about whether their technical, biological lives 
continue after they have become unconscious and the void has begun, after the light is 
already dead forever.  Death has dominion because it is not only the start of nothing 
but the end of everything, and how we think and talk about dying – the emphasis we 
put on dying with ‘dignity’ – shows how important it is that life ends appropriately, 
that death keeps faith with the way we want to have lived.”
6  
In the context of this thesis end-of-life denotes that a judge has to make a decision which is 
literally a choice about the patient’s life or death.  For example, in the hypothetical Anne 
Blythe case, the court would need to decide whether to either withdraw treatment or withhold 
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future treatment, either of which would result in the patient’s death, or to continue those 
treatments and potentially prolong her life.  In all of the cases analysed in this thesis, the 
person was in a hospital (or under medical care).  Therefore, the term patient is often used to 
signify the person at the centre of the court case.  In many of the cases the patient was in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS).  The New Zealand Medical Association accepts a definition 
of PVS which relates to lack of responsiveness to any stimulation: 
“A state of unconsciousness (i.e. loss of self awareness) where the body cyclically 
awakes and sleeps but expresses no behavioural or cerebral metabolic evidence of 
possessing cognitive function or of being able to respond in a learned manner to 




It is also important to note that a clinical diagnosis of PVS takes place several weeks, and 
usually months, after the initial incident:  
“The common feature of all definitions is that there should be no clinical evidence of 
cortical activity.  PVS may arise from cerebral anoxia, from ischaemia, or from 
damage due to trauma, or rarely due to disease. Before beginning to consider the 
discontinuation of treatment of PVS the diagnosis must be sure, and this takes time. 
Some recovery from PVS has been recorded after a period of several months. During 
the period of initial assessment it is appropriate to provide aggressive medical 




By comparison, a patient may be in a minimally conscious state (MCS), the difference being 
that the patient displays some form of awareness: 
“The minimally conscious state (MCS) is a recently defined clinical condition; it 
differs from the persistent vegetative state (PVS) by the presence of inconsistent, but 
clearly discernible, behavioral evidence of consciousness.”
9
 
There are a wide range of patients within both of these categories, as evidenced by extensive 
clinical and academic dialogue regarding the various permutations of what each means.   
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Permanently, Terminally Incompetent and Unconscious 
In end-of-life cases there is a distinction that can be made between cases as to whether the 
patient is competent or incompetent.  Where the patient is competent the issues are, of course, 
entirely different, as the individual can speak for themselves.  There are three distinctions that 
can be made: (1) cases involving competent patients;
10
 (2) cases about determining 
competence;
11
 and (3) cases involving incompetent patients.  The first two categories of cases 
offer some peripheral background to decision-making for incompetent patients but do little 
more than this.  The focus of this thesis is on the third distinction, the incompetent patient, 
which is an area worthy of further critique (justified in subsequent sections).   
The many issues concerning competence and incompetence are discussed in Chapter Three, 
but first clarification should be provided regarding the use of the term permanent in this 
thesis, and how it manifests in the two main groups of patients.  Permanently incompetent, as 
used in this thesis, denotes either: (1) an adult with a severe cognitive impairment (which will 
prevent achieving competence at any stage from that point forward); or (2) a young child who 
may or may not have an underlying cognitive impairment.  Incompetence in minors is firstly 
due to their age and lack of developmental maturity, and may or may not also be contributed 
to by some condition which damages cognitive abilities.  The description of permanently 
incompetent, however, is still applicable to minors in these cases because, (in almost every 
case, except those of conjoined twins) it is anticipated that they will not be able to live long 
enough to reach competence.
12
   
The term permanently incompetent has been chosen carefully to describe the patients at the 
centre of all the cases.  In most cases they could also be described as unconscious, but some 
are in a MCS which is why the term permanently unconscious (used by some commentators) 
is not used in this thesis.
13
  Additionally, some of the minors are not unconscious.  In this 
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 Often involving the right to assisted suicide: in England application not granted: R (Pretty) v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2002] 1 AC 800; Pretty v 
United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1.  Canada: Rodriquez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 
521.  Application not granted but overturned 22 years later by Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 
SCR 331.  New Zealand: Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239; application not granted. 
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prolonging treatment. Ms B was a tetraplegic who successfully sought the right to refuse treatment; her 
ventilator support was removed.   
12
 This may represent an anomaly amongst the cases chosen, however it is representative of this selection. 
Normally pre-competent unimpaired children are not classified as permanently incompetent. 
13




thesis the term permanent denotes a minute chance of any recovery (as predicted by doctors) 
in the patient’s condition (or circumstances), and therefore the consideration of gaining, or 
regaining, competence at a future time is not at any stage part of the decision-making 
process.
14
  Furthermore, incompetent in these cases signifies a more severe and global 
incompetence than a legal finding of incompetence.  For example, a person with a mild 
cognitive impairment, such as someone with Down syndrome, could be deemed incompetent 
for some decision-making, but the patients in the cases in this thesis are severely cognitively 
impaired (or minors) and are completely unable to make any of their own healthcare 
decisions.  This is reflected in the end-of-life aspect which signifies that the decisions to be 
made can be anticipated to have life and death consequences.  The patients will never be able 
to participate in any treatment decisions and decisions must be made for them.  The patient is 
always incompetent, and permanently so, and there is no prospect of deferring the decision 
until they are competent.  Therefore, they are unable to make the decision for themselves as 
to what treatment plan they would choose.
15
   
Best Interests 
“As judges, we are often required to make difficult decisions which have a profound 
effect on the lives of others…  The decisions do not get any easier, no matter how 
often a judge must deal with the issues.  This is one of the most difficult cases that I 
have had to deal with, as it may not only change lives, but it may have the effect of 
ending a life.  I can assure you that the last week has been most difficult for me as I 
have wrestled with the competing issues that have been raised.”
16
 
In all of the end-of-life cases that I canvassed, three major ethical issues came to the fore: 
best interests, autonomy and sanctity of life.  Sanctity of life, whilst often mentioned in the 
cases, it is with little discussion or definition, despite the decision that is subsequently made 
resulting in the death of the patient.
17
  The apparent contradiction, of giving priority to the 
notion of sanctity of life, but also maintaining that it can be overruled, is a result of the 
complex relationship between judges having to make decisions, and the way they justify 
these decisions.  Upon further scrutiny the presumption in favour of life was at times found to 
be outweighed by other factors and to be part of the consideration of best interests.   
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Legal issues around the incompetent patient have emerged as an area of contemporary 
significance in New Zealand.  For example, in 2014, barrister Alison Douglass was awarded 
the New Zealand Law Foundation’s “premier legal research award”, the International 
Research Fellowship.  Her topic is titled “Mental Capacity: Updating New Zealand’s Law 
and Practice”.  On receiving the award she noted: 
“In New Zealand, there is no specific guidance for medical or legal practitioners and 




There is also an increasing awareness of the importance of decision-making for incompetent 
adults in a manner that includes the incompetent patient in the process, as exemplified by the 
recent Victoria Law Report on “supported decision-making” and “co-decision making”.
19
  
Furthering this point, there has been debate regarding the concepts of capacity and best 
interests applying in New Zealand and Australia, and that these tests may become obsolete as 
a result of ratifying the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) in 2008 which requires shared decision-making.
20
  However, this is seen as 
supplementing the existing common law and legislative regimes that allow for substitute 
decision-making where the patient cannot participate.
21
                  
The Role of Autonomy in Decision-Making for the Incompetent Patient 
The principle of autonomy will be referred to frequently throughout this thesis.  Although it 
may not seem to be relevant to the incompetent patient (they currently have no way of 
engaging currently with autonomous decision-making), if they had previously been 
competent questions can be raised about any previous wishes they may have had.
22
  
Autonomy is not usually understood as just one more interest in the mix, it is a different 
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principle altogether, and one that often takes priority over best interests.  This is predicated 
on the right that every competent person has to refuse any medical treatment and thereby 
assert their autonomy.   
“The courts have effected a process of change over the past 30 years which has 
fundamentally altered the focus of the law from being based on the duties of the 
doctor (as defined by doctors themselves) to emphasis on and prioritisation of the 
patient’s right to autonomy.”
23
 
The obvious point is that incompetent patients do not have such a right; there is no way of 
ascertaining their current autonomous wishes.  But in keeping with the individualistic nature 
of autonomy, the focus on the individual is the one agreed criterion for the best interests test.  
This has often taken the form of focus on autonomous principles, which is argued in this 
thesis can lead to a more convoluted expression of the interests that the incompetent patient 
may have. 
The primary context for autonomy is in the consideration for prior views that a previously 
competent patient may have had on their future treatment.  The significance of any prior 
views is reflected in the two approaches to substituted decision-making: substituted judgment 
and best interests.  Substituted judgment prioritises the autonomy of the patient, and any prior 
views they may have had as the most important factor.  This is a view of autonomy which 
prioritises a person’s precedent autonomy.  By comparison, the best interests approach 
includes prior views as one of the factors that should be considered in the decision-making 
process.  Whilst the main focus in this thesis is on best interests, this must be done with 
reference to substituted judgment for two reasons: (1) substitute judgment is the decision-
making tool used for incompetent patients in some Australian and Canadian states; and (2) it 
is necessary to understand both, as their close relationship has resulted in a blurred distinction 
between them.  The prior views of an incompetent patient (which necessarily involves 
discussion of autonomy) are examined extensively in this thesis: Chapter Two outlines the 
legislative framework, Chapter Four discusses the significance of including an approach 
which recognises precedent autonomy, and Chapter Five outlines a proposal for ascertaining 
the veracity of prior views, and also analyses cases in detail in reference to this proposal.     
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The next criterion applicable to this thesis is that only prospective cases are analysed.  Often 
some kind of catastrophic medical situation has arisen, and the court is being asked to clarify 
what should happen next.  Sometimes this decision will need to be made urgently, sometimes 
there will be more time for the courts to consider it.  Often it will be about withdrawal of 
treatment such as in the hypothetical case of Anne Blythe.  The proposed action could be a 
specific procedure, for example an operation to separate conjoined twins where one will 
definitely die if the operation takes place.  Whoever is taking the case to court is asking – can 
we do this?  What should we do?  Occasionally everyone will be in agreement, but it is not 
clear if the proposed action is even legal.  At other times it will be a dispute between different 
parties, for example the family and the medical profession, and the judge will then have to 
decide between opposing views.   
The cases require prospective decisions (on behalf of incompetent individuals) and this 
requirement leads to the reliance on an anticipatory tool being used.  Best interests in this 
context is an anticipatory tool which is used to make substitute decisions in advance of 
possible future events.  The prospective nature of the decisions made by the courts in this 
thesis represents a shift in their function.  Until relatively recently, courts were rarely 
entreated to make decisions regarding future events.  In the last twenty five years this has 
changed;
24
 courts are now being called upon to make prospective decisions, and are not only 
seemingly content to do so, but some judgments actually encourage the practice.
25
  The 
reasons for this change are not entirely clear, and there are many contributing factors.  It may 
be the result of more litigation, or more cases being reported, or perhaps courts were simply 
not approached previously.  With regard to end-of-life cases, the advancement of medical 
technology has undeniably played a significant role.  Courts are being asked to answer 
questions that were quite simply unimaginable fifty years ago.  Complex ethical and legal 
questions regarding whether a patient should be kept alive artificially were the subject of 
science fiction, not court cases.   
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“It may be helpful if I were to describe at the outset what I consider to be the function 
of the court in a case of this kind.  It belongs to a group of cases which have been 
recurring with increasing frequency in recent years where the courts are being asked 
to give their authority to actions to be taken by medical practitioners which raise acute 
questions of moral or ethical principle.  Medical science has now advanced to such a 




Additionally, there does appear to be a rise in prospective cases coinciding with an increasing 
lack of confidence in the medical profession.  This perception may be due to a Western 
society that is increasingly aware of its personal autonomy and various rights that it wants to 
negotiate.  Kennedy attributes it in part to an increasing awareness that decisions that the 
medical profession make are ethical, and not just clinical.
27
     
Common Law Jurisdiction 
Under the parameters identified so far – incompetent, end-of-life and prospective – five cases 
from the New Zealand jurisdiction were identified.
28
  Using the cases from New Zealand 
there were numerous citations of cases from England and Wales.
29
  From all of these cases 
two other jurisdictions were often cited: Australia and Canada.  Using these guidelines, and to 
ensure a wide range of documentation, cases were gathered from New Zealand, Australia, the 
United Kingdom and Canada.  All of these countries are common law jurisdictions, and 
although the legislation differs in each country, the similarities are sufficient from which to 
draw useful conclusions.
30 
  The only other common law country which is often referred to, 
the United States of America, has been excluded for two reasons.  The first is that, due to the 
size of the country, its inclusion would increase the number of cases disproportionately, and 
the second, main reason is that it differs in regards to best interests, favouring a substituted 
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  Whilst the cases from within New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada have all been discussed, and often cited with approval by each of the 
other jurisdictions, this does not apply to the American jurisdiction.  Instead, occasionally 
dissenting judgments have been referred to with approval from the jurisdictions that this 
thesis is focused on.
32
        
Using these criteria 68 cases have been gathered which form the basis of the analysis in this 
thesis.  In each, an application was made to the court regarding a decision which had major 
consequences concerning whether the patient would live or die.   
Some Further Considerations 
“These are hard cases for the patient, they are hard cases for the family and they are 
hard cases for those that have to treat the patient.”
33
   
Other than the patient, there are three main groups of people – judges, the medical profession, 
and families – that are the most involved in, and most affected by the kinds of cases that are 
the subject of this thesis.  I want to acknowledge their contribution before embarking on the 
process of evaluating these cases from a privileged position which is very different from the 
reality that these groups faced.   
I am aware that I have spent many months reflecting upon judgments that judges have had to 
make in a considerably shorter time frame – in some instances mere hours.  Additionally I 
have not had to make tough decisions about life and death.  While respectful of the need to be 
heedful of this, it is maintained that it is also not possible to be constantly excusing a 
particular decision based on time constraints.  This thesis claims decisions for incompetent 
patients should be more robust, and more consistent, and does this by shining a spotlight on 
the decision-making process.  However, the following caution elucidated by an American 
judge is acknowledged: 
“Whatever judges may say or even believe, there is little reason to doubt that they 
exercise considerable discretion and frequently must and do decide indeterminate 
cases.”
34
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The doctors and nurses who care for incompetent patients do a remarkable job, and thereby 
serve their communities, when caring for some of the most vulnerable patients in our society.  
Some of the cases are brought about by disputes between the medical profession and family, 
but only a tiny minority of medical carers could have the allegation directed at them that they 
do not have the patient’s best interests as their motivation.  It is a testament to the medical 
profession that despite the impression given in this thesis – that courts commonly need to 
make decisions for incompetent patients – it is actually a rarity.   
From the outset I also want to be mindful that in all of the cases that are analysed, there is a 
person at the centre of that case.  All of these patients had many people who cared about 
them.  Therein lies the devastating sadness associated with these cases; there has been a 
traumatic event or events that has left a much-loved person in a permanently incompetent 
state.  All of this has occurred before the case gets to court, and sometimes the families have 
lived for years with the uncertainty of not knowing what will happen.  There is no doubt that 
there has been much sadness and grief for these families who have had to endure the 
unbearable.  I have endeavoured at all times to be respectful of this. 
Throughout this thesis there is little comment on the correctness of the outcome of the 
judgments, except in relation to how those outcomes were reached.  For example, no 
statements are made regarding whether ANH should or should not be withdrawn from a 
person in a PVS, or in any particular case involving a patient in PVS.  The focus is on making 
extensive observations concerning the manner by which the judges have reached their 
decisions.  Effectively a step has been taken back from a lot of what has been written on these 
difficult cases, much of which is framed around “should the judges have decided that?”
35
  
Instead, this thesis examines how they decided what they did.  The answer to this lies in the 
next section which shows how the close analysis of the cases produced a discernible pattern.  
Having established this to be the central proposition of the thesis, the next logical question to 
ask is how well are the judges making the decisions?  Chapters Five, Six and Seven address 
this question.   
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“The common characteristic to all these cases is that Judges have been asked 
to determine complex legal issues, sometimes urgently, in a context in which 
philosophical , moral, ethical and clinical viewpoints are deeply divided.” 36 
This chapter aims to establish a broad understanding of the complexity regarding the concept 
of best interests.  To achieve this goal fundamental preliminaries are addressed, providing the 
basis for the detailed analysis in subsequent chapters.  When someone is unable to make 
healthcare decisions for themselves a decision must be made for them, effectively requiring a 
substitute decision.  Two questions then arise: who should make the decision for the person 
and how should they make it?  Often the ‘who’ part of the question is easily answered 
(especially by the time it gets to court), but how the decision is made, or should be made, is 
the difficult part.
37
  All four of the Commonwealth jurisdictions focused on in this thesis use 
best interests as a mechanism for decision-making on behalf of those who cannot decide for 
themselves.  Best interests is prevalent in cases regarding end-of-life issues for those who are 
permanently incompetent, and even a cursory examination into cases dealing with end-of-life 
reveals how frequently it is employed.  In this chapter possible definitions of the best interests 
test are addressed, as are some of the complexities involved with the use of the term, the legal 
framework for the best interests test, and then preliminary observations will be made 
regarding the difficulties judges are faced with in applying a best interests test.  The 
Appendices, which provide comprehensive overviews of the end-of-life cases, are also 
outlined.  
Although the focus in this chapter is on providing an overall summation of best interests, as 
used in end-of-life cases, the outcome of this inquiry is less than ideal.  All of the countries 
attach great importance to best interests, but a clear description of its meaning is not able to 
be provided.  Therefore, the analysis in this chapter reveals that further investigation into the 
concept of best interests is required. The first part of this analysis is provided in Chapter 
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Three, which isolates the term interests and discusses what is meant by interests; this affirms 
how important an understanding of interests is to the concept of best interests.  
In the comprehensive analysis of prospective end-of-life cases in the Commonwealth 
undertaken in this thesis, five main themes were revealed: (1) a complicated relationship 
between law and ethics; (2) a notable use of language; (3) unanimous decisions, despite 
individual judges employing different reasoning; (4) use of ancillary guidance; and (5) the 
legal framework that the courts are working within in each jurisdiction is inadequate, or 
inadequately applied.  These themes have been used to structure the enquiry into the concept 
of best interests, and how it relates to end-of-life issues both legally and ethically.   
An Introduction to Best Interests 
There is no simple or single definition of best interests.  This lack of cohesion stems in part 
from its multi-faceted nature as a guiding principle, used in all three fields of practice on 
which this thesis focuses – legal, ethical and medical.  Not only is it discussed in all of these 
different professions, but there are diverse ways that it is employed, and therefore numerous 
definitions have been applied in the various fields of practice that it is used in.   
In the legal and medical professions the term best interests is most commonly used in areas 
not dealing with end-of-life issues.  In law, best interests is often invoked when dealing with 
custody disputes over children.  Medically, it is discussed in relation to patients, but this is 
not necessarily dependent on the patient being incompetent.  All healthcare decisions have to 
be made in the best interests of the patient, with two notable exceptions: treatment refusals by 
competent patients have to be honoured, whether or not they are in the patient’s best interests, 
and rationing decisions have to balance the interests of different patients.  When a patient is 
competent they can choose whether to have treatment, irrespective of others’ views of their 
best interests.
38
  This thesis discusses best interests in a specific situation; a patient is in an 
end-of-life situation, and treatment decisions are linked to whether it is in their best interests 
to receive the proposed treatment plan or not.  Therefore, best interests is essentially a tool 
that those in a professional capacity often use when making decisions for those who cannot 
decide for themselves.  However, it is not just professionals who get to make decisions based 
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on someone’s best interests, there are provisions in legislation to designate a person with 
substitute decision-making capabilities for another person, such as appointing an enduring 
power of attorney.  These provisions and how they work are looked at more closely in 
Chapter Four, but it is worth noting at this introductory stage that there are three groups of 
decision-makers – doctors, judges, and friends or family – who are the principal sources for 
deciding what someone’s best interests are.   
The considerations deliberated on by these substitute decision-makers are effectively ethical.  
Often the central question being asked can be reduced to this maxim: “will this decision to 
treat/continue treatment/withdraw treatment be of benefit or harm to the person?”  In 
considering this, the decision-maker will evaluate the patient’s best interests.  This means that 
best interests acts as an umbrella term or gateway to other ethical principles, because, when 
considering what is in a patient’s best interests, other concepts will be  invoked.  For 
example, in considering whether or not to withdraw treatment from a patient in a PVS, the 
principle of sanctity of life (expressed as the presumption in favour of life or an interest in 
continued life) is seen as intrinsically valuable, and therefore always considered as an interest 
that the incompetent person has.  This is balanced against their perceived interest in being 
“alive but not living”.
39
   
Best interests is therefore not a term that can be considered in isolation.  Whilst it may seem 
that the basic tenet of the principle is that a person has interests, this is not necessarily 
accurate, as shown in Chapter Six.
40
  The usual way we live our lives is that we are able to 
decide what is in our own best interests.  Generally speaking, the ability to make an 
autonomous and valid decision about your own life overrules someone else’s perception of 
your best interests.  Best interests as a concept is very broad, and just what constitutes a 
particular person’s best interests is not always easy to discern.  This is because best interests 
is a gateway term to assessing other principles, and the interests that it aims to assess are 
value-laden.  A competent person decides what they value and then balances these values, 
and this may relate to undertaking a particular action or not.  For example, they may weigh 
up the pros and cons of a medical procedure.  The same approach may be taken when making 
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the decision for someone else – what did the particular person consider important?  What 
interests would they have likely valued given this situation?  There are often competing 
values to consider, such as an interest in living versus an interest in the manner of death.  For 
example, on contemplation of a MCS, a person who had ardent religious views on 
continuation of treatment regardless of futility, would probably have very different views to 
someone who was intensely private, who could not think of anything worse than being 
subjected to such dependence.  The weight that is placed on each of the possible values can 
also be difficult to determine and this is examined more closely in Chapter Seven.   
In their book “Deciding for Others” Buchanan and Brock outline an ethical framework, 
which serves as a theory of substitute decision-making, which comprises of a:  
“coherent set of principles related to one another in a systematic way, and with 
sufficient power to resolve a wide range of important issues.”
41
 
Their framework provides a very valuable insight into the complexities of best interests, and 
why it poses so many difficulties in interpretation.  Essentially they distinguish between the 
different elements that comprise patient-centred principles for deciding for others: (1) 
underlying ethical values – primarily related to the individual, although they acknowledge 
that others may be relevant; (2) guidance principles – “principles that provide substantive 
direction as to how decisions are to be made”,
42
 including the specific concepts of advance 
directive, substituted judgment, and best interests (which is defined as “acting so as to 
promote maximally the good of the individual”);
43
 (3) authority principles – those relating to 
who should make the decision; and (4) intervention principles – the principles specifying 
when those in institutional roles may intervene, such as physicians, courts, and government 
protective agencies.  Using their framework, this thesis evaluates a guidance principle, best 
interests, when intervention principles by the courts are invoked.  However, as the authors 
identify, these principles do not exist in isolation from each other, and distinguishing them as 
they do makes it easier to see how easily they can be conflated.
44
  By using the five themes 
identified from the end-of-life cases – and looking at best interests from different aspects 
according to these themes – an attempt is made to avoid this possibility of conflation.   
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Five Themes in Prospective, End-of-Life Cases 
This thesis focuses on a clearly defined set of prospective, end-of-life cases, from the four 
jurisdictions of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.  Initial critique 
showed that there were a number of ways these cases could be categorised.  Appendix One is 
a table of the majority of cases that could be identified as fitting within the criteria outlined in 
Chapter One, listed in numerical order by the year of the judgment.  These cases are further 
sorted into three basic divisions, on the basis that the decision at the centre of the cases was 
about a proposed or disputed treatment action which could be described as either: future 
provision of life-prolonging treatment, withdrawal of treatment, or an operation.  This action 
was then ruled on by the court.  Further to the dispute in each case was consideration of 
whether the action was recommended by the medical profession, and whether the family were 
in agreement with this recommendation.  
From this extensive canvassing a clear pattern emerged, which can be applied to a large 
number of the cases.
45
  Essentially inconsistencies across the cases were observed, resulting 
in five specific themes being developed from this analysis.  The identification of these themes 
initially justified further evaluation of how well the judges applied the best interests test, and 
can also be utilised to demonstrate both the definable aspects of the principle and the 
difficulties that best interests presents.  Three overall conclusions are presented by (a), (b) 
and (c), with the specific themes (1) – (5) organised under each heading.   
(a) End-of-life decision-making is problematic, and illustrative of: 
(1) a complex relationship between law and ethics. 
(b) Best interests is a complex and multi-layered concept, as demonstrated by:  
(2 value-laden and inconsistent use of language; 
(3) the same conclusions being reached in cases, despite differences in individual 
judges’ reasoning;  and  
(4) frequent discussion of, and reliance upon, ancillary guidance such as academic 
commentary.   
(c) The legal framework within each jurisdiction is inadequate, or inadequately 
applied as illustrated by:  
(5) convoluted use of legal principles.   
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The first two themes are primarily a descriptive exercise, so, rather than providing an account 
of numerous quotations from the wide range of available data, two influential end-of-life 
cases, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (Bland) and In Re A (Children) (Re A), have been relied 
on to illustrate these themes.
46
  Each theme is discussed separately, and the last theme will 
incorporate a summary of the overall legal framework in order to demonstrate the 
inadequacy. 
Complex Relationship Between Law and Ethics 
“The issue of end of life decisions remains a thorny one.”
47
 
End-of-life cases raise a myriad of ethical issues.  There is, in all likelihood, an overlap in 
these difficult cases which make decisions about life and death, between what might be 
considered ethical reasoning and what might be considered legal reasoning.  Any extended 
exposition to identify what exactly constitutes ‘ethical’ and what is ‘legal’ is not necessary, 
except as a means of highlighting the difficult task that judges face.  In a large number of the 
cases, judges acknowledge the ethical component of the case, noting that it is the 
complexities brought about by the ethical issues that make it so difficult.  Part of this 
difficulty lies in the nature of the relationship between law and ethics.  This has always been 
an intensely contested area with a large amount of work already dedicated to this very 
question, and therefore it can only be addressed with a narrow scope for the purposes of this 
thesis.  A brief overview, which provides the main features of what constitutes law and what 
constitutes moral, is, however, useful for the overall discussion.   
In his book, Responsibility in Law and Morality, Cane establishes two normative domains – 
law and morality.
48
  The jurisprudence on what constitutes a ‘law’ is formidable, so trying to 
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marry this, with what is ‘moral’ is part of the difficulty when trying to define a concept, best 
interests, that is used in both domains.  A relatively simplistic interpretation would be to say 
that because the judges are ruling on these cases, then what they are doing is ‘law-making’, 
ergo it is law.  But with further elaboration of what it actually means to be law, the 
complexity of the issue emerges.  Because something is law that does not necessarily make it 
right or morally correct.
49
  For the purposes of this thesis the rightness or moral authority of 
the law in these cases is not at issue.  The law can be described as being law by legislation 
and law by adjudication.
50
  The decision-makers in these latter cases are judges; their 
judgments are documented, and are able to be read and analysed as representative of their 
jurisdictions.  This is because law is institutionalised, for example by parliament, the 
judiciary and police.  By comparison, much within the moral domain is not.
51
   
Trying to define morality is therefore even more problematic as it does not have comparable 
formal institutions to fall back on.  With a specific concept such as best interests to refer to 
though, it is possible to state that evaluating what interests matter, and questions as to how 
they should be balanced, and what interests should be prioritised, unquestionably invokes 
ethics because evaluating and weighing up interests invokes ethical values.
52
  If the person 
was previously competent it also invokes the possibility that the substitute decision-maker 
should respect their autonomy, and this necessitates deciphering how this should happen.
53
  
The usual practice is that if the patient had stated their wishes prior to becoming incompetent 
on what they would want to happen to them, these are followed.  But this possibility raises 
many more questions, discussed in Chapters Four and Five, about how these prior views are 
utilised in a way that does respect the individual.   
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Some commentators call the intersection of these difficult legal cases with ethical issues an 
opportunity for judges to comment on difficult moral issues.  Lee and Morgan argue that 
judges should use this opportunity to make moral issues clearer, in what they call “stigmata 
cases”.  Criteria for stigmata cases include that they be ethically challenging, and they also 
require the courts to develop a moral vision; therefore it is a term which could also apply to 
the end-of-life cases in this thesis.
54
  Veitch does not necessarily disagree with the view that 
judges should comment on moral issues, but points out that judges have been reluctant to use 
this so-called opportunity.
55
   
It is at this extreme end of difficulty with judicial decision-making that a tension inherent in 
these kinds of cases comes to the fore.  There is a tension between a requirement of 
predictability as a measure of success in a common law system, whilst still maintaining 
suitable flexibility.  One of the manifestations of this tension is provided by the 
acknowledgement of the existence of ethical issues.  This is the most elementary of the five 
themes identified in this thesis.  If the judges themselves acknowledge this struggle then it is 
an important starting point for looking at cases that use ethical principles.  The impartiality of 
judges is one way that consistency of decision-making manifests, and it is one of the core 
principles of the legal system which Henaghan alluded to in his inaugural professorial 
address: 
“I am sure you would want the judge to be as impartial as humanly possible and listen 
fairly to both sides of the case and treat them with equal respect. You would want to 
know that the result you received would have been the same no matter who the judge 




Acknowledgement of Ethical Issues 
A common way that the complexity of the relationship between law and ethics surfaces in 
end-of-life cases is not only in the acknowledgement of the co-relation between the two 
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domains, but also in the existence of ethical issues.  In Bland most of the judges discussed 
this in some way or another: 
“This appeal obviously raises acute problems of ethics, but this should 
not obscure the fact that it is also exceptionally difficult in point of law”.
57
   
“This case clearly raises serious moral, medical and ethical issues.”
58
  
“The present appeal raises moral, legal and ethical questions of a profound and 
fundamental nature, questions literally of life and death.”
59
  
Likewise, in Re A the judges also acknowledged the legal and ethical challenges: 
“I freely confess to having found it exceptionally difficult to decide – difficult 
because of the scale of the tragedy for the parents and the twins, difficult for the 
seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of moral and ethical values and difficult because 
the search for settled legal principle has been especially arduous and conducted under 
real pressure of time.”
60
 
Whether judges should strive to align their judgments with moral considerations is a 
contested jurisprudential issue.  Some argue that no difference should exist between what is 
right and what is legal:  
“I think it would be not only lawful but right to let Anthony Bland die… This is not 




Not all judges recognised the potential conflict between ethical and legal issues however, and 
in a case where the issue was continuation of treatment for an infant, Holman J stated that his 
job was to apply the law without concerning himself about the ethical issues: 
“I wish to stress and make clear, however, that I myself am not concerned with any 
ethical issues which may surround this case.  My task, difficult enough in itself, is to 
decide, and only to decide, where the objective balance of the best interests of M lies. 
If I decide that it is not in his overall best interests to continue with a given form of 
treatment, in particular with continuous pressure ventilation, then I must say so; and it 
will follow as a matter of law (and I will declare) that it is lawful to withdraw or 
withhold that form of treatment.  The ethical decision whether actually to withdraw or 
withhold it must be made by the doctors concerned.  Judges are neither qualified to 
make, nor required, nor entitled to make ethical judgments or decisions.”
62
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Therefore, as well as the acknowledgment of ethical issues, there is a tension between judges 
who think no difference should be discerned between law and ethics (as per Hoffmann LJ) 
and judges who think that law and morality are, at the end of the day, separate things (as per 
Holman J).   
The complex relationship between law and ethics is undoubtedly an important factor in the 
decision-making process in these end-of-life cases, and it is a factor which is integral to the 
difficulties that these cases present.  The next section expands on this, concluding that there 
are three themes related to substitute decision-making which demonstrate that best interests is 
a complicated term: (1) value-laden and inconsistent use of language; (2) differences in 
outcome with the same reasoning; and (3) ancillary guidance.   
Best Interests as a Multi-Faceted Concept 
Value-laden and Inconsistent Use of Language 
Expanding on Wittgenstein’s view that “Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of 
our intelligence by means of language”, Crouch and Elliott discuss the relationship of 
language to philosophical thought: 
“Language bewitches our intelligence by suggesting to us certain ways of thinking 
about philosophical matters.  The manner in which we ask and answer questions, use 
metaphors, and offer descriptions all subtly influence the way in which we think about 
the world.  Because we do not have a clear overview of our language, we can easily 
be led into philosophical confusion.”
63
 
One way that this bewitchment is noticeable in end-of-life judgments is in the notable use of 
language.  During the course of this thesis various terminology is used, but care has been 
taken to describe what is meant by these terms.
64
  The following examples illustrate: (1) that 
different terms can be used for the same concept, or be mistaken for a similar concept; and 
(2) language, by its very nature, is value-laden and the words chosen and the way they are 
used reflect and influence the perceptions of individuals.  The first example of the complexity 
which language provokes is found with the use of the terms competence and capacity.  In 
Chapter Four it is shown that these are often used to indicate the same meanings, but what is 
important is not which term is used but that the person using it is clear about how they are 
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using it, and what meanings they are applying to it.  As another example, the term substitute 
decision-making can be confused with the principles required for substituted judgment: both 
require a substitute decision-maker, however substitute decision-making can refer to any 
proxy decision-maker, including those evaluating best interests and those making a 
substituted judgment for an incompetent person.
65
   
An example of language being value-laden is provided in the phrase persistent vegetative 
state; it has been criticised for being erroneous and misleading, which may be justified.
66
  
Perhaps the difficulty with PVS is because although it may seem that it is descriptive, it may 
also be evaluative of a patient’s state.  The use of the words “vegetative state” may influence 
the perceptions, and subsequently lead to assumptions, regarding the value of the life of that 
person in a PVS, namely that they are of little value.  It could also convey a confidence 
(perhaps falsely) in the certainty of the prognosis.  Nevertheless this term is used extensively 
in this thesis, because it is the predominant terminology referred to in judgments.  It is not 
always important which particular word or phrase is used.  Instead, the significance could lie 
in recognition of the range of other possible interpretations, and the fact that any word or 
phrase should be questioned as to its neutrality.   
Language is something that is very personal, and judges are not immune to this.  The personal 
nature of language does not, however, invalidate the following observations that can be made.  
Expanding on the idea that all language can be perceived in different ways with different 
connotations, and that it is not possible to avoid this, it has to be recognised that it is also 
possible to use it in a detrimental way.  In a number of the cases an abundance of value-laden 
terminology was found: words, phrases and metaphors that seemed to exist outside the scope 
of what would be expected in legal judgments.  If emotive language being used this seems at 
odds with the impartiality expected of the legal profession.  Is the language ‘value-laden’?  
Are the judges using language which implies a moral judgment?  For example, Lords 
Browne-Wilkinson and Keith use the imagery of Anthony Bland in a state of “living death”.
67
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This could be described as language which attempts to convey some emotional reaction 
(perhaps ‘horror’ to the idea of ‘living death’).  At other times it may be an attempt to convey 
the comprehension of the judge, for example the description of Anthony Bland as “alive but 
has no life at all”.
68
  Other times judges make personal statements, often to convey to the 
patient’s family their personal sympathies. 
“It may be no great comfort to them to know that in fact my heart bleeds for them.”
69
 
Bolstering the viewpoint that there is a need for awareness of language, some of the judges 
recognised the possible difficulties, exemplified by Butler-Sloss LJ:  
“we have to rid ourselves of emotional overtones and emotive language which do not 
assist in elucidating the profound questions which require to be answered.”
70
   
This was also discussed in Re A by the three appellate judges who all indicated (in various 
ways) that they were not comfortable with the phrase “monstrous births” to describe 
conjoined twins.
71
  Brooke LJ quoted Williams:  
“There is, indeed some kind of legal argument that a ‘monster’ is not protected even 
under the existing law.  This argument depends upon the very old legal writers, 




But why does there need to be any mention of ‘monsters’ in reference to the conjoined twins?   
There would probably, and quite rightly, be outrage today if there was a case about a child 
with Down syndrome, and the judge stated the use of mongol is not acceptable.  Any 
reference to this word would be seen as prejudicial.  An appeal court judge, in the earliest 
prospective end-of-life case identified, did refer to a child with Down syndrome as a mongol:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consider her husband’s condition to be a “living death”, in the eyes of the law, he remains a human being. As 
such, he is entitled to remain alive, with the assistance of life support measures, until such time as she feels there 
is no further hope for his recovery.” 
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“The shock to caring parents finding that they have given birth to a child who is a 
mongol is very great indeed, and therefore while great weight ought to be given to the 
views of the parents they are not views which necessarily must prevail.”
 73
    
The interpretation of value-laden or emotive language should of course include an element of 
relativity.  In 1981 it seems plausible that mongol was a commonly used term.  However, 
closer inspection shows that there had been controversy over the word since the 1960s and it 
had been increasingly out of use since then.
74
  Therefore, mongol may simply have been used 
as an archaic diagnostic term, or it may be that Templeman J’s choice of language was 
indicative of values on his part.   
The claim here is that awareness of value-laden language must be present for full 
transparency in judgments, not that it is possible to discuss this type of case avoiding any 
emotive overtones.  There will always be judges who have more colourful expressions than 
others:  
“Certainly, there could always be hope but for Mrs. Holland it was sadly scant.  Mrs.  




As well as the initial distancing from ‘monsters’ in Re A, on even a cursory reading the 
language and metaphors used can be described as evocative.  Ward LJ compared the case to 
that of one where parents starved their child to death, questioning whether the principle in 
either case was different.
76
  He also used a metaphor of parents at a concentration camp 
choosing which child to save:  
“In my judgment, parents who are placed on the horns of such a terrible dilemma 
simply have to choose the lesser of their inevitable loss.  If a family at the gates of a 
concentration camp were told they might free one of their children but if no choice 
were made both would die, compassionate parents with equal love for their twins 
would elect to save the stronger and see the weak one destined for death pass through 
the gates.”
77
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The first problem with this is the unfortunate imagery of a concentration camp and reference 
to a situation which has no relevance whatsoever to the case.  Secondly, he makes several 
leaps of logic and presumptions about moral issues: that the parents would make a choice, 
that they would save the stronger child, that the weaker child is destined for death, and that to 
make this choice is morally acceptable or correct because it means they are compassionate 
parents with equal love for their children.
78
   
It may be unfair to infer so much from an analogy.  It is possible to isolate and compare 
certain features of cases without claiming that they are similar in all respects; the doctrine of 
precedent necessitates this (albeit that it was not being used in the above example).  Ward 
LJ’s moral conclusions in the previous example may not owe much to the language he used, 
so much as the analogy he drew and assumptions he relied on.  A better example may be in 
the following excerpt, where Ward LJ might be argued to have used evocative imagery, as 
well as a questionable analogy, to support his conclusion:  
“Mary uses Jodie’s heart and lungs to receive and use Jodie’s oxygenated blood. This 
will cause Jodie’s heart to fail and cause Jodie’s death as surely as a slow drip of 




The use of language – words, phrases, terms, metaphors – is important to the overall 
consideration of dissecting ‘best interests’.  Why is it such a complicated term?  Part of the 
reason is that it is imbued with different values, different interpretations, and different 
analyses.  As language plays a significant part in this, it needs to be understood from the 
outset that the impact of decisions regarding language is an important consideration.  
Differences in Outcome With the Same Reasoning 
The third theme that emerged from closer inspection of the end-of-life cases is crucial; it is 
the observation that, although judges are reaching the same conclusion, they are basing this 
decision on very different reasoning.
80
  Whilst discrepancy is not unusual in such difficult 
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cases, the degree of differences, coupled with how widespread these differences are, 
highlights the justification for further examination of best interests.  The differences in 
reasoning are not confined to consideration of the best interests test, but overwhelmingly this 
is where the most confused, complex and inconsistent reasoning occurred.  Other issues, such 
as examination of the sanctity of life principle, also demonstrated different reasoning, 
however it is often discussed more shallowly and sparingly.
81
  Appendix Two provides a 
flow-chart documenting in detail the justification for this claim, and how the various 
permutations of this theme emerge.   
This is not an original observation, and other commentators have remarked on the lack of 
cohesive reasoning in these difficult end-of-life cases.
82
  This thesis, however, furthers these 
investigations by identifying it as a trend across a large number of prospective, end-of-life 
cases.  The acknowledgment that judges use different reasoning, to reach the same 
conclusion, essentially acts as a conduit for recognising a very important point: best interests 
is a concept that is applied and interpreted in many different ways.  This may be due to the 
fact that judges have rarely engaged explicitly with the notion of interests, which is a lot more 
complex than they may perceive.  It is this underlying, contestable utilisation by the courts of 
best interests which forms the basis for this thesis.  After a taxonomy of interests is 
established in the next chapter, Chapters Five, Six and Seven employ these distinctions to 
explore very specific differences of reasoning regarding best interests: how best interests is 
applied, who the concept applies to and how it should be applied, which interests matter and 
which do not.   
The recognition of different reasoning in the judgments links into the last two themes 
identified.  Miola noted that two aspects stood out in the Bland judgment: (1) there was a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
how it was used.  Lord Mustill (and perhaps Lord Keith) found that Anthony Bland had no interests and 
therefore his best interests in being kept alive no longer existed.  This narrow approach will be discussed in 
Chapter Six.  Lord Goff found that Anthony Bland did still have interests but that could be discontinued as 
prolongation of treatment was no longer in his interests.  Lords Lowry and Browne-Wilkinson seemed to agree 
with this approach.   
81
 For example in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789: The assertion by Sir Thomas Bingham in the 
Court of Appeal that  “profound respect for the sanctity of human life is embedded in our law and our moral 
philosophy” is echoed in the other judgments.  Eight of the nine judges did refer to sanctity of life, and they all 
acknowledged its importance and supported the view that it can be overridden by other factors.  However, the 
differences outnumbered this similarity.  For example, there was no one place that is pointed to that it is derived 
from.  Hoffmann LJ said it was intuitive; Lord Goff said legislation; Lords Keith and Mustill said the State.   
82
 For example: Jose Miola Medical Ethics and Medical Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, 2007); 
Rebecca Dresser "Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients" (1994) 46  Rutgers L Rev 609; 




wide range of approaches regarding the amount of ethical guidance the judges cited; and (2) 
there was variation in how much law creation the judges were engaged in, and how they 
reached their conclusion.
83
  Both of these aspects are variants on the next two themes 
discussed: the appeal to sources outside legal sources and the corresponding paucity of legal 
precedent or legislation that is relied on.   
Ancillary Guidance 
“Where old law must be adapted to new circumstances, and where new law must be 
developed, ethical guidance is essential.”
84
 
It is not uncommon, unusual or even unconventional for judges to refer to supplementary 
texts, such as those written by academic lawyers.  It is, however, indicative of complex 
issues, and therefore it is one component to revealing the difficulty of a case.   
Some commentators on medico-legal writing argue for greater use of non-legal materials: 
“If it were more generally recognized that the main significance of precedents is 
information rather than authority, judges and lawyers might make greater use than 




In Bland Hoffmann LJ acknowledged the assistance he received from Professor Bernard 
Williams, and also quoted Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty, an excerpt which in turn 
refered to Kant.  Hoffmann LJ attributed some of his thinking to the manuscript of Dworkin’s 
Life’s Dominion, and (in a rather circular manoever) in the published version of the book 
Dworkin refered to the Bland case: 
“Lord Justice Hoffmann, in a strikingly philosophical opinion said ... that even though 
respect for the sanctity of life might argue in favor of keeping him alive, respect for 




In Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James (James) the use of extraneous 
texts is noteworthy.  Sir Alan Ward discussed Keown and Finnis and the vitalist view, in 
order to decide whether the treatment was futile.
87
  Keown is also discussed in relation to 
vitalism in Re A: (life is absolute and cannot shorten it or fail to lengthen it) and the right to 
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life is defined with reference to Keown.
88
  This statement is stand alone and not followed up 
in any way, and seems very much at odds with the surrounding text.  It is interesting how 
often Keown has been quoted in legal judgments, especially as he is seen as on the 
conservative end of the scale in many academic fields.
89
 
The use of the additional non-legal sources is therefore common.  But is there anything 
wrong with it?  Foster and Miola argue that the use of such guidance is self-serving, given 
that it is possible to find arguments for any decision: 
“Professional medical ethics, if used at all, has been as often as not used as a tool to 




With the knowledge that judges are referring to extraneous texts, and that these texts are from 
medical ethical discourse, in the following section there is discussion about some of the 
questions raised by these cases to show why judges may be referring to other sources.  There 
is also discussion about two particular changes in our society which have necessitated 
different responses in relation to the assessment of best interests; the advance of medical 
technology and the increased respect for a person’s autonomy.   
Best Interests in Relation to Ethical Principles 
“The best interests standard has been widely used both in and beyond health care.”
91
 
As stated in the introduction, an incompetent patient’s best interests cannot be considered in 
isolation.  To assess best interests it is necessary to ascertain what the person’s interests are, 
and evaluate what would then be in their best interests.  The notion of best interests is 
predicated on the idea that as a society we should do good, or at the very least not cause 
harm, to individuals, and it is therefore based in beneficence, or the principle by which we 
want to ‘do good’ by the patient.
92
  The emphasis is not only what is generally good, but what 
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is good for the individual patient.  There is little doubt that some form of value system is 
necessary for the evaluation of best interests:  
Any assessment of an individual’s best interests must be based on an underlying value 




Sometimes it is not easy to decipher what the harms and benefits are in a particular case, 
especially in the end-of-life cases which are the focus of this thesis.  Do we want to act with 
beneficence or is non-maleficence a high enough standard?  For example, where is the harm 
in letting a patient die?  How do we measure quality of life?  Consequently the link between 
ethics and best interests comes when looking at its application, and for the purposes of this 
thesis its application in legal cases.  What constitutes interests?  Are they physical, emotional 
or spiritual?  Do they include interests after death?  What kinds of things are considered to be 
interests of a permanently insensate patient or a minor?  Why should we care what is 
considered?  Is there another way of looking at the best interests of a patient?  What 
principles are at work here?  Do you have to have personhood to have interests?  If so what 
constitutes personhood?  Who gets to be the decision-maker?  Is it the doctors, the family or 
the courts?  Once the interests are identified, what weight should they be given?  Should there 
be a hierarchy?  All of these questions invoke an evaluation and reference to some sort of 
values, usually ethical values, in order to be answered.  Furthermore, many can be answered 
by consideration of what an interest is, who has them and identifying where they come from, 
all of which are discussed in the next chapter.  Although decisions have been made on behalf 
of the incompetent for centuries, the emphasis on their best interests and what those interests 
entail have necessarily changed dramatically due to: (1) advances in medical science (the 
prospective end-of-life cases have only been possible due to advances such as ventilators and 
ANH),
94
 and (2) the increased respect for a patient’s autonomy.   
Advances in medical science have effectively created this prospective nature of law-making 
whereby treatment decisions about whether to keep patients ‘alive but not living’ need to be 
made.  It has created the dichotomy between ‘what we can do’ and ‘what we ought to do’.
95
   
“Death, for some, is an end; death, for others, is a beginning; death, for all, is the 
unavoidable outcome of birth, the natural completion of life.  Medical treatment and 
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technology can remedy some illnesses one encounters along life’s path, but medical 
treatment cannot alter the inevitability of death.  The past half century has seen, 
however, significant developments in the ability of medical technology to prolong 
existence, delay death, and create conditions where the final phases of life risk 
becoming overly medicalized.  Consequently, as a person advances closer towards 
death, issues arise about what medical assistance should be administered.”
96
 
Just because doctors can keep a person alive in a PVS indefinitely, should they?  What 
treatment burdens should a patient be subjected to?  How should their quality of life be 
assessed?  All of these are ethical questions that are inherent in any weighing up of best 
interests.  It must also be noted that there is a complex relationship between these difficult 
cases and the duty of care as predicated on a reasonable medical opinion.  Oftentimes the 
recommended provision of treatment, or withdrawal, or withholding, is done based on the 
medical profession’s duty to life sustaining care, and their corresponding duty to not burden 
the patient where there is no hope of recovery.   
The second shift is the accumulative respect for a patient’s autonomy, which has, at times, 
been touted as the weightiest of considerations in the last few decades (although there has 
more recently been some resistance to this).
97
  When looking at the best interests of 
incompetent persons, autonomy may not be an obvious competing factor.  How can a person 
exercise their autonomy when they cannot communicate any of their views?  As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the pervasiveness and influence of autonomy is so strong that it appears judges 
are trying to adhere to it when it is technically impossible to do so.  This is because it is 
considered to be upheld within the concept of best interests when deciding that a patient’s 
prior, competent views should be given weight.
98
  It is also a way to keep the focus on the 
individual.  There are other considerations, those of other-regarding interests, that can, and 
perhaps should, be made and this idea is explored in Chapters Three and Seven.   
The last theme discussed explains to some extent why the courts have appealed to sources 
other than legal precedent or statutes; namely that there is a scarcity of these resources. 
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Inadequacy of Existing Law  
“We do not ask for work but we have a duty to decide what parties with a proper 
interest ask us to decide… Deciding disputed matters of life and death is surely and 
pre-eminently a matter for a court of law to judge.  That is what courts are here for.”
99
 
This section sets out the theme identified in relation to the law governing best interests.  
Following that the general legal principle of parens patriae is discussed, which is informed by 
an exploration of the differences between the two predominant ways to make decision about 
an incompetent person in common law jurisdictions: the best interests and substituted 
judgment tests.  The substituted judgment test is one that is crucial to the understanding of 
best interests as it relates to the formerly competent patient’s expressed wishes, therefore the 
particular focus is on how prior views are factored into legislation.  Finally, each country’s 
specific case law and legislation is examined – within certain parameters – and how the best 
interests test has been utilised is discussed.   
The cases examined can all be similarly classified as indeterminate.  Whilst all cases that go 
before the courts are indeterminate to some extent, the lack of certainty associated with the 
cases in this thesis may be more exaggerated where there is no established legal precedent or 
settled reasoning process upon which to base the decision-making.  It is also presumed that an 
increased predictability of the outcome corresponds with a decreased likelihood in reaching 
the courts.
100
  To reach a decision, judges use legal reasoning, which at a very basic level 
means that statutory interpretation and the use of precedent are employed.
101
  Where there is 
no legislation or precedent for the judge to determine from, it is suggested that there are three 
possible approaches: (1) arguing from analogy – using binding precedent from cases with 
similar facts that established broad enough principles; (2) following persuasive precedent 
from similar jurisdictions; and (3) considering public policy and dispensing justice as 
befitting the society they are in.
102
  Some of these characteristics are lacking in the group of 
cases analysed, which leads to the conclusion that there may be something besides legal 
reasoning being utilised; perhaps something closer to ethical reasoning.  The difficulty is, of 
course, in defining what is meant by ethical or legal reasoning.  A working definition of these 
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terms could be advanced, for example the way that permanently incompetent was defined in 
Chapter One.  But the legitimacy in doing this lies with how nothing in particular hangs on 
how the terms are defined.  Since this thesis contends that transparency with terms is an issue, 
it would then be hypocritical to confuse the issues with personal suggestions regarding what 
is relevant.  Instead, an attempt is made to show how the terms are analysed by the courts.  It 
is therefore problematic to outline an extensive exposition on the definitions of legal and 
ethical reasoning since these cover such a vast array of philosophies that there can be no 
definitive answer.  Instead, the subject matter is discussed irrespective of the type of 
reasoning someone may assign to it.  Some may call what the judges are doing legal 
reasoning, some may call it ethical reasoning – it is actually irrelevant to this thesis, but it is 
important to acknowledge that some commentators would describe the reasoning utilised in 
these difficult cases as resembling something closer to ethical reasoning than legal reasoning.   
A fundamental question emerged from the cases: to what extent are the judges referring to 
precedent or statutes as the basis for their reasoning?  The contention, regarding inadequacy 
of law, arises from an observation that in some cases there is very little discussion of statute 
law, or precedent, that the judges rely upon to reach decisions.  This was particularly true, as 
might be expected, in earlier cases in which some of these end-of-life issues were still being 
negotiated.  Often this was acknowledged by judges who stated their reluctance for court 
involvement, and that the matter should be legislated by parliament.
103
  If they are not relying 
on precedent or statute then what are they using to reach their conclusions?  This led to the 
deduction that often judges relied on very different doctrines or interpretations of the same 
concept, which was often best interests.  They also at times did not even agree on how to 
apply best interests, and Re A is a good example of this as the judges disagreed as to whether 
the operation was in both twins’ best interests.  It is also a good example of judges relying on 
a variety of legal doctrines (bodily integrity, doctrine of necessity, self-defence) to justify 
separating the conjoined twins.
104
  This also ties into the above theme regarding different 
reasoning to get to the same conclusion.   
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The following sections set out the general law regarding end-of-life so that the gaps can be 
identified.  Discussion of the legislation and case law is presented as it applies to incompetent 
patients needing end-of-life care, and this does not negate the general theme outlined, but 
rather bolsters the observation.  First, there will be a discussion of parens patriae, which is 
the historical jurisdiction for protecting an incompetent person, followed by an illustration of 
the main difference between best interests and the other main guidance principle, substituted 
judgment.  From here the importance of a person’s prior competent view emerges as an 
essential consideration for Chapter Five.  Finally, there is a brief overview of the law in each 
of the four jurisdictions focused upon in this thesis. 
Parens Patriae Jurisdiction  
Parens patriae jurisdiction is an instrument of the court that enables it to make decisions on 
behalf of any person who is deemed to be incompetent.  Specifically, it places the court under 
a duty to protect those who are unable to protect themselves.  It is an ancient power of the 
courts, dating back as far as the thirteenth century.
105
  It originated from the upper class’ duty 
towards those in need of protection; these were typically aristocracy with obligations to serfs 
on their land:  
“Under it the Crown as parens patriae had both the power and the duty to protect the 
persons and property of those unable to do so for themselves”.
106
   
Parens patriae jurisdiction is an instrument that is still used by the courts today.  In New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada it can apply either to children or to adults who are 
incompetent.  However, in England and Wales it applies solely to children.
107
  There is also 
some doubt whether parens patriae is a substitute for parental powers or derived from the 
State’s duty to protect their citizens.
108
   
When considering the application of parens patriae powers it appears that the courts are 
required to use the incompetent person’s best interests as their main consideration.  They are 
making a decision because the person is unable to do so themselves, and they do so using that 
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person’s best interests as the guiding principle.  However, parens patriae provides little 
guidance in determining what those best interests are, except as it provides a historical 
jurisdiction to the judiciary who are able to invoke it to protect those who are unable to 
protect themselves.   
Guidance Principles: Best Interests and Substituted Judgment 
There are two approaches to how decision-making for incompetent adults is discussed in 
common law jurisdictions: whether to make the decision based on a person’s best interests or 
whether this decision is made using substituted judgment.  Chapters Four and Five 
demonstrate that this distinction is an important one, and it is referred to extensively in this 
thesis.  Substituted judgment is the test for incapacitated adults most widely used in the 
United States,
109
 while New Zealand, England and Wales, Scotland, Australia and Canada all 
adopt the best interests approach (with some variances in some of the different states in 
Australia and Canada).
110
   
Similar to best interests, substituted judgment does not have a clear definition.  The usual 
interpretation of substituted judgment is that the substitute decision-maker makes the decision 
based on what the patient themselves would have wanted when they were capable.
111
  This is 
distinguished from substituting the decision-maker’s judgment for that of the individual’s.   
“Substituted judgment is an approach that requires the decision maker to attempt, as 
far possible, to make the decision the represented person would have made if they did 
not have impaired capacity.”
112
 
Therefore, the ethical foundations for substitute judgment are mostly linked to autonomy, as 
articulated in a report from the Victoria Law Reform Committee: 
“Jeremy Moore, President of the South Australian Guardianship Board, has argued 
that a substituted judgment approach ‘ensures the greatest respect is given to the 
autonomy of the represented person’, and allows the person to ‘live the life they 
would have lived, but for the incapacity’.”
113
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This differs from the emphasis of best interests whereby the substitute decision-maker takes 
into account all the patient’s interests.  This is why best interests was shown to be linked to 
the ethical value of beneficence (rather than to autonomy) in the previous discussion of the 
theme relating to ancillary guidance.  It could be argued that under a best interests test the 
substitute decision-maker takes a more objective view of the patient’s condition in weighing 
up best interests.  However, sometimes there is little difference between the two in practice; 
this theme is explored extensively in Chapter Five.  At the very least it can be said that 
current common law principles, and some legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
(MCA) include a person’s views in a consideration of their best interests, whereas this is the 
main priority in a substituted judgment test.
114
  Chapter Six outlines the various 
interpretations of best interests and concludes that the best interests test is most often 
interpreted as a qualified-objective test, whereby objective and subjective elements are taken 
into account, and this is especially true if the person was previously competent.  Because 
previously expressed competent views are a crucial part of understanding what a person’s 
best interests may be, the following section expands on where, and how, prior views are 
considered in the various jurisdictions.     
Prior Views 
Since 1991 there has been judicial recognition that somebody’s prior views and values can be 
informative for an assessment of their current best interests, as advanced by the English case 
Re J.
115
  There have been legislative changes in the area of incompetent patients over the last 
couple of decades, and these laws require substitute decision-makers to make their decision 
under guidance as to what the incompetent person’s previous wishes were.  There are two 
main approaches to incorporating previous wishes.  The first is that these prior views are 
considered alongside other factors, and this is currently the law in the England and Wales and 
in New Zealand.  In England and Wales the MCA s 4 (6) (c) requires consideration of “the 
other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so”.
116
  Under New 
Zealand’s Health and Disability Commissioner Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers’ Rights Regulation 1996 (Code of Patient Rights), Right 7 provides that the 
decision should be made: “consistent with the informed choice the consumer would make if 
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he or she were competent”.
117
  The best interests of the patient is the core guiding principle 
for decisions made by substitute decision-makers in most Australian jurisdictions.  Currently 
in Victoria the wishes of the patient and the family members must be taken into account, 
along with considerations about the actual treatment.
118
  In New South Wales (NSW) the 
general principles laid out in the Guardianship Act 1987 require the views of the patient to be 
taken into consideration.
119
  The second approach was alluded to earlier – a test that is 
effectively substitute judgment; this is currently in place in South Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) and Queensland.  In South Australia, under the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1993, (GAA Qld) s 5 (a) “consideration (and this will be the paramount 
consideration) must be given to what would, in the opinion of the decision maker, be the 
wishes of the person in the matter”.
120
  However, there must be “reasonably ascertainable 
evidence” upon which to base the decision.  The ACT adopts an approach that prioritises a 
person’s “wishes” over their “interests”, but not if doing so will adversely affect their 
interests.
121
  In Queensland, the general principles of guardianship are “maximum 
participation, minimal limitations and substituted judgment”:  
(4) Also, the principle of substituted judgment must be used so that if, from the 
adult’s previous actions, it is reasonably practicable to work out what the adult’s 
views and wishes would be, a person or other entity in performing a function or 
exercising a power under this Act must take into account what the person or other 
entity considers would be the adult’s views and wishes (6) Views and wishes may be 
expressed orally, in writing or in another way, including, for example, by conduct.
122
  
In Ontario, Canada, there is a two-tier system which prioritises the person’s expressed 
wishes, but also requires consideration of any other beliefs under the Health Care Consent 
Act 1996 (HCCA) s 21 (2) (a): “the values and beliefs that the person knows the incapable 
person held when capable and believes he or she would still act on if capable”.
123
  In s 28 (4) 
of the Manitoba Mental Health Act, a patient’s wishes are prioritised; if there is no 
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knowledge of any prior wishes, then the proxy decision-maker must make the decision 
guided by the patient’s best interests.
124
   
All of these provisions are relevant for discussion of prior views in Chapter Five.  Under the 
MCA, prior views have to be considered but there are no clear guidelines as to the weight 
given to these views (this has led to some confusion which is explored in this later chapter).  
South Australia’s Act is an example of a substituted judgment test as it clearly makes the 
patient’s prior wishes paramount.  New Zealand has very little guidance with only the Code 
of Patient Rights to reference.  Canada, similar to Australia, has various approaches in 
different states, Ontario’s is highlighted as it is pertinent to later discussion.   
Best Interests in Law 
“But neither law nor legal scholarship has provided an adequate theory of decision 
making for incompetents or a satisfactory analysis of competence.”
125
 
It is difficult to discuss the law on best interests at this introductory stage because the case 
law forms the basis of the analysis in subsequent chapters, and therefore the legal background 
is problematic to convey without duplicating information.  This is mainly because the data – 
the end-of-life cases examined – have two main purposes in this thesis: (1) they inform and 
are an important part of the common law, and are therefore an integral part of this chapter 
which looks at the concept of best interests; and (2) this same group of cases are subsequently 
used to analyse how well the judges are using best interests.  Consequently, the end-of-life 
judgments are part of the common law and require to be discussed as such, but these cases 
also form the data used to analyse how well the best interests test is being applied.  Two 
approaches have been used to disentangle the potential difficulty that this overlap between 
data and analysis might present.   
Firstly, Appendix Three has provided a précis of 31 cases from the different jurisdictions.  
Listed by country, each case’s facts have been summarised, with a particular focus on how 
best interests is utilised.
126
  Due to the volume of cases from the United Kingdom and 
Canada, cases from these countries were chosen based on their contribution to the 
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understanding of the best interests test, but the lower number identified from New Zealand 
and Australia resulted in nearly all of those being featured in Appendix Three.  Appendix 
One is a comprehensive list of the cases which informed this thesis.  It should be referred to 
for the following information: case name, year, court, country, condition, if the patient is a 
minor, the disputed action, what the decision was, whether the family agreed with the 
prospective action, whether the disputed or proposed action was recommended by doctors, 
and who the court instigator was.  The decisions that the courts faced were about a proposed 
or disputed action to treat (or not treat) the patient in some way with medical treatment.  
Those actions were further categorised into the type of end of life decision that was 
discussed: (1) an operation (for example to separate conjoined twins); (2) a device needing to 
be re-inserted (often a shunt or similar device); (3) future provision of life-prolonging 
treatment (often regarding administration of antibiotics, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
and use of a ventilator); and (4) withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment (often ANH or a 
ventilator).   
Secondly, this section focuses on the legislation dealing with best interests rather than the 
common law.  This fits in with the fifth theme identified, that there is a dearth of law from 
which judges can refer to inform decisions in these cases.  Obviously, precedent from the 
common law forms part of this picture, but the intention with these themes is to provide 
enough information to show that they are present, rather than a detailed exposition on every 
possible case that they apply to; this can be done without compromising the aim of this 
section which is a broad overview of the law as it relates specifically to best interests. 
This thesis deals with multiple jurisdictions, all of which have common law and legislative 
redress to the courts regarding the best interests of incompetent patients, both minors and 
adults.  With these complexities in mind this section has been set out as simply as possible for 
clarity.  A comprehensive account of the law is not the objective; consequently this section is 
descriptive, and highlights particular instances of best interests in cases, with the intention 
that the amount of detail given is sufficient to inform the remainder of the thesis.  A wide-
ranging discussion of all relevant legislation is also not beneficial here.  But what is needed is 
to point to the key legislation so that the indicators regarding use or lack of use of statutes can 
be more readily identified.  There is additional complexity for this when considering the 
legislation of Australia and Canada as they both have federal legal systems, whereby each 




states are they from and therefore which legislation does (or can) apply to the issues that the 
cases address.   
There are a number of ways that the prospective cases come to court.  For example, the 
family might disagree with a medical opinion,
127
 the family members may disagree with each 
other,
128
 or all parties involved might be unanimous in their views but are unsure if the 
proposed plan regarding treatment is legal or not.
129
  As well as these possibilities, there is a 
further complication regarding whether the patient is a minor or an adult lacking capacity.
130
  
If the patient is an adult, there are generally guardianship laws in each jurisdiction which 
apply.   
“The vast majority of Western societies have legal regimes that provide decision-
making mechanisms for adults with some kind of impaired capacity.”
131
 
Each jurisdiction has its own specific legislation, but they all provide in some way for those 
who are incapacitated.  Most allow for a competent person to make advance decisions, (such 
as an advance directive) and appointment of a substitute decision-maker in the case that they 
became incompetent.  If they have not done so then other powers, such as parens patriae, can 
be invoked by the court.   
In all cases it must be noted that best interests as a legal test has a different starting point 
from that of an ethical framework.  This is because the decisions are being made against the 
established precedent that consent is needed for treatment, and everybody has the right to 
refuse treatment.  Where there is no consent (as the person is unable), the test can be 
interpreted in two ways, but both involve clearing a threshold where the benefits outweigh 
the harms.  The first interpretation is that of a cross roads where the two possibilities are to 
treat, or not treat, and the ‘best’ path is chosen.  The second is justificatory, where there is a 
barrier that must be overcome.
132
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There have been few cases in New Zealand which fit within the criteria for this thesis, and in 
those few cases although there is clearly parens patriae jurisdiction it has been used rarely, 
declarations and orders under specific legislation being more frequent.  Parens patriae 
jurisdiction is vested in the High Court by s 17 of the Judicature Act 1908.
133
  By exercising 
this power, courts can make prospective decisions on behalf of all incompetent adults.  Peart 
and Gillett argue that the method of resolving such issues by declaratory powers instead of 
parens patriae is not ideal.  This is because the focus in declaratory powers is on the potential 
liability of the doctors rather than the best interests of the patient.
134
  
In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, Thomas J considered the submission 
regarding parens patriae powers, but he found that, while this jurisdiction existed in New 
Zealand, it was not necessary in this case to consider whether it should be invoked.
135
  The 
reasons for this conclusion were not entirely clear.  In Re G the judge decided to use the best 
interests test rather than substituted judgment, but also gave weight to Mr G’s prior views.
136
    
Specific legislation regarding decision-making for incompetent patients has not been 
addressed by the New Zealand Parliament for over twenty years.  Under existing legislation 
there are clear authority principles under which substitute decision-makers can be appointed.  
There are two formal means of appointing decision-makers: welfare guardians and enduring 
powers of attorney.  The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR Act) 
gives powers to welfare guardians for incompetent adults: 
18 (3) In exercising those powers, the first and paramount consideration of a welfare 
guardian shall be the promotion and protection of the welfare and best interests of the 
person for whom the welfare guardian is acting, while seeking at all times to 
encourage that person to develop and exercise such capacity as that person has to 
understand the nature and foresee the consequences of decisions relating to the 
personal care and welfare of that person, and to communicate such decisions.
137
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Under s 93A, the PPPR Act also enables a competent person to “grant to another person an 
enduring power of attorney to act in relation to the donor's personal care and welfare if the 
donor becomes mentally incapable”.  The same requirement to prioritise a person’s best 
interests applies to an individual with enduring powers of attorney under s 98A.  This is a 
relatively recent amendment, in 2008. 
The Code of Patient Rights is delegated legislation from the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994.  It gives ten rights to all New Zealand consumers in all health care 
services, and places obligations on all providers of those services to enable consumers to 
exercise those rights.  Right 7 is the right to give informed consent and make an informed 
choice.  It also provides guidance for when the patient is not competent:  
Right 7 (4) Where a consumer is not competent to make an informed choice and give 
informed consent, and no person entitled to consent on behalf of the consumer is 
available, the provider may provide services where –  
(a) it is in the best interests of the consumer; 
and 
(b) reasonable steps have been taken to ascertain the views of the consumer. 
The qualification under Right 7(4) that “no person entitled to consent on behalf of the 
consumer is available” means that it would apply to minors only when their parents were 
unavailable, (s 4 of New Zealand’s Care of the Children Act 2004 states that the child’s best 
interests are the paramount consideration in any decisions made under the Act)
138
 and 
incompetent adults where they had not appointed an enduring power of attorney or had a 
welfare guardian appointed for them.  Right 7 (4) (c) goes on to state that the provider must 
also have regard to the consumer’s views if they have been ascertained and make a decision 
that is “consistent with the informed choice the consumer would make”.  But if they are not 
known the provider may “take into account the views of other suitable persons who are 
interested in the welfare of the consumer”.  Section 7(4) therefore requires the decision-
maker to consider both the incompetent person’s best interests and take reasonable steps to 
ascertain their views, which is consistent with other jurisdictions.  It is important to note that 
the Code of Patient Rights applies to all providers of services – so it is the provider who is the 
decision-maker that is being referred to.   
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“To date there has been no analysis of how patients’ rights under the Code of Patient 
Rights fits within the adult guardianship law under the Protection of Personal and 




In Australia the parens patriae jurisdiction exists, but the use of guardianship orders and other 
legislation governing decision-making for those who are incompetent is more common.  
Every Australian State and Territory possesses legislation that governs substitute decision-
making for those who are incompetent.
140
  Unlike in New Zealand, in all of the Australian 
states a spouse can consent to some treatments.
141
  In Australia all jurisdictions’ legislation 
governing substitute decision-making includes consideration for the person’s prior wishes.  




In Re Marion the Australian Family Court considered the application regarding sterilisation 
for a teenaged girl, and it provides a starting point for the consideration of best interests test 
for minors in Australia.
143
  Nicholson CJ dissented in his judgment that all applications for 
sterilisation should go through the court, but this view was eventually upheld by the High 
Court.
144
  Furthermore, the best interests test for medical procedures on minors that 
Nicholson CJ put forward, when the case was referred back to the Family Court in Re Marion 
(No 2), was essentially codified by the Family Law Rules.
145
  Section 4.09 of the Family Law  
Rules sets out a list of considerations, including (2) “(c) the likely long-term physical, social 
and psychological effects on the child” and “(f) that the procedure is necessary for the 
welfare of the child”.  The other sections are concerned with the necessity of the procedure, 
the child’s ability to consent, and if the parent or caregiver agrees.  However, in Re Baby D 
(No 2) there was no discussion of these Family Law Rules in the context of withholding life-
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prolonging treatment to Baby D which indicates that these rules may not apply to withholding 
treatment.
146
   
The parens patriae jurisdiction has not often been used in Australia to allow withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment, but instead has been used positively to order that treatment be 
continued.  Northridge v Central Sydney Service (Northridge) used the parens patriae 
jurisdiction to protect the patient and order his treatment.
147
  Re BWV; Ex Parte Gardner 
differed from Northridge because it was decided on the basis of the Medical Treatment Act 
1988, not parens patriae jurisdiction.
148
  The issue before Morris J was to determine which 
instrument (if either) was appropriate to use for the withdrawal of the Percutaneous 
Endoscopic Gastrostomy (PEG) feeding tube.  He found that the statutory provisions laid out 
in the Medical Treatment Act were meant to be used by Parliament for such a decision.  He 
even stated that there was no place for the use of parens patriae powers in Victoria where 
they have extensive legislation dealing with guardianship matters, namely the Guardian 
Administration Act 1986.  The powers given to the Public Advocate under this Act were akin 
to those that the court could wield under the use of parens patriae.
149
     
Canada 
At the federal level little legislation exists, but the provinces and territories have been more 
active and enacted legislation governing substitute decision-making.
150
   
In Ontario the HCCA establishes a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) which governs all 
disputes that arise when health practitioners disagree with substitute decision-makers over 
treatment.
151
  Under s 21, the substitute decision-maker can consent to or refuse treatment 
based on the incapacitated person’s expressed preferences, where known, and their best 
interests.  In Manitoba the Mental Health Act provides for proxy decision-makers, and if the 
person has not appointed a proxy then a relative may make decisions for the incompetent 
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person.  However, s 28 (3) (a) requires that the relative must have been in contact with the 
incompetent person within the last twelve months in order to qualify.   
United Kingdom 
Firstly, a note about the court structure in the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom refers 
to the countries of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This is complicated by 
those countries having separate parliamentary and court structures.  There are two 
parliaments: United Kingdom and Scotland, and two assemblies: Wales and Northern Ireland.  
Legislation which is enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom may apply to the 
whole of the United Kingdom (in the case of ‘reserved’ matters), or only to certain 
constituent parts.  The MCA only applies to England and Wales.  The treatment of 
incompetent adults in Scotland is governed by the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000.  While Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own court system, the Supreme Court 
is the final court of appeal in civil matters for all of the United Kingdom (replacing the House 
of Lords in 2009).  Where necessary, it is indicated in this thesis if, for example, the case is 
from the Scottish courts and they have a different finding from the English and Welsh 
jurisdictions.   
The parens patriae jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults ceased to exist in England 
and Wales, seemingly unintentionally by statute.
152
  As a result, there was a void in the law 
governing how the courts could protect adults who lacked capacity.
153
  Many of the cases in 
England and Wales were decided before there was legislation governing the decision-making.  
The MCA rectified this, and s 4 of the MCA 2005 effectively codifies the best interests test.  
Paragraph 28 of the Explanatory Notes to the MCA states: 
“It is a key principle of the Act that all steps and decisions taken for someone who 
lacks capacity must be taken in the person’s best interests.  The best interests principle 
is an essential aspect of the Act and builds on the common law while offering further 
guidance.”    
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In Scotland, Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate discussed best interests as to whether 
the proposed action was lawful or not, and also found that the parens patriae jurisdiction 
(referred to as pater patriae) applies in Scotland:  
“What is required from the court is [a decision as to] whether the proposed operation 
is in the best interests of the patient and therefore lawful, or not in the patient’s best 
interests and therefore unlawful.”
154
   
Baker J in the 2011 case of W v M summarised the legal position in England regarding best 
interests:  
“Any decision made under the Mental Capacity Act for a person who lacks capacity 
must be made in her best interests.  The law requires the court to identify those factors 
which are relevant to the person’s best interests and carry out a balancing exercise 
weighing up the factors on each side of the issue.  This approach is well established in 
cases involving medical treatment.”
155
   
Prior to the enactment of the MCA, Bland was the leading legal authority regarding decision-
making for incompetent patients in end-of-life circumstances.  James was the first Supreme 
Court case to consider end-of-life issues for an incompetent patient under the MCA.
156
  Bland 
was discussed extensively in James and the Supreme Court interpreted a major aspect on best 
interests, upholding the threshold approach taken by the House of Lords in Bland: 
“Hence [following from Bland] the focus is on whether it is in the patient’s best 
interests to give the treatment, rather than on whether it is in his best interests to 
withhold or withdraw it.”
157
  
Therefore, best interests is the guiding principle for those lacking capacity in England and 
Wales, under ss 2 and 4 of the MCA:   
Section 2: People who lack capacity: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the 
material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain. 
(2) It does not matter whether the impairment or disturbance is permanent or 
temporary. 
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Section 4: Best interests: 
(5) Where the determination relates to life-sustaining treatment he must not, in 
considering whether the treatment is in the best interests of the person concerned, be 
motivated by a desire to bring about his death. 
 
(6) He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable — 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant 
written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. 
7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the 
views of — 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare … as to what 
would be in the person’s best interests and, in particular, as to the matters mentioned 
in subsection (6). 
The MCA Code of Practice was published in 2007, and discusses how to approach assessing 
best interests, stating that a decision in the person’s best interests may lead to their death (for 
example withdrawing treatment), that any prior statements the person made should be 
considered, and that there is no obligation to continue treatment.
158
   
Summary of Chapter Two 
This chapter has provided the background information needed to examine the thesis question:  
how are judges making decisions for incompetent patients, and how well are they applying 
the principles of the best interests test in end-of-life cases?  The answer to this question is in 
the analysis of cases from four Commonwealth jurisdictions: New Zealand, Australia, the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  From a starting point of no agreed definition of what best 
interests is, the analysis has provided five themes grouped around three conclusions.  (1) End-
of-life decision-making is difficult, which is exemplified in the complex relationship between 
law and ethics.  (2) Best interests is a complex concept, with no clear rules on how it is 
applied.  This is shown in the cases by the same term being used to express different 
concepts, and the observation that language is inherently value-laden.  Confusion over the 
terminology is therefore not easily avoided when coupled with a complicated concept such as 
best interests.  Differences in judges’ reasoning, despite reaching the same conclusion, forms 
the main investigation into how judges are reaching the decisions regarding incompetent 
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patients, and this is examined in the remainder of the thesis, especially Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven.  The use of ancillary texts was highlighted to discuss the impact on the way that best 
interests relates to other ethical principles, and the dichotomy that has arisen between what 
society ‘can do’ to keep people alive indefinitely regardless of their medical condition, and 
what they ‘should do’.  The principle of autonomy was also discussed as it is an influential 
factor in decision-making for incompetent patients who were previously competent.  (3) The 
inadequate legal framework from the four countries has resulted in convoluted law-making.  
In the exploration of this theme 68 cases that fit the thesis parameters are charted in Appendix 
One, and a précis of 31 of these cases is given in Appendix Three.  A tension between 
predictability and flexibility appears necessary for judicial decision-making, and the 
application of the best interests test could be considered to epitomise this tension.   
The discussion in this chapter has presented various ways that the best interests standard has 
been utilised.  In doing so, there was no clearly agreed definition of best interests, and 
furthermore no indication that judges explicitly engaged with the notion of interests.  In the 
next chapter some philosophical accounts of interests are investigated.  Part of the process of 
understanding how judges are making their decisions about what is in a patient’s best 






“In order to know what is in the patient’s best interests one has to inquire 
about the nature of these interests in the first place.” 159 
It is essential to understand what interests actually are before exploring how they are 
discussed in the test of best interests.  This chapter therefore addresses fundamental 
questions, starting with – what are interests?  What are judges actually incorporating into the 
balancing of interests?  Are they utilising commonly understood interests?  What kinds of 
interests are being attributed to incompetent patients?  What sort of things count as interests?  
Does the term ‘best interests’ refer only to a person’s interests in his or her own life, or does 
the term encompass that person’s interests for others?  Do the interests that we have for 
ourselves outweigh the interests we have for others?  What, if any, is the difference between 
an interest, and a want or desire?   
In this chapter three different accounts of interests are explored; Feinberg, Dworkin and 
Sperling all make significant distinctions amongst interests.  These include, for example, the 
distinction between interests in pleasant experiences, and interests in things we may not or 
could not experience; and the distinction between interests which we have while alive, and 
those we have after we are dead.  In addition to these distinctions, and others discussed by 
these commentators, a further and particularly important distinction emerges between two 
further broad categories of interests: self-regarding and other-regarding.  Self-regarding 
interests are interests about ourselves that we can experience (for example an interest in 
music) and those that we cannot (for example the interest we have in being well 
remembered).  Other-regarding interests are the interests that we have for others – usually 
someone we care about – enough to consider others’ interests as much as (or sometimes more 
than) our own interests.  These definitions are used throughout the thesis, and especially in 
Chapters Five and Seven.   
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There are numerous texts on the subject of interests and what they are, or may be.  Sperling 
asserts that at a fundamental level: 
“An interest is a kind of stake in the well-being of an object or state.”
160
 
Feinberg also discusses interests as related to having a stake in something: 
“If I have an interest …  I have a kind of stake in its well-being.  All interests are in 
this way types of risks: the word ‘stake’ has its primary or literal use to refer to ‘the 
amount risked by a party to a wager, or match, or gamble, a thing whose existence, or 
safety, or ownership depends on some issue’ … In general, a person has a stake in X 
… when he stands to gain or lose depending on the nature or condition of X.”
161
   
Having a stake in something means caring about something.  We might care because we will 
be affected by a particular state or decision, or we might care, not because it affects us 
personally, but because we attribute some value to that state or decision.  For example parents 
have many interests in regard to their children, both for the child’s sake and their own.   
This chapter examines the predominant themes that appear in any discussion of interests, with 
particular reference to three influential books in this area: Joel Feinberg’s Harm to Others, 
Ronald Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion and Daniel Sperling’s Posthumous Interests.
162
  With a 
concept as ubiquitous as ‘interests’ there are innumerable ways that they could be described, 
categorised and analysed.  Feinberg identifies many interests in Harm to Others; welfare, 
ulterior, other-regarding and surviving.  In Life’s Dominion Dworkin identifies two types of 
interests, experiential and critical.
163
  In Posthumous Interests Sperling identifies four 
(possible) categories of interest: (1) pre-birth; (2) life interests; (3) after-life interests; and (4) 
far-lifelong interests.
164
  The first of Sperling’s categories is not relevant to this discussion as 
it focuses on interests that arise pre-birth and are contingent on the person coming into 
existence, however, the other three of his categories are applicable here.  Both Feinberg and 
Sperling discuss what could be called specific categories of interests, whereas Dworkin’s 
discussion of interests is more expansive, linking his notion of interests to an assertion that 
interests can explain why people live their lives in certain ways, and why they should live 
their life in certain ways.  Feinberg and Sperling discuss interests in a narrower context; they 
use multiple categories to argue that there are certain types of interests that people have, or 
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can have.  These categories reflect the specific work that they are embarking upon.  Feinberg 
discusses interests in relation to harm (defining harm as a setback to an interest) and Sperling 
discusses interests in relation to life and death.  Dworkin discusses interests on a much 
broader scale, saying that all interests are one of two types, focusing on their properties or 
qualities.  In this thesis Dworkin’s lead is followed in the proposition that interests can be 
discussed broadly, as well as in the proposition that it is possible to discuss all categories of 
interests under two headings.  However, the terms chosen to define the categories, self-
regarding and other-regarding, are similar to those used by Feinberg and Sperling.  It is not 
suggested that all interests can be described by these terms, but rather that for the purposes of 
a discussion of the interests for the permanently incompetent individual these distinctions can 
provide a valuable insight.  This is because other-regarding interests have been undervalued 
by courts in end-of-life cases, and this has led to missed opportunities to truly engage with 
the patient’s interests.  In regard to the concept of best interests, where the discussion is 
focused on the individual (and in many cases the individual’s family), then referring to 
interests in a way that relates to that person, and relates to interests they have for others, is 
not merely justifiable, it also contributes to the understanding of best interests.   
All three of these books were published within the last three decades, starting with Feinberg 
in the 1980s, Dworkin in the 1990s and then Sperling in the 2000s.  Therefore, they provide a 
spectrum of contributions to the discussion of interests which is necessary for the purpose of 
this exercise.  The objective of this chapter is to show the way that interests have been 
discussed, and the range of interests which can be identified, which will then inform the 
understanding of interests as related to best interests.  Subsequently, the engagement with the 
material is on this descriptive level and intentionally so; discussion deliberately refrains from 
engaging with the particular intricacies of the definitions of interests.  Instead, common 
themes in all of these theories of interests are identified as an area of agreement from which a 
taxonomy of interests can be extrapolated.  These themes are then drawn on in order to 




Part One: Exploration of Interests 
Dworkin 
In Dworkin’s account there are two kinds of interests that people have, or could have.  
Experiential interests are relatively easily defined as the things that we want to experience, 
and things that we do not.  Critical interests are the interests that reflect, represent, or are 
determined by the type of person we are or want to be; essentially the ‘character’ of the 
person you are or want to be. 
Experiential Interests 
Dworkin describes the things that we do just because we like the experience of doing them, 
as experiential interests.
165
  Experiential interests exist because of, and in relation to, 
something we can actually experience.  Therefore, to have experiential interests a person 
must be sensate, but does not need to be able to convey what interests they have in relation to 
what they are actually experiencing.  A baby has experiential interests in being fed, being 
warm, and getting enough sleep.  But they also have interests in not experiencing pain or 
suffering.  For example, I have experiential interests in reading vampire fiction (much better 
than non-fiction), watching the BBC version of Pride and Prejudice for the eleventh time, or 
spending time with loved ones.
166
  The interest in, and value of, these experiences lies with 
the person who is experiencing them – obviously it would be some people’s worst nightmare 
to read novels about vampires or to watch Pride and Prejudice umpteen times, but because I 
enjoy these things they can be considered to be in my experiential interests to pursue.  
Although I may think that others are missing out on pleasure by not sharing my interests I 
cannot sincerely hold that they are wrong in their views.
167
  Some of these interests as 
described by Dworkin can be distinguished from Feinberg’s account of interests, which 
would term some experiential interests as passing desires.  For Feinberg, interests are more 
closely linked to the stake one has in them. 
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Dworkin further explains that some experiences are not pleasurable, and uses pain as one 
such example.  He claims that the transient nature of pain shows how ‘time sensitive’ our 
experiential interests are – once our time is done in the dentist’s chair we are indifferent to 
the suffering we endured while in it.
168
  If Dworkin is referring to the memory of pain then it 
could be argued that people are not indifferent to the memory of pain, but instead a painful 
experience contributes to an ongoing interest in avoiding similar experiences and perhaps 
causes ongoing distress.  If it is particularly painful or distressing it can provide a watershed 
experience which then informs our subsequent approaches to similar events.  There is often a 
narrative based on previous experiences as to whatever those may be, positive or negative.  
And if the experience is particularly painful or upsetting then understandably this will inform, 
and probably affect, subsequent experiences.  The discussion of pain becomes relevant when 
discussing the suffering or ‘intolerability’ that patients are perceived to be enduring, and 
hence their past experiences could reasonably be construed as informing any views that they 
made regarding future suffering.   
Critical Interests 
Not all interests are experiential, they can be aspirational or future-orientated (in the sense of 
one’s life-long purposes, not just things we may want to experience in the future) or 
character-orientated.  Dworkin calls this group of other interests critical interests and states 
that these are harder to grasp than experiential interests, but people have: 
“interests that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests they would 
be mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if they did not recognize.”
169
 
He uses the following to illustrate his point: 
“They represent critical judgments rather than just experiential preferences… I do 
think my life would have been worse had I never understood the importance of being 
close to my children, for example, if I had not suffered pain at estrangements from 
them.  Having a close relationship with my children is not important just because I 
happen to want the experience; on the contrary, I believe a life without wanting it 
would be a much worse one.”
170
  
Dworkin states that critical interests are not necessarily more important than experiential 
interests: 
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 “I do not mean that experiential interests are characteristically frivolous or critical 
interests inevitably profound … Nor am I trying to contrast supposedly elite, 
reflective, philosophical lives with more ordinary or mundane ones.  I mean to 
identify what is elite, in the sense of aspirational, within most lives.  Nor am I saying 
that people who do not consciously reflect on how their lives are going as a whole, 
who just get on with living, taking things as they come, are defective or not living 
well … I do believe, however, that even people whose lives feel unplanned are 
nevertheless often guided by a sense of the general style of life they think appropriate, 




In Dworkin’s account of interests, the distinction between experiential and critical takes on an 
almost deontological versus consequentialist tone, as he uses it to explain why people should 
or should not be treated in certain ways.  This is a critical point, as Dworkin proposes that 
people should want to live a good life and this is an interest that they have regardless of 
whether or not they know it.  The next section further discusses this notion of what life you 
should lead, described by Feinberg as an ideal-regarding concept.  Dworkin not only uses 
this to argue that people should lead their lives in certain ways, but to state that critical 
interests show why there is disquiet sometimes with the way that people are treated: 
“We need the distinction between experiential and critical interests to understand 
many of our convictions about how people should be treated.  We need it, for 
example, to explain why we think that mind-changing drugs or other forms of 
brainwashing that produce long-lasting pleasure and contentment are not in their 
victims’ interests: we mean they are not in their critical interests.  Understanding the 
difference between experiential and critical interests is also essential to understanding 
a certain kind of tragedy, in life as well as in fiction.”
172
 
There are numerous examples of this distinction in books and movies; it seemingly fascinates 
us that people can have positive experiences whilst living a life that does not fit within their 
view of their critical interests.
173
  Dworkin argues that interests are not necessarily restricted 
to what people think their interests are, or what their pleasurable experiences may be.  This 
needs to be discussed in relation to the evaluation of best interests, because this thesis adopts 
an approach that comes close to this reasoning when it proposes that an incompetent patient 
may have non-experiential, and other-regarding interests.  Although judges have discussed 
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these kinds of interests (for example, an interest in being well remembered) it is important to 
explore Dworkin’s ideas more thoroughly to show why we care about things that we may 
never have knowledge of.   
In order to achieve this, critical and experiential interests are explored using the premise of 
the movie The Truman Show, which centres around a man who has been filmed for his entire 
life, all day, every day, as part of a reality television programme.  He does not know that all 
of his family and friends are actually paid actors, and that his life – and even the village he 
lives in – is fictional.  At the start of the movie Truman is happy, and if he lived out his whole 
life remaining ignorant of his true situation, could we say that his life had been negatively 
affected due to the deception?  Most people would recognise that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with the scenario even though Truman is unaware that he is being 
deceived, but what – if anything – are we objecting to?  Any objection would be based on a 
sense that Truman is being denied something, and that something is a life lived with honesty 
and sincerity.  This could be what Dworkin is clarifying with his concept of integrity:  
“Recognizing the independent importance of integrity helps us to understand much 
that would otherwise be puzzling in the idea of critical interests.”
174
 
Dworkin explains the concept of integrity as being linked to a steady, self-defining 
commitment to a vision of character or achievement.
175
  Presumably Truman could still have 
such a commitment whilst unaware that his life was a television show, but Dworkin would 
argue that his integrity was being harmed.  Within the duration of the movie, Truman 
develops awareness of the sort of critical interests which, Dworkin says, are objectively good 
for him (for example wanting to have authentic relationships with people).  What does the 
fact that these critical interests are exercised in a context in which they cannot be achieved 
(because actually he has no family to want to be with) mean?  It is not that Truman is making 
a mistake – he is not mistaken about what the ‘right’ interests are.  This is in contrast to 
Tolstoy’s Ivan Illich who Dworkin uses as an example of a man who realised he had 
mistakenly had the wrong critical interests all his life and this is his torment – because, in 
part, he is the author of his own failure.  The tragedy of Ivan Illich is that he was also given a 
false sense of what was actually good; this is different from Truman who has the ‘right’ 
interests.  The problem for Truman is that these right interests are based on deception: he 
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cares about his best friend, and thinks this is a mutual bond, without realising that his friend 
is an actor following a defined script to maintain his false life.  Truman’s problem is a bit like 
the problem of those in the movie The Matrix as they are divorced from a certain truth about 
their situation.
176
  What we might note, however, is that within both The Matrix and The 
Truman Show some of the same critical interests might be developed as those that are found 
in ‘the real world’.  However the nature of the deception practiced by the actors around 
Truman, and the fictional world created by computers in The Matrix, seems to automatically 
exclude any notion we could hold about what ‘integrity’ means in any real sense.  This way 
of forming the discussion links integrity to reality, but is integrity predicated on truth?  Not 
necessarily, it requires knowledge of one’s self and its true values, but also the truth about 
one’s relation to the world.  If taking this viewpoint, then it may be possible to have critical 
interests which are predicated on a deception about whether those interests are being 
authentically satisfied (although this would be invalidated in Dworkin’s account as he 
presents critical interests as being linked to a ‘good’ life).  It would seem that those around 
him inform, and therefore preclude, any attempt Truman would make to live his ‘good’ life.   
It is helpful at this point to canvass the three main approaches from normative ethics as they 
all contribute to ideas of what Dworkin is driving at with his discussion of a good life.  One 
form of Utilitarianism might state that the only considerations for ethical importance are the 
consequences, and the most benefit for the most people, which means that as long as Truman 
was happy, and he was entertaining thousands of people around the world which increased 
their happiness, it is irrelevant that any possible critical interests are being harmed.  This 
could be countered by devising a rule that the greatest good was only met if it was not 
predicated on sacrificing one person’s true self for the happiness of others, justified by its 
overall contribution to happiness.
177
  Another understanding could be derived from 
deontology; a person’s life should not be based on any deception.  Virtue ethics contributes 
by asking whether Truman himself, while he could still be a virtuous person, could truly have 
the attribute of phronesis (practical wisdom) or eudaimonia (the sense of living a life well).  
This may be what Dworkin is alluding to when he discusses the notion of a good life: 
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“We have the abstract ambition to lead a good life, and we worry, some of us all our 
lives, about what that is.”
178
 
In his account, the finding (the experiencing) of the life as good is as important as the life 
being good: 
 “it is important both that we find a life good and that we find it good”
179
 
Therefore it could be said that Truman would prefer to discover the truth, even though his life 
may be a good one, because he is not able to find this good himself since he is not free to do 
so.  As Feinberg points out, one of the major philosophical problems that Socrates and Plato 
discussed was the separation of interests from the person’s character.
180
  So, can a person 
with no goal of having lived a ‘good’ life be harmed?  In opposition to Plato’s position 
Feinberg suggests that they are not.
181
  It is a reasonable supposition in major ethical theories 
that any life based on deception is not a good one.
182
  However, even within the virtual 
environment, characters in The Matrix could still have an authentic sense of what matters, 
and could choose to make ethical decisions and display personal priorities.  They were not 
necessarily deceived about where their critical interests lay (or their experiential interests, for 
that matter).  The integrity that is lacking lies in the deliberate deception, not just because 
there is an ideal that full disclosure of information enables true autonomy over our lives.  But 
it does not necessarily follow that all of Truman’s other critical interests are frustrated by the 
deception.  Much would depend on what we thought those interests actually were and 
whether Truman was able to find his life good.   
From Dworkin therefore a full picture can be derived of two kinds of interests –  experiential 
and critical, from which a number of things can be deduced: (1) there are interests we have 
that can be both experiential and non-experiential; (2) there are some interests we have that 
are not dependent on us knowing them, but nevertheless are important to our sense of self; 
and (3) there are some interests that we ought to have.  Feinberg challenges this this last idea, 
and it is his account of interests which is discussed in the next section, before addressing 
Sperling’s account of interests. 
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Feinberg discusses interests in relation to harm in his seminal text “Harm to Others”.
183
  He 
discusses a complex system of interests as related to different ways that interests can arise, 
and what form they may take.  The complexity of his description provides both a challenge 
and a rich resource in this attempt to summarise the kinds of interests that people may have.  
At first there will be discussion of his general framework of identified interests, before then 
canvassing those which relate to end-of-life issues, namely interests of others and surviving 
interests.   
Welfare and Ulterior Interests 
Firstly, Feinberg suggests that two standards can show the importance of an interest to the 
well-being of the person.
184
  Welfare interests are extensive, and include: 
“the interests in the continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the 
interests in one’s own physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning 
of one’s body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque 
disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the absence of 
groundless anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in social 
intercourse and to enjoy and maintain friendships, at least minimal income and 
financial security, a tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain amount 
of freedom from interference and coercion.”
185
 
Welfare interests are termed “minimal but nonultimate” and can be contrasted by ulterior 
interests which are closer to Dworkin’s concept of critical interests and can be seen as “a 
person’s more ultimate goals and aspirations” such as: 
“producing good novels or works of art, solving a crucial scientific problem, 
achieving high political office, successfully raising a family, achieving leisure for 
handicraft or sport, building a dream house, advancing a social cause, ameliorating 
human suffering, achieving spiritual grace.”
186
 
Feinberg’s description provides an informative discussion of the difference between interests 
and wants.  He acknowledges that there must be a close connection between a person’s 
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interests and his or her wants,
187
 and although wants are necessary for interests, they can be 
distinguished: 




Therefore there must be something more to raise a want into an interest: 
“… some degree of ulteriority, stability, and permanence is necessary to the very 
existence of an interest.  A mere ‘passing desire,’ however genuine or intense, does 
not establish an interest.  A sudden craving for an ice cream cone on a hot summer 
day, when plenty of cold water is available, does not itself make it true that ice cream 
is ‘in one’s interest’ at that time.  To say that something would be ‘in my interest’ is 
to say that it would increase my ability or opportunity to satisfy those of my ulterior 




According to Feinberg there are three categories of wants that create interests: instrumental 
wants, welfare interests and focal aims.  The terminology does not help with clarity here as in 
Feinberg’s account an instrumental want is actually an interest by virtue of being a want that 
is linked to ulteriority.  For example, consider a young athlete.  A passing want would be to 
eat ice cream, an instrumental want is to forgo dessert, a welfare interest is in their general 
physical health and the focal aim is winning an Olympic medal.    
Declining dessert, or working late, involve our interests insofar as they advance our “more 
general, stable and permanent goals like health and financial sufficiency”; he calls these 
interests instrumental wants.
190
  Welfare interests as already discussed are typically 
instrumental interests, although they can be “goals as ultimate as any that one has.”
191
  Focal 
aims are related to ulterior goals:  
“Common to all of [interests], however, is their character, at least in part, as ends in 
themselves.  These aims are as ‘ulterior’ as our dominant ends can be, and their value 
cannot be entirely instrumental.  Still, for the most part, their value is not entirely 
intrinsic either, since their advancement or fulfilment invariably produces benefits of 
a great many kinds throughout the whole network of personal wants and interest.”
192
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Want-Regarding and Ideal-Regarding Interpretations of Interests  
What Feinberg’s analysis brings out clearly is the interrelatedness and complexity of 
interests, something that is somewhat lost in Dworkin and Sperling’s accounts.
193
  One of the 
ways he achieves this is by pointing out the different concepts behind the notions of interests 
that we have, such as ‘wants’ and ‘ideals’:  
“A concept is want-regarding if it can be analyzed entirely in terms of the ‘wants 
which people happen to have,’ whereas it is ideal-regarding if reference must also be 
made to what would be ideal, or best for people, their wants notwithstanding, or to the 
wants they ought to have whether they have them or not.”
194
 
Feinberg employs a want-regarding view of interests in his analysis of harms.  He maintains 
that what a person wants or strives for is the most important (or only) factor to consider.  
However, the ideal-regarding view suggests that there is something lacking if consideration is 
given only to the wants a person may have, and that the ultimate good is not merely to have 
the things we want, but to be a good person, and to have a good character, regardless of what 
we want.
195
  Dworkin’s concept of the good life is therefore an ideal-regarding view of 
interests, where he argues that there are interests people ought to have regardless of whether 
they are aware of them or not.  Therefore, on this critical point Dworkin and Feinberg 
disagree.  This ideal-regarding view of interests is one that will be revisited in the context of 
other-regarding interests that incompetent patients may have, and this thesis will put forward 
the position that an ideal-regarding view can be separated from the question of whether or not 
there are objective interests.  Objective interests are interests that everyone has, regardless of 
whether or not they want them.  Ideal-regarding interests are interests that everyone should 
have.  For example, dignity is often ascribed by the courts to the permanently incompetent 
patient in a way that aligns it with an objective interest that everyone has.
196
  Possibly this is 
because it is something that someone should have, but even if it could be shown that the 
person did not have an interest in their own dignity (that they did not care what happened to 
them if they were unaware of it), it is unlikely that they would then be treated without 
respect.  Some notions of dignity are objective, in that they involve the belief that everyone 
has an interest in being treated with dignity, whether or not they are aware of, or have ever 
been aware of it. Such accounts – including from some judges – do not necessarily involve 
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the claim that patients should have an interest in dignity, but rather, that they do in fact 
already have such an interest.   
Therefore, whether interests are held to be want-regarding or ideal-regarding is significant as 
it relates to whether there is an objective application of interests that everyone has, which is 
different from finding that there are interests that a person ought to have.  Are there some 
interests – such as altruistic tendencies towards resource allocation – that a person ought to 
have?  This thesis contends that it is sufficient to have a framework of interests that take into 
account objective interests, and it is not necessary to argue the more difficult position of 
ideal-regarding interests.  This is predicated on the position proposed in the summary of Part 
One, that there are interests we can have that we are unaware of.  If this is true then it is also 
true that there are objective interests. 
Interests of Others 
It is not just our own interests that matter according to Feinberg, and in his analysis there are 
two ways that a person can have an interest in another person’s wellbeing.  The first is when 
A is dependent on B for the advancement of A’s interests.  The second is where C is so 
invested in D that D’s wellbeing becomes a personal stake for C also.
197
  It is this second 
proposition that used in this thesis’s proposal for interests.  However, as Feinberg points out, 
rarely in life is the distinction so neatly exemplified.  Often, the interest in another’s 
wellbeing has links to our own interests, and he uses the example of a parent.  Harm to their 
child violates the other-regarding interest that the parent has, but it could also affect their 
instrumental self-regarding interests of emotional and financial stability, and be a burden on 
their time.   
“Loving interests are so commonly intertwined with, and reinforced by, instrumental, 
essentially self-regarding interests, that many observers are led to discount the former, 
or even deny altogether their existence in given cases.”
198
 
This egoist way of interpreting all of our actions – that ultimately we benefit – is one that 
Feinberg dismisses, and he makes a compelling argument for why there are other-regarding 
interests that are separate from self-regarding interests that we may have, dismissing 
arguments against their existence by the following exposition.
199
  Self-regarding and other-
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regarding acts can both be self-interested, and this is how other theories which argue against 
other-regarding interests have been misled, Feinberg surmises, as there is a linguistic 
difficulty in having other-regarding interests that are related to the person, for example using 
your last dollar to pay for a doctor for your children, and so such acts can be described as 
acting out of conscience or principle.
200
  In his account there are acts which can be self-
interested (acts that promote the person’s own interests) and not self-interested (acts not done 
in order to promote the person’s own interests).
201
  One example he uses is when there is 
pooled interest in a common goal, or sharing of a common lot.  Taylor-Sands uses this idea in 
a way that proposes saviour siblings have familial interests because they have a stake in the 
future family.
202
  Using Feinberg’s account, Crouch and Elliott also accept and add to the 
concept of other-regarding interests:  
“Other-regarding interests involve the desires that an agent has for the well-being of 
another person.  Here, the agent may act to bring about the increased well-being of 
another person, and may in fact serve this other person’s own interests at least partly 
as an end in itself.  Thus an agent who acts in the service of other-regarding interests 
may do so partly for instrumental reasons (some of her own interests are served 
through the action) and partly because the end that I promoted (the well-being of 
another person) is important to the other person.”
203
 
The interests of others are integral to the understanding of the best interests; this position is 
argued in the second part of this chapter.   
Surviving Interests 
In Feinberg’s account, interests can be posthumous; he calls these surviving interests.  
Surviving interests can be ascribed to the ante-mortem person; that is the person who, 
although now dead, is described as they were in life.
204
   
“The interests of a person that can be said to have ‘survived’ his death are those 
ulterior interests that can still be thwarted or promoted by subsequent events.  These 
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include his publicly oriented and other-regarding interests, and also his ‘self-centred’ 
interests in being thought of in certain ways by others.”
205
 
Feinberg argues that what interests we can have, and do have, for ourselves and others are 
dependent on the degree of investment (as stated from the outset of this chapter, with 
quotations from both Feinberg and Sperling claiming that interests are something that we 
have to have a stake in).  His account differs from that of Dworkin in that he maintains 
interests are something that we need to have more than a passing desire for.  He also provides 
an account that is sceptical of the notion that interests are ideal-regarding, effectively 
rejecting the idea that there are interests that people ought to have, which also differs from 
Dworkin.  Rather the interests are predicated on the person themselves and their wants and 
desires.  Both Dworkin and Feinberg’s explorations of interests have accepted the idea that a 
person can have interests that persist beyond death, and this is something that accords with 
Sperling’s detailed account of posthumous interests, as discussed in the next section.   
Sperling 
Sperling’s discussion of interests is intimately related to the state of the person, and whether 
that person is alive or dead, as might be expected from a book titled Posthumous Interests.  
As noted in the introduction, he proposes four categories of interests relating to life; those 
relevant to this thesis are life interests, after-life interests and far-lifelong interests.   
Life Interests 
The category of life interests is derived from experiences, and consequently overlaps with 
Dworkin’s experiential interests.  Both are therefore recognising interests that we have just by 
virtue of being cognitively aware or merely sensate.  Obviously, there is a significant 
difference between cognitive awareness, which has implications for notions of personhood, 
and only being capable of experiencing bodily responses to pain or warmth.  This is 
examined further in Chapter Six, but it should be noted here that all three accounts of 
interests allow for both.   
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Life interests also overlap with critical interests, as highlighted by Sperling, who considers 
the interest in survival and financial security to also be within this category.   
“The importance of most interests included in this category derives from the 
experience or awareness of their fulfilment and is dependent upon the existence of the 




This congruence makes sense in light of the many ways that interests can be divided, and it 
also furthers the assessment that Dworkin is discussing interests on a broader scale which is 
interwoven through Feinberg and Sperling’s categorisations.   
After-Life Interests 
After-life interests are different from life interests in that they are posthumous interests, and 
although in existence when a person is alive, they are only realised after death.  They refer to 
such things as views regarding what happens to your body and your estate, and anything else 
that happens after your death, including: 
“being remembered after death as a human being with specific characteristics”.
207
 
This overlaps with Feinberg’s description of surviving interests, and in Sperling’s account 
these interests can be both self-regarding (using the example of being well remembered after 
death) or other-regarding (for example the desire that one’s loved ones flourish).
208
  The will 
of actor Robin Williams exemplifies this interest in a very twenty first century way.  In it he 
restricted the use of his image for 25 years after his death.
209
  In an age where someone’s 
digital likeness can be replicated to the extent that they can appear in movies after their death, 
and be credited – somewhat chillingly – as appearing ‘post-production’ this restriction by 
Robin Williams was a strong assertion of an after-life interest.
210
  Many individuals want to 
be remembered as a good or caring or loving person after death.
211
  This desire to be well 
remembered may partly explain why people leave money to charity in their wills, as they 
want to extend their ‘good’ selves past their death.  It also explains the phrase ‘they died 
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doing what they loved’ which is often depicted as a comfort to the loved ones the person has 
left behind.  Buchanan and Brock agree with Sperling and Feinberg that people can have 
interests that survive their death:  
“The additional fact is that the interests of persons can survive not only incompetence 
and the loss of personhood, but death itself.”
212
 
Dworkin also accepts the notion of interests that survive beyond what the person has 
knowledge of, using critical interests to show this.
213
  Therefore, in all three accounts there is 
consensus that interests are not dependent on an individual’s awareness that they actually 
have any interests at all, something that is explored further in Part Two of this chapter.   
All of the interests that Sperling calls after-life interests are interests that nobody can 
personally experience.  Thus, while it is an interest that is predicated on being present whilst 
alive, the actual interest can only be realised when the person is dead.  Some interests, such as 
our will being recognised, are examples of what we want to happen after our death and these 
are (usually) legally upheld.  Other interests are not legally binding, but most people feel a 
strong duty to uphold them regardless.  For example, my Grandfather was a true ‘Southern 
Man’ – born and raised in Dunedin, New Zealand where his parents had also lived all of their 
lives.  Although in his adult life he lived in various places, New Zealand was his home.  He 
died in Adelaide, Australia while visiting with his oldest child, and my mother travelled from 
New Zealand for his funeral.  It was a scorching hot day, about 40
o
C, and as they lowered 
Grandad’s casket into the ground Mum could see ants scurrying across the red earth, in stark 
contrast to the cooler green grass of his home.  Her overwhelming impression was that it was 
wrong for him to be there, so far away from any family (as no family members now live in 
Adelaide) and that he should have been cremated and brought to Dunedin.  As is often the 
case in families, it was not until many years later that Mum was told that Grandad had been 
adamant about his views after his death – he had wanted to be buried.  This knowledge was 
not just of great comfort to Mum; it made the difference between her feeling contentment 
about Grandad’s resting place rather than regret.  This was because she knew it was his view, 
it was an interest that he had expressed, and so the fulfilment of that wish was enough to 
appease any lingering doubt.   
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Some commentators, such as Harris, rank after-life interests as secondary to other interests.  
Using the term persisting interests to describe those that can survive death, Harris states: 
“I believe that although there are such things as persisting interests they are, of 
necessity, less significant than person affecting interests.”
214
   
Person-affecting interests are not dependent on the person experiencing them “in the sense of 
being aware of them”, but are dependent on the person being alive, not dead.  Harris uses the 
example of malicious gossip whereby it can affect the person even if he or she is not aware of 
it because it can impact on the interests that you are aware of, such as not getting the job you 
wanted or losing friends.  Therefore, if my Grandfather’s wishes had been ignored, who 
would have been harmed, and how would the harm occur?  According to Harris, Grandad’s 
persisting interests (in being buried) would have been harmed but this was not a person-
affecting interest.  Therefore the greater harm was to my mother’s interests (in ‘doing right’ 
by her father) as she was still living.  Person-affecting interests of the living, in Harris’ 
account, should always outweigh persisting interests of the dead.
215
  This view can also help 
inform the concept of other-regarding interests if it is accepted that a person-affecting 
position is sustainable.   
Whatever term is used – ‘surviving’, ‘after-life’ or ‘persisting’ – the consensus is that there 
are interests that a person can have after their death.  Harris qualifies this by saying that 
although they exist they are weaker than the interests of the living. 
Far-Lifelong Interests  
Sperling’s last applicable category, far-lifelong interests, can apply in life or death.  These 
include: 
 “being the object of an affection or esteem of others, the interests that one’s promises 
not be broken, the interest that one’s loved ones flourish within and beyond one’s life, 
the interest in the integrity on one’s body and the interest in respecting one’s privacy 
and good reputation.” 
How does an interest in having your reputation protected, as discussed as a far-lifelong 
interest, differ from a life interest in the same thing?  Sperling refers to Steven Luper’s 
categories of personally and impersonally defined projects.
216
  The personal projects are 
things that we want to do ourselves; personal achievements such as aiming to obtain a PhD or 
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run a marathon.  The impersonal are those things that if we do not undertake to fulfil the 
interest ourselves we want others to fulfil for us.
217
  For example, a dedicated 
environmentalist who wants a particular species of bird saved from extinction would want the 
bird species to continue to exist regardless of whether or not they are alive.  Sperling goes on 
to construct what he calls the “Human Subject’ who is: 
“construed as one whose existence persists over time and extends over the life of the 
person whose interests they are.”
218
 
From his analysis, the Human Subject is someone who holds all four categories that Sperling 
identified.  Their existence is not just defined by their life and death however, they have pre-
birth interests and after-life interests that extend beyond these boundaries.  The existence of 
the Human Subject never ceases, but time can limit the effect of their interests.
219
  This is 
helpful for the discussion of the interests of the incompetent person because it shows that 
interests are not dependent on experiences, and it perhaps offers a reason as to why courts 
often say that an incompetent person has an interest in being well remembered.
220
   
Summary of Part One 
Any taxonomy of interests will need to provide an account which describes all of the 
different categories and qualities of interests that Feinberg, Sperling and Dworkin have 
outlined.  The overview of interests presented in this thesis endeavours to provide a summary 
which, in particular, does not claim any metaphysical truth beyond acknowledging that there 
are interests.  The focus has been directed at discussing a set of complex, interrelated, but not 
entirely congruent views into the form of a single synthesis.   
Where possible the common denominator has been extracted; this forms the approach 
outlined in the next section which is aimed at: (1) identifying what interests are applicable to 
the incompetent person; and for subsequent chapters (2) deciphering what the best interests 
are.  Based on this synthesis it is possible to state that there are many interests that we 
probably all have – interests that we can experience and those that we cannot, interests that 
we have a stake in personally and interests that we can have for others.  There are also 
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interests that we can have that survive our death.  Part Two of this chapter utilises these 
ubiquitous ideas by formulating a framework for categorising interests.   
Part Two: A Framework for the Interests of 
Incompetent Patients 
A Proposal for Categorising Interests 
It is proposed that all of these various ideas of what interests are, can be accrued under two 
headings, self-regarding and other-regarding.   
1. Self-Regarding Interests – Consideration for one’s own interests. 
These can be: 
(a) experiential, or; 
(b) non-experiential. 
2. Other-Regarding Interests – Consideration for others’ interests.   
The ‘others’ of this definition has two categories:    
(a) those closest to the patient, namely family and friends, who I will collectively call 
the whānau, and; 
(b) society as a whole, usually the community that the patient is living in.   
The following section outlines these, and the remainder of this chapter will present a 
discussion of each of them in detail, with reference to specific examples in selected cases.  
Part of the overall picture derived from the discussion of interests in Part One is that they are 
intimately related to the work they are intended to do.  For Feinberg therefore, his discussion 
of interests related to harm.  Conversely, Sperling used terms for his categorisation of 
interests that relate to life and death.  Dworkin used his discussion to show why some things 
ought to be cared about.  Therefore it is legitimate to propose a framework for interests which 
is formulated from the subject of discussion.  In this thesis this has been done by using the 
terms self-regarding and other-regarding.  Firstly, the range of interests that judges described 
in the end-of-life cases is identified, and then is widened to interests that they perhaps should 
have considered.  Therefore, this proposal for interests advanced in this thesis is not intended 
to be the definitive answer to defining all possible interests, but instead a way of referring to 
two broad possibilities of interests that a permanently incompetent  patient may have.
221
  By 
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using these terms, a different lens can be used to focus on a permanently incompetent 
person’s interests.  This focus is on the acknowledgement of other-regarding interests, which 
is at times either lacking in judgments, or warped into something resembling a self-regarding 
interest.  This does a disservice to the incompetent patient, and therefore it is proposed that 
using these terms demonstrates how the best interests of a permanently incompetent patient 
may be better explored. 
Self-Regarding Interests 
Experiential interests, and having negative or positive experiences, can only be self-
regarding; although we can seek out the company of others, and empathise with them to an 
extent, it is still our own experience that we have intimate knowledge of.  It is not necessarily 
true, though, that we have to directly experience all self-regarding interests, as Feinberg’s 
ulterior interests and focal aims, Dworkin’s critical interests, and Sperling’s life interests 
show us.  Therefore, a picture of interests emerges, about the self, that are directly 
experienced (experiential) and also not directly experienced (non-experiential).  Into this 
picture it is possible to plot the various terms that are used in the three accounts, but what 
matters is that there is agreement from all three authors about this.  This group of interests 
can be labelled self-regarding, as the individual is the subject of the interests.  The definition 
is qualified by adding that these can be experiential or non-experiential interests.   
The Self, Not Selfish 
It is irrefutable that individuals have interests related to themselves.  Indeed, the majority of 
our interests are about ourselves, and what we want or need or require to pursue those 
interests.  Much of was discussed in Part One of this chapter highlights interests that are 
focused on individual pursuits and personal preferences, the values that individuals have, and 
the value that they place on the interests that they pursue.  This does not mean that the 
interests are selfish, it means that the subject of the interests is the person themselves, not 
someone else.  In considering an archetypal selfless person, such as Mother Theresa, it seems 
unequivocal that even she also had interests that were about herself.  She surely had a self-
regarding interest in living a long and healthy life, and this is separate from the reason that 
she may have had to do so, which was to help others.  Conversely we could take an 




long and healthy life is separate from the reason that he may have, which is bestow us all 
with his ‘genius’.   
Experiential Interests 
There are a whole range of interests that arise when a person can experience anything – 
whether that is any degree of pain or suffering or merely sensations – and having such 
interests triggers a certain response for any appraisal of best interests.  In Chapter Eight the 
recommendation is advanced that experiential interests should be a primary consideration for 
any substitute decision-maker in appraising best interests for the permanently incompetent 
patient.  In the current proposal self-regarding, experiential interests are dependent on the 
person being sensate, and that sensation is usually physical, but can include the person having 
cognitive awareness.
222
  Essentially, some form of awareness is central to the notion of 
experiential interests.  Some interpretations of best interests hold that these are the only 
interests that matter, and if a person cannot experience anything this means that they have no 
interests.
223
  Another interpretation is that medical best interests should prevail, which may be 
referencing an interest in having a certain state of wellbeing, or the possible futility of the 
treatment that the permanently incompetent patient is experiencing.  These are thoroughly 
explored in Chapter Six, and criticised for being too narrow an approach. 
Non-Experiential Interests 
A permanently incompetent patient can also have non-experiential interests, and it is 
important to note that these interests also overlap with those that a sensate person can have; 
they are self-regarding interests that they can experience (or not): an interest in having their 
dignity maintained, an interest in not being subjected to invasive treatment and humiliations, 
an interest in the manner of their dying, and an interest in having their views on their 
treatment considered.   
If a patient is non-sensate, for example in a PVS, then they may still have interests that are 
self-regarding.  In fact, all of the interests considered to be non-experiential interests can be 
ascribed to any of the patients in end-of-life cases analysed in this thesis.  Non-experiential 
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interests are an interesting subsection of interests, as they are more difficult to quantify, and 
appear to be more nebulous than experiential interests.  What do concepts such as dignity and 
manner of dying even mean?  Where do those interests come from?  Do they depend on 
things that the patient used to care about? Are they objective interests?   
In the landmark case of Bland, Hoffmann LJ recognised the idea that someone in a PVS does 
have interests other than those they experience, dismissing the argument that suggests people 
only interests in what they can experience: 
“I think that the fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that we have no interests 
except in those things of which we have conscious experience.  But this does not 
accord with most people’s intuitive feelings about their lives and deaths.  … Most 
people would like an honourable and dignified death and we think it wrong to 
dishonour their deaths, even when they are unconscious that this is happening.  We 
pay respect to their dead bodies and to their memory because we think it an offence 
against the dead themselves if we do not.  Once again I am not concerned to analyse 
the rationality of these feelings.  It is enough that they are deeply rooted in our ways 
of thinking and that the law cannot possibly ignore them.”
224
   
These remarks from Hoffmann LJ demonstrate one salient difference between an academic 
discussion of interests and the manner by which judges make their decisions.  Hoffmann LJ 
acknowledges that the “rationality” of respecting dead bodies is something that can be 
challenged, but this is immaterial as this respect is indisputably part of the society in which 
we live.  This may be different from stating that it is an interest of the PVS patient 
themselves.  Some commentators suggest that the principle of dignity (which underlies the 
interest that someone has in it) is the only principle needed in any ethical theory.
225
  This 
debate is not evaluated here, but instead a summary is presented showing that the courts have 
endorsed the notion that there is such a principle, and it is a principle that applies to a 
permanently incompetent patient.  Butler-Sloss LJ in Bland stated:  
“A mentally incompetent patient has interests to be considered and protected, the 
basic one being the right to be properly cared for by others… He has the right to be 
respected.  Consequently he has a right to avoid unnecessary humiliation and 
degrading invasion of his body for no good purpose.”
 226
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However, in NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H, Butler-Sloss LJ discussed the principles of 
Bland which needed to be reconsidered in the light of the implementation of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953
227
 and 
appears to contradict her earlier endorsements with regards to the concept of dignity as non-
experiential: 
“… article 3 requires the victim to be aware of the inhuman and degrading treatment 
which he or she is experiencing or at least to be in a state of physical or mental 
suffering.  An insensate patient suffering from permanent vegetative state has no 
feelings and no comprehension of the treatment accorded to him or her.”
228
 
These different approaches, from one judge, epitomises one of the difficulties inherent in 
concept of dignity.  Is dignity dependent on awareness or not?  This is discussed further in 
Chapter Seven, which concludes that awareness is not a necessary requirement.  This position 
is bolstered by the judicial application of dignity; for example, most of the judges in Bland 
recognised dignity as non-experiential, and Hoffmann LJ placed a lot of importance on 
this:
229
   
“It is demeaning to the human spirit to say that, being unconscious, he can have no 
interest in his personal privacy and dignity, in how he lives and dies.”
230
  
Lord Goff also recognised that Anthony Bland had self-regarding, non-experiential interests, 
including the invasiveness of the treatment and the indignity he suffered.
231
   
The Amicus Curiae who appeared in the High Court in the Bland case was quoted by Sir 
Stephen Brown P in his judgment, seemingly with approval, putting forward the view that 
Anthony Bland had interests in the way his family remembered him and his manner of dying.   
“The best interests of the patient in my judgment embrace … a dignified death.”
232
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But what does a dignified, or good death mean?  Hedley J in Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt 
[2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam) (Wyatt) gave the following definition:  
“Given that death is the one experience (other than birth) that all humanity must 
share, no view of life that does not include a contemplation of the place of death, even 
in a child, can be complete.  As a society we fight shy of pondering on death yet 
inherent in each of us is a deep desire both for oneself and for those we love for a 
“good” death.  It seems to me therefore that in any consideration of best interests in a 
person at risk of imminent death is that of securing a “good” death.  It would be 
absurd to try to describe that concept more fully beyond saying that everyone in this 
case knows what it means – not under anaesthetic, not in the course of painful and 
futile treatment, but peacefully in the arms of those who love her most.”
233
 
Wyatt centred on the best interests of a child, Charlotte, and yet the concept of a ‘good’ death 
still arose.  Hedley J considered this an interest that Charlotte, although a minor, would have 
regardless of her awareness of what a good death was, and irrespective of not being able to 
form any preferences she may have had regarding it.   
Other-Regarding Interests 
“Adding intimacy concerns expressly brings another player to the table: we have not 
only a potential clash of individual concerns (this, indeed, is arguably the case in any 
medical intervention, given the present climate of fiscal scarcity), but also a clash 




In the discussion of interests presented in Part One there was acceptance that people can have 
interests regarding others.  In Dworkin’s discussion of critical interests he determines this 
when he refers to his children.  Although he is not specifically talking about the children’s 
interests, it is implied that he has a critical interest in their well-being.
235
  Sperling also 
acknowledges the interest that we have in our loved ones flourishing, which he categorises as 
a far-lifelong interest.
236
  Feinberg’s engagement with the interests of others is more direct, 
and provides a clear account whereby considering others’ interests alongside our own is a 
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  It is therefore credible that there is a second group of interests that we 
all have, the corollary to self-regarding interests, which is other-regarding interests.   
The concept that individuals may have interests that are not about themselves needs more 
investigation than the notion of self-regarding interests.  There are three reasons for this: (1) 
although Feinberg directly referred to other-regarding interests, Dworkin and Sperling did not 
explicitly engage with the notion, and therefore the justification should be further explored; 
(2) this thesis defines other-regarding interests in relation to the concept of best interests; and 
(3) this thesis contends that other-regarding interests have been undervalued and often 
overlooked in the best interests test.  The following section discusses different relationships 
with people that individuals could possibly have interests in, demonstrating that the 
conclusion that individuals do have other-regarding interests is a legitimate claim. 
The question now becomes: if we can have interests in something other than just ourselves, 
what are those other interests in?  It is logical that we care about, and have interests in, our 
own family and friends, but what about other things?  What about interests that are not 
people-centred at all?  The care for pets and their wellbeing is a common interest people 
have.
238
  Many also care about animals in a wider context – some people are vegetarian or 
vegan, citing the treatment of animals and the rights of animals as their reason.  Many care 
about endangered species of animals that will never personally be seen.  Environmental ethics 
shows us that non-anthropocentric views, and interests in things other than human beings are 
genuine and widespread, and that people can have interests in things other than ourselves.  
We care about the state of our planet, and on a daily basis may show this by using recycling 
bins.  This could be because of a belief in the protection of the earth and its environment for 
its own sake, or because of other-regarding interests in protecting future generations.  
Regardless of the underlying values this viewpoint highlights that individuals can have a 
wider view of interests, and although an extensive discussion regarding these kinds of 
interests is outside the scope of this thesis, they are discussed briefly to show that there is a 
wide scope of interests that people have.   
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The other-regarding interests that are most common, and best understood, are those that we 
have for the people that we care about.  We care about our family and their well-being to 
varying degrees (often depending on the closeness of the relationship rather than its status), 
and have regard for their interests.  Often, the nature of a person’s interests can depend on 
what is going on in their lives (parents quickly learn the truth of the old saying that ‘you are 
only as happy as your least happy child’).  These interests are other-regarding because it is an 
interest that one individual has for another person’s interests.  Parents want their children to 
be happy and healthy, for the child’s sake, completely unrelated to their own interests.
239
  I 
agree with Feinberg; people have other-regarding interests for those closest to them in a way 
that is not reliant on themselves benefitting, regardless of how inextricably our self-regarding 
interests are tied up with theirs.   
The development of other-regarding interests is a deliberate approach to the test of best 
interests, whereby an individual can only be understood by reference to others around them: 




It makes sense that people care for others in their lives, that they care for the people who have 
been good to them or who they feel connected to on some level.  However, infants (and some 
severely cognitively impaired adults), are not capable of recognising, or deliberately caring 
about, other people.  An important distinction needs to be made here.  Does a person need to 
be aware of others in order to have other-regarding interests?  For example, can an infant 
have other-regarding interests?  This thesis takes the (arguably) controversial position that 
they can.  If a person can have non-experiential interests, it seems to follow that infants can 
have interests which they are not aware of (if it is accepted that non-experiential interests do 
not derive from ever having awareness).  Infants do have interests tied up with certain people; 
for example statutory requirements that parents should, if they are able, provide their children 
with basic necessities for continued survival.  This legal protection can be traced to moral 
imperatives and social mores in every society in existence; all communities place a high 
value on protecting the children born into it.  Taylor-Sands argues that, because of the future 
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stake that an infant has in their family, there are shared interests.  Using feminist and 
communitarian theories, she argues that a child’s interests are inextricably linked to those of 
their families and that there are “collective interests” that any child shares with their 
family.
241
  Therefore, a child in her argument has an interest in the well-being of the parent, 
whether or not they are aware of such an interest.   
The issue with an infant having other-regarding interests may be intrinsic to the question of 
whether other-regarding interests should be linked to things people actually develop an 
interest in, rather than interests they might have gone on to develop.  In this thesis it is 
advocated that, whilst the incompetent patient is an individual, they are also something more: 
they are also someone who has not descended on the courts as an individual entity without 
ties to other people.  This is exemplified by the fact that many of the cases are actually 
brought to the courts by families who disagree with the treatment plans of the medical 
professionals.
242
  This is an important conceptual difference in the way that the best interests 
test can be interpreted.  Because it is the best interests of an individual that needs to be 
assessed the courts have interpreted this with all interests needing to be focused on self-
regarding interests rather than acknowledging the other-regarding interests that the person 
may have.  The view expressed here is not that the courts fail to acknowledge the families of 
the patients in the cases, but rather that their role can be elevated; as expanded upon in 
Chapters Five and Seven.   
In Aoteroa New Zealand, the Te Reo Māori concept of whānau is one that forms an integral 
part of society.  It is used in this thesis to reference the other-regarding interests individuals 
have for those closest to them; their family and friends.
243
  Whānau is not used in any 
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“Whānau is often translated as ‘family’, but its meaning is more complex.  Whānau 
ake describes an individual and their immediate whānau.  This can refer to a large 




There are two other reasons that the term whānau has been chosen in this context, both of 
which correlate to the ideas to be advanced in relation to other-regarding interests.  The first 
is inherent in the concept of whānau, it is the sense that an individual is interconnected with 
those around them. 
“Whānau begins with the individual.  The relationship between the individual and the 
whānau is subtle and complex.  Individuals have rights of their own, but they exist 
because of the whānau and have responsibilities to the whānau.  People are expected 
to express their individuality within the context of the whānau framework and whānau 
do not set out to create clones.  Respected Ngāti Porou elder Merekaraka Ngarimu 
explained the significance of the individual using performance of the haka ‘Ruamoko’ 
as an example.  The individuals in the haka party will perform the haka differently 
according to their own natures and styles.  In doing so they contribute to, support and 
strengthen the whole.  The aim of their teacher was not to standardise the performance 
but to allow the uniqueness of each individual to emerge.  This pepeha (saying) 
encapsulates the essence of the individual within the whānau: 
Ehara taku toa i te toa takitahi engari he toa takitini taku toa. 
My strength does not come from my individuality, my strength comes from many.”
246
 
Whānau describes the intimate relationships that people actually have.  Some do not feel a 
sense of kinship with their traditional family, but instead form these relationships with others, 
and the whānau concept acknowledges this.  Secondly, it also provides a framework of 
inclusion whereby there are associated duties, so if someone is not performing those duties 
their position in the whānau would reflect this.  For example, if an immediate family member 
is treating another member badly this could indicate that the courts should rely less on that 
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  Any account that allows for whānau and their wishes to factor into the 
decision-making for an incompetent patient must consider that not all family situations are 
the same, and understand that, while no one is from the quintessential ‘perfect’ family, some 
families are very far from this ideal.
248
  There should also be recognition that not everyone 
has strong familial ties. 
“The fact that most of us feel a strong sense of obligation towards our family 
members, then, cannot in itself form the basis of a moral duty incumbent on those 
who do not, or cannot, have similar feelings.”
249
 
However, in most of the end-of-life cases, families are very present, and have often actually 
instigated the proceedings because they feel strongly about a certain outcome.  In those cases, 
there is no reason to question the incompetent person as a connected member of a familial 
community.  Of course, the courts do recognise the role that families play, and in some cases 
prioritise certain family members’ views.  In the Canadian case Janzen v Janzen, Mr Janzen 
had suffered severe brain damage and the prognosis was that he would live in a vegetative 
state for the rest of his life.
250
  His siblings sought guardianship of their brother, as they 
wanted treatment for him to be continued, but his wife was refusing treatment for him.  The 
judge commented on the nature of their relationship and prioritised the wife’s view of what 
the patient would want over the siblings’: 
“I note that Maria Janzen and Edward Janzen have been married for over 12 years.  
They have two children.  They have operated as an intimate family unit for many 
years.  There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Maria Janzen would not know 
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her husband’s wishes in these circumstances and that she would not have his best 
interest at heart.  I consider it instructive that under s. 20(1) of the Health Care 
Consent Act, 1996, supra, in the absence of a court order, the spouse of an incapable 
person is considered to have a higher right than a sibling to give or refuse consent to 
medical treatment on behalf of the incapable person.  I believe this reflects that in the 
normal course, a spouse will have been more intimately involved than a sibling in the 
recent life of the incapable person.”
251
 
This is an entirely reasonable approach to any consideration of best interests, but is, arguably, 
implicitly based on Mr Janzen’s other-regarding interests.  Who is he most likely to have the 
most other-regarding interests for?  His wife, and therefore her view should be prioritised 
over the views of his siblings.   
The individual interests of the patient are considered the focus of the best interests test, and 
any consideration to the interests of the family secondary, which is appropriate.  However, 
this is done by applying a broad stroke which does not consider that the patient can have 
interests which actually align with the ‘family’s best interests’.  In the following case Ms D 
may have had other-regarding interests in her family’s hope for a miracle; she may have 
prioritised their hopes over her interest in a dignified death.  The point here is not how likely 
this view is (the veracity of views is discussed in Chapter Five) but the lack of consideration 
for these interests.  
“From the family’s point of view, of course, every extra day is worth fighting for and, 
given what they have had to face in the past few years, no one can have anything but 
the profoundest sympathy for them in their hope for the arrival of a miracle.  But my 
focus must be on the patient’s best interests and not on the family best interests.  In 
my judgment Ms D’s best interests demand that she should not be subjected to more 
than the minimum necessary to allow her to die peacefully and with dignity.”
252
 
Often too the family’s interests are seen as ‘emotional’, and therefore not objective enough to 
impact upon a legal decision: 
“That understandable concern of the members of his immediate family adds its own 
dimension of sadness to the overall situation with which the Court is called upon to 
deal, and makes it particularly important that in coming to grips with the issues on the 
present application, the Court take care not to be inappropriately distracted by feelings 
of sympathy, entirely proper and logical feelings of sympathy, for the plight of the 
members of Mr Krommydas’s family.  They are entitled to express their views as they 
have done through their solicitor.  They are entitled to have those views given every 
proper and respectful consideration by the Court.  But in the end the way in which the 
present application falls to be considered depends not upon consideration of that kind, 
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but upon cut and dried considerations of law, and cut and dried findings of fact based 
not upon supposition or hope, but upon concrete evidence.”
253
 
Whilst the judge recognised in Krommydas that the family views should be considered, the 
overall tenor of this passage shows that they are in actuality held in relatively low regard.  Of 
course, there is no suggestion here that other-regarding interests should be applied without 
discretion, and Chapter Seven discusses the difficulties involved with prioritising interests.  
However, a framework for the consideration of best interests is presented in this thesis which 
does not simply dismiss other-regarding interests either.  This is, perhaps, an even more 
persuasive point when the child is a minor (the following case dealt with twins who had the 
same degenerative disorder): 
“The father also made the point that withdrawal of life support and the consequent 
deaths of the children would not affect just him and his wife and their elder surviving 
son, but also the whole family, most of whom remain in Iraq. I completely understand 
and deeply sympathise with that point. However, as is clear from the propositions of 
law quoted above, my decision must be governed solely by the best interests of each 
of these children themselves. I cannot ultimately be influenced by the obvious impact 
upon, or sympathy for, the families.”
254
 
Holman J has overlooked that the impact upon the family might actually be an other-
regarding interest of the children in this case.  A parent is almost always the person who is 
closest to the child, and spent the most time with them as recognised by Holman J in a 
different case, NHS Trust v MB.
255
 
Chapter Seven discusses the implications of other-regarding interests with regard to the 
parental role.  However, for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to note that, although 
judges are understandably aware of the impact on families in these cases, mostly this is not 
manifested as an interest that the patient can have.   
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The focus on the individual, which is unchallenged in its centrality to the best interests test, 
means that consideration for other-regarding interests is difficult to advance in a way that 
recognises these interests.  Nelson refers to this individualist tradition as one that has 
consequences for the end-of-life cases.   
“[Medical ethics] and medicine’s own ethical tradition are ruggedly individualist: the 
interests of the individual patient, in splendid isolation from her social context, are to 
a considerable extent privileged.  To be sure, there are powerful reasons for this focus, 
rooted in our concern about defending the vulnerability and privacy of patients.  Yet 
there is increasing reason to believe that this intensity of focus on patient interests – 
considered as the interests of splendidly isolated individuals – reflects a kind of moral 
obtuseness, and that we would do better to design a system of medical 
decisionmaking sensitive to a broader range of values.”
256
 
Whilst interests relating to families that the courts do recognise are discussed, other-regarding 
interests that go beyond their friends and family are even more difficult to assert.  It does, 
however, seem plausible to care about people other than those closest to us.  For example, 
people often care about those seen on the news who may be suffering, or starving, or who 
have lost loved ones.  The solidarity principle proposes to explain this, but is itself a difficult 
concept to define.
257
  Gillett has contributed to this discussion with the following syllogism: 
“The solidarity syllogism. 
(1)  A human being is a relational and dependent entity, the well-being of 
whom rests partly on that relatedness and, therefore, on other human 
beings. 
(2)  It is rational and good to enhance the lives of those whose lives contribute 
to one's own well-being. 
(3)  Any human being has a (rational, endorsable) interest in enhancing the 
lives of other human beings with whom she is in contact.  (Call this The 
Solidarity Principle.) 
The solidarity principle is, like any other principle, defeasible and not over-riding in 
the light of a person's other interests, but it serves as a sound default position from 
which to begin in reasoning about the dues we owe to others.  If it is true then, in 
principle, we have some interest—a solidarity interest—in contributing to the lives of 
others when we can do so at no or minimal cost to ourselves.  Thus, it posits an 
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The last sentence is particularly significant to this thesis, where Gillett refers to an interest in 
the good of others which does not benefit oneself.  Gillett uses the solidarity principle to 
argue for elective ventilation where the patient has not yet been declared dead and 
consequently the ventilation is solely for the purpose of facilitating organ donation.  This 
solidarity interest endorses the view that other-regarding interests exist, but also elevates it to 
a positive principle that we actually owe others a duty to enhance their lives where it does not 
negatively affect our own interests.  Gillett also posits that this principle is defeasible, but 
states that there is a presumptive case for donating, whether or not the person involved 
expressed a preference to do so.  Where the person involved had a strong subjective interest 
in not donating, then: 
“It would also be instructive to see whether such a subjective antisolidarity interest 
was reasonable (in some intuitive sense).”
259
 
This seems to be a claim that people ought to have such interests, not necessarily that they 
actually do have them. Or maybe that we should assume the existence of such interests?  The 
inclusion of reasonableness into the standard may be requiring too high a level of beneficent 
action.  It also assumes that being ventilated for the sole purpose of organ donation does not 
negatively affect that individual’s interests – which could be disputed.  This is especially true 
if we extrapolate from the current model of autonomous decision-making in healthcare, 
which allows for refusal of consent for any reason for any procedure whereby it is explicitly 
stated that reasonableness or rationality is not necessary.
260
  The standard may also escalate 
too quickly from wanting to enhance the lives of those who have contributed to our well-
being, to enhancing the lives of any others with whom we are in contact.   
However, Gillett’s solidarity principle asserts that it is possible to have interests about others 
beyond any awareness an individual might have, and that this interest is one that is vested in 
the community of others around us: 
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“… to act consistently with the solidarity principle we can all be deemed to have, we 
should support measures that enhance the likelihood that it will be served by decisions 
made about us when we can no longer be part of them and are beyond any adverse 
consequences they might cause.”
261
 
But does this necessarily mean that we have other-regarding interests not just to those closest 
to us, but also other-regarding interests in our community?  This is also expressed in the 
notion that our identities are only understood in a wider context of our communities.  
Sperling addresses this idea when he discusses the concept of the ‘social self’:  
“The idea is that the self originates in a social context and becomes aware of itself 
only after communication with another is enabled.”
262
      
The view that an individual can only be explained in relation to a community is important in 
many cultures: 
“individuality is not found in ‘textbook’ cases but in the social and cultural aspects of 
the people involved in the situation; individuals are created and discovered in relation 
to others – that is, to communities.”
263
  
If the idea of solidarity is accepted, where does that fit with a notion of altruism?  In some 
accounts they share characteristics, but altruism is described as a general principle compared 
to the practice of solidarity: 
“Solidarity might also share features with the concept of altruism, but again, there are 
important differences. Altruism is a more general attitude towards (all) others, 
whereas solidarity comprises concrete practices within a community of people who 
are sharing certain things in common.  The outcome may well be the same, but the 
motivations differ: I may help someone because I am motivated by a sense of 
altruism, and thus generally think that it is important to help others without thinking 
of my own benefit, or I might help someone because I recognize sameness in a 
relevant sense with her and I am thus enacting solidarity.”
264
 
There have been few cases in the end-of-life context which have discussed the notion of 
altruism.  This is possibly because it seems inextricably linked to resources, and any 
consideration of resources gives the impression of going against the patient’s best interests: 
“I have considerable difficulty with application of such a test in the circumstances of a 
proposed withdrawal of treatment case such as the present.  However, I do accept that 
such a test can properly be applied in a case such as the present if the matter be 
viewed negatively, namely that it is not in the best interests of the patient to be kept 
alive by artificial means, where the court is satisfied that the diagnosis is so clear and 
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the prognosis so futile that the ward truly has no interest in being kept alive.  
Parliament will no doubt require to grapple in due course with the thorny problems of 
implication of altruistic sentiments and the relevance, if any at all, of interests other 
than those of the patient.”
265
 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR was the lone judge in Bland to consider the possibility that the 
patient could have an interest in altruism: 
“[An] account [of the individual’s best interests] may be taken of wider, less tangible 
considerations … even, perhaps, if altruism still lives, to a belief that finite resources 
are better devoted to enhancing life than simply averting death.”
266
 
It is interesting that he was the only judge to address this directly; however he had little to say 
beyond this as the National Health Service (NHS) had invited the court to consider the issue 
as if resources were unlimited.  This in itself is indicative that the medical profession (and by 
association the judiciary) are very careful to avoid the perception that decisions are made 
based on where limited resources could best be used.  This is undoubtedly divorced from the 
reality of all healthcare situations, which is of course that money, medical practitioners and 
hospital beds are all finite, and resource decisions must be made daily on both a micro and 
macro level.   
In the New Zealand case of Shortland, resources were more transparently the issue, as the 
treatment decision was about kidney dialysis and the judge found that the basis for the 
decision-making was unclear: 
“It is not clear to me whether the decision to cease dialysis was made on the basis of a 
judgment that it was not in Mr Williams’ best interests or whether it was based on an 
assessment of where scarce resources should best be used.”
 267
  
In England and Wales the best interests standard under the MCA 2005 can apply to property, 
and In the Matter of G (TJ) the judge recognised that the patient had altruistic interests:  
“These various references to gifts, lifetime and testamentary, and settlements for the 
benefit of others, suggest to me that the word “interests” in the phrase “best interests” 
is not confined to matters of self interest or, putting it another way, a court could 
conclude in an appropriate case that it is in the interests of P for P to act 
altruistically.”
268
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Property and life or death matters are, however, very different.  A patient could, however, 
have altruistic interests of their own; altruism does not necessarily have to be an objective 
interest that everyone should have.  That we can have altruistic interests of our own seems a 
far less controversial claim than that we have objective interests in the welfare of others. 
An Overlap of Interests  
Ways of Being Remembered by Family 
There are also other-regarding interests that a permanently incompetent person can have, 
some of which can be categorised as self-regarding.  Whilst at first this seems counter-
intuitive, the following example demonstrates how it can work.   
Mark Darcy has a secret.  He met his wife Elinor after she had run away from her 
abusive husband, bringing their one year old daughter Marianne into hiding with her.  
Mark raised Marianne as his own daughter, and Marianne thought that Mark and 
Elinor were her biological parents.  When Mark was diagnosed with terminal cancer 
he thought about telling Marianne the truth, but decided that he wanted her to 
remember him as her Dad for not only his sake, but also for hers.  He did not want to 
diminish any of the memories that she had of him and did not want to add to her 
suffering. 
In this scenario, Mark has a self-regarding, surviving interest in the way that he is 
remembered after death as Marianne’s Dad.  However, there is another aspect to consider 
here, and that is the other-regarding interest Mark has in how Marianne remembers him for 
her own sake.  This other-regarding interest arises because people care for their loved ones 
and the memories they have of them with consideration of their loved ones’ interests, not just 
their own.  A non-experiential interest in being remembered a certain way after death is not 
always both self-regarding and other-regarding, but it may be and it should be considered as a 
possibility.  The right to be well regarded is one that is protected by the law, as stated by 
Sperling: 
“In addition to these legal cases, there are some legal areas in which one can find 
support for the idea of the interest in the recognition of one’s symbolic existence.  
With regard to the living, and in some jurisdictions also to the dead, defamation law 
and the law of privacy protect a person’s interest in maintaining her good name”.
269
 
Therefore, a person can have an interest in how they are remembered after they are dead; this 
interest can be a self-regarding, non-experiential interest that they had while competent 
(expressed as an after-life interest by Sperling and a surviving interest by Feinberg).  This is 
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an interest that is fairly common.  Most people if asked would probably express a desire to be 
remembered after death in a particular way that resonated with the person that they were 
during life.  For example, a mountain climber may want to be remembered as someone who 
loved the outdoors and a challenge.  In this thesis however the idea is taken further by 
suggesting that an interest in how a person is remembered can also be other-regarding; it does 
not necessarily need to be predicated on how the particular person wants to be remembered, it 
can also be based on consideration for others’ interests. 
Butler-Sloss LJ in the Court of Appeal identified this distinction in the Bland case: 
“He retains in my view the right to be well regarded by others, and to be well 
remembered by his family.  That right is separate from that of his family to remember 
him and to have the opportunity to grieve for him when he is dead.”
 270
  
Although, again, she discussed this in terms of ‘rights’ (which could require too high a 
threshold) she nevertheless recognises that there are different interests, and that these are self-
and other-regarding.   
Family’s Views Respected 
“S described how he and other family members had concluded that what M would 
have wanted was to ‘put an end to her suffering’.  He stressed that he was not seeking 
to alleviate his own distress. ‘It’s not about us. We’re irrelevant. I could only speak up 
for her, knowing her views and opinions. We’re her voice’.”
271
 
There is also a self-regarding, non-experiential interest in wanting your whānau to have their 
views considered.  This is probably more significant than an interest in how the patient is 
remembered because it has implications for the patient’s current care.  As a competent person 
I can say that if I became incompetent I would want my whānau’s views on what should 
happen to me to be considered, as they know me the best, and it is for my benefit that their 
views are known.  This is separate from the other-regarding interest I have, in wanting them 
to have their views considered for their own sake.   
Harriet Jones is pregnant.  She says to her husband – “if anything happens to me 
over the next few months please keep me alive on a ventilator if it means that the baby 
might live.  I want my baby to have a chance at life.  And I don’t want you to lose me 
and the baby.”   
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If something happens to Harriet, leaving her in a permanently incompetent state, it could be 
said that she had an interest in being kept alive artificially while pregnant, an interest that was 
expressed previously to her husband.  This is a self-regarding, surviving interest which is 
separate from the interest she has for the baby to live, and the interests that her husband has 
for himself.   
A person’s interest in their whānau having their views respected regarding treatment 
decisions is a self-regarding interest.  One reason that a person may want their whānau’s 
views taken into consideration is because the whānau are the most likely to know what, if 
any, views the permanently incompetent person may have held on possible treatment 
considerations.
272
  This is linked to a respect for the patient’s autonomy, and is something 
that is discussed extensively in Chapter Five.  However, it is important to note here that there 
is a distinction that can be made in relation to these views, a way of interpreting them that 
means that the family’s views are taken into consideration as an other-regarding interest.  A 
person can want their family’s views respected in end-of-life treatment decisions because 
they want whānau to have influence on the decision-making, which perhaps is a way of 
recognising that their loved ones are more affected in some situations than themselves.
273
  
The views of family for those who have not been previously competent will be examined in 
more detail when discussing parental views.
274
  There is, therefore, an other-regarding 
interest that a person may have regarding their family’s views being respected, not just 
because of the possible benefit to the person, but because the close relationship reflects that 
they do have a valid view on any treatment decisions and these treatment decisions should 
not be made in isolation from this.   
In clinical practice the family’s view is an important one, and it is one that the medical 
profession does take seriously.  For example, in New Zealand the family does not have a 
legal right to veto an organ donation from somebody who has indicated that they would like 
to donate organs.  In practice, however, the medical profession are reluctant to override a 
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family’s strong objection to donation.
275
  There are various reasons for this, namely not 
upsetting families when they are already going through an extremely difficult time, and not 
wanting to erode doctor-patient relationships with either that particular family or the wider 
public.  Not only is this an example of the medical profession giving credence to family’s 
views, it is also an example of a no-longer competent person’s autonomy being overridden 
for reasons that are not based on the person themselves, but others close to them.  This is a 
potentially meaningful example for later chapters as it demonstrates the importance of family, 
and it is also an example of what Harris argued, that a person-affecting interest is more 
important than a surviving interest.
276
 
In many cases, it is the family who are the instigators in bringing the case to court, as they 
disagree with the approach that the medical practitioners have taken.  Northridge is one of the 
most extreme examples of a breakdown between family and the medical profession, and an 
aberration in the cases canvassed.
277
  This Australian case was characterised by extremely 
poor communication between physicians and family; at one stage it is alleged (and the doctor 
accused of doing so did not deny it) that, in response to requests for the resumption of 
antibiotics for the patient, he pointed to the patient Mr Thompson and said “What’s the 
point?”.
278
   
Lord Goff discussed the distinction between the actual indignity, and the perception of the 
indignity: 
“It is reasonable also that account should be taken of the invasiveness of the treatment 
and of the indignity to which, as the present case shows, a person has to be subjected 
if his life is prolonged by artificial means, which must cause considerable distress to 
his family – a distress which reflects not only their own feelings but their perception 
of the situation of their relative who is being kept alive.”
279
 
This introduces some quite subtle and ramified ideas.  First, there is the actual indignity of the 
patient, and there is also the distress the family feels in experiencing the artificial 
prolongation of their loved one’s life.  Additionally, there is the perception of the indignity 
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which is being visited upon that loved one, which raises an interesting question as to whether 
this is really just another reference to the indignity of the patient, or whether the perception of 
an indignity is an additional concern.  Regardless, it does exemplify the point that there are 
interests which can separated into self-regarding, non-experiential (Mr Thompson and 
Anthony Bland suffering indignity) and the other-regarding view of the patient’s family 
seeing him being subjected to the indignity.   
Taxonomy of Interests 
Using this extensive discussion it is possible to summarise and categorise all the various 
interests discussed in this chapter.   
1. Welfare Interests 
Self-Regarding interest 
Not valuable for themselves, but instrumentally valuable for the satisfaction of 
other interests.  For example, a basic standard of health. 
2. Future-Orientated Interests  
Self-  or Other-Regarding interest 
Critical interest 
Surviving interest 
Interests that do not correspond to anything a person values or cares about 
now, but which relate to things that they are likely to value later.   
3. Awareness-Dependent Interests  
Self-Regarding interest  
Experiential interest  
Interests that do not survive death or total loss of physical or cognitive 
awareness.  For example, an in interest in avoiding pain.  In some accounts 
(not the one proposed in this thesis) an interest in dignity belongs in this 
group.   
4. Value-Dependent Interests 
Self-  or Other-Regarding interest 
Precedent interest 
Only applicable to those who have – or have had – relevant values.  Can 
potentially survive death.   
5. Collective Interests 
Interests that are shared interests, for example infants having an interest in 
their family’s wellbeing.  The family unit is seen as being more than just an 
‘other’, but something of which the individual is a part.  Collective interests 
can be described as straddling the self-regarding and other-regarding 
categories, and can be objectively applied based on future-orientated interests.  
Collective interests not based on future-orientated interests are more 




6. Ideally Motivated Interests 
Self-  or Other-Regarding interest 
Critical interest 
Interests that are linked to a sense of good.  For example, an interest in doing 
the right thing, or being the right sort of person.  Possibly the most 
controversial of all interests if applied as an other-regarding interest as it then 
risks conflating interests and duties.   
7. Objective Interests  
Self-  or Other-Regarding interest 
Critical interest 
Interests that everyone has regardless of either being aware of having any 
interests, (unlike category 3) or having been capable of valuing anything 
(unlike category 4).  This is a crucial category as any recognition of objective 
interests is essentially recognising that a human being has interests merely by 
virtue of this status.  If it there are objective interests then they are not 
dependent on a person’s state of awareness.  Two self-regarding interests 
could also be called objective: an interest in dignity and an interest in avoiding 
prolonged suffering.  An interest in not suffering is an experiential interest, the 
person must be sensate.  However, dignity is an interest that is more disputed.  
Does a person need to be aware of their own dignity to have an interest in it?  
Although in one case this was ruled necessary, mostly it has been recognised 
as independent from awareness by the courts.
280
  It is contentious to have 
objective, other-regarding interests.   
Summary of Chapter Three 
This chapter has discussed the various kinds of interests that people can have.  This thesis 
places a particular emphasis on the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding 
interests, a distinction that I have suggested has been under-discussed in the literature to date.  
Essentially people may care about other people: (1) for the sake of those other people; (2) 
because the well-being of those other people is related to their own well-being or life plans; 
or (3) out of some more general sense of altruism.  (1) and (3) are genuinely other-regarding, 
whereas (2) could be instrumentally and indirectly self-regarding.  Where there are other-
regarding interests, these could form the basis of a presumption about what most people 
actually have, or – more controversially – a prescriptive statement about what people ought to 
care about, as advocated by Dworkin.  A prescriptive application of best interests would take 
the test in a very new direction, as it would be including the notion of ideal-regarding 
interests and ascribing to the incompetent patient interests that they ought to have. 
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Sometimes the interests a person has, or has had, may depend on what they are currently 
experiencing, or not experiencing.  Feinberg, Dworkin and Sperling all accept that interests 
are not necessarily dependent on a person’s direct experience of them, and that everyone has 
interests that go beyond those that are directly experienced.  There is also agreement that 
there is a link between how someone lived their life and what interests they may have.  What 
this means is that what the person is, or is not, experiencing, and what they have, or have not 
experienced in their lives is important in assessing any interests that they may have.  In order 
to do this whether or not they had a previous self becomes a crucial distinction.  If someone 
has been previously competent they will have experienced a life and this should inform and 
help decision makers decide what the best interests of the incompetent are.
281
  As I discussed 
in Chapter Two, the prior wishes of an incompetent person are a component of any best 
interests consideration, and therefore the establishment of categories regarding incompetency 
are necessary to properly reflect whether or not a person has even been able to previously 
express any wishes.   
In this chapter there has been a discussion of what kinds of interests people may have, and 
issues relating to competence have been raised: is prior competence equated with more 
interests?  Are the interests that are ascribed to someone who is permanently incompetent 
different to those ascribed to someone currently competent?  The following chapter provides 
a detailed exploration of incompetence, and provides distinctions regarding the different 
states of competence.  
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“[A]n analysis of competence determination is on e central part of the ethical 
and legal analysis in  a theory of decision making for incompetents.” 282 
Best interests, as shown in Chapter Two, becomes a decision-making tool in the courts once 
someone is incompetent and can no longer exercise their own self-determination.  Therefore, 
a person’s incompetence is a prerequisite for the use of the best interests test.  If a person is 
not incompetent, then there is no need to make decisions on their behalf.  Of course, a 
person’s competence is not a simple determination.  There are various accounts of what 
competence entails, and similar to the use of best interests, there are various ways that 
competence can be utilised.  Is it a legal or medical term?  How is it used in end-of-life cases?  
It is important to understand the concepts of competence and incompetence, because 
individuals who are incompetent are not all identical in ways which are relevant to 
determining their best interests; for example, some may be able to experience pain, while 
others may not.  Additionally, and critically, some incompetent patients will have been 
previously competent and some will not.  The example of a patient with dementia, and 
precedent autonomy, is used to show the difference between previously held interests and 
current interests; this is further developed in Chapter Five to sometimes be conflated in end-
of-life judgments. 
It is commonly accepted that there are three states relating to competence that a person can be 
in: (1) currently competent and able to make their own decisions; (2) transiently incompetent 
at the time decision-making is required; and (3) permanently incompetent.  As described in 
Chapter One this thesis provides a consideration of permanently incompetent patients within 
the context of end-of-life decision-making, and this group of incompetent patients is further 
categorised these into three different groups: (1) permanently incompetent and made prior 
expressions of their views when competent; (2) permanently incompetent and made no prior 
expressions of their views when competent, despite having the capacity to do so; and (3) 
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permanently incompetent and made no prior expressions of their views, because they never 
achieved competence.  The differences between these three groups of patients is significant; 
these categorisations are used in Chapters Five, Six and Seven to indicate that judges have 
made crucial distinctions about the possible interests that a permanently incompetent person 
may have based on what group they fall within.  In trying to assess best interests of someone 
who cannot now say what they want (or communicate what they believe their own best 
interests to be) there is the presumption that what they once would have wanted will be 
relevant. This focus on previous views (which necessitates that the patient had prior 
competence) is a legislative requirement, and is further justified by the interpretation that 
such a focus respects the patient’s autonomy.  This is problematic, as the question of ‘what 
the patient wanted when they were competent’ could be viewed as an attempt to preserve and 
act upon current autonomy when that autonomy has in fact been lost, as the patient no longer 
has any ability for autonomous decision-making.  It is therefore necessary to examine the 
important ideas that emerge from a discussion of competence to illustrate the basis for some 
of the attitudes towards interests and prior views.   
Part One: The Concepts of Competence and 
Incompetence   
Difficulties exist regarding the context, the terminology, and the definitions applied, in any 
discussion of competence.  The contextual difficulty relates to a broader debate regarding 
competence and when a person is, or is not, competent, and when a person can, or cannot, 
participate in the informed consent process.  This is not of particular relevance to this thesis, 
except insofar as this broader debate has established that the concept of competence can be 
more deeply understood as being pertinent to decision-making for specific tasks and specific 
decisions.  The following section outlines the importance of informed consent in order to 
provide a background for the discussion of competence in the healthcare setting.   
The issues around terminology primarily concern the words competence and capacity when 
discussing a person’s ability to make their own decisions.  Do competence and capacity apply 
to the same concept or do they have different meanings?  In this thesis the position is taken 
that they are interchangeable, but that the separate components of the concept – whichever 




Relating to the fact that competence has requisite components, there has been some debate 
over what these should include.  The components which are universally agreed upon are the 
ability to communicate, to understand information, and to reason and deliberate.  It is not 
always accepted that there should be a requirement that a person has a set of values, or sense 
of good, included in the requirements for competence.  A framework is proposed in this 
chapter which accepts values as a component of competence, arguing that it is not only 
necessary, but also important for any determination of a person’s best interests.  This may 
seem like an exaggerated claim at this point, but it is proposed to show how this is linked to 
what we understand of a person, and their views, and how this can subsequently be used to 
assess their best interests when they are incompetent.   
These difficulties are discussed in Part One, with a focus on acknowledging the 
complications and utilising the discussion as it relates to the permanently incompetent 
patient.   
Informed Consent 
In the health care setting, the accepted ethical practice from a medico-legal point of view is 
that every patient has the right to make decisions about their own body and health care 
treatments.  This means anyone has the right to consent to, or refuse, treatment.  This is a 
right that is enshrined in all four of the legal systems considered in this thesis, as summarised 
by the following maxim:
283
 
“every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body”.
284
 
In end-of-life cases, substitute decision-makers are therefore appropriating this basic right 
accorded to everyone, and this partly explains why it is such an onerous duty.  This basic 
right is not, however, applied indiscriminately, and is dependent on the person actually being 
able to give or withhold informed consent to any health care treatment or investigation.  In 
order to be able to consent the person must give informed consent.  Informed consent is a 
process in which both the individual and the medical practitioner participate, and it is 
considered to be the foundation for respecting the autonomy of the patient.  It is generally 
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accepted that the informed consent process has three elements: that the individual has (1) 
been informed of all necessary information; (2) has given consent voluntarily; and (3) is 
competent to make the particular decision where competence includes components of: (a) 
communication and understanding; (b) reasoning and deliberation; and (c) (in some 
interpretations) a set of values or concept of the good.
285
  A person who is determined to have 
met the threshold of competence required for the particular decision in the informed consent 
process, is then in a position to be able to make their own decisions.   
“Participation in decision-making provides the opportunity to exercise choice 
according to one’s own values and beliefs rather than receiving treatment through 
paternalistic imposition of another’s treatment decisions.”
286
 
The permanently incompetent patient therefore cannot participate in the informed consent 
process because they lack any ability to participate in the three elements comprising the 
process.  While a deeper discussion on precisely how the informed consent process is 
approached by health professionals is not merited in a thesis focusing on permanently 
incompetent patients, it is appropriate to note that there is little controversy over the central 
role of informed consent in the health care setting.  The next section of this chapter focuses 
on the components required for competence and what it means to find that someone is, or is 
not competent, before Part Two discusses the categorisation of incompetent patients.   
Competence and Capacity 
Until now the terms competent and incompetent have been principally used in this thesis, but 
the term capacity is widely referred to in this area.  Competence and capacity have the shared 
meaning of “the ability to perform a task”.
287
  Both of these terms are used when considering 
if an individual has decision-making abilities, and both are used when discussing the ability 
for autonomous decision-making.  Since there is a lack of clarity regarding these two terms, 
including if indeed there actually is any difference between them, some possible 
interpretations are briefly examined here.  This section concludes that there is little difference 
in the way that the terms are used, both medically and legally, and that little rests on what 
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term is used – the important part is to identify what it means for a person to be competent, or 
to have capacity – and therefore the terms are interchangeable.   
In some discussions regarding a lack of ability to consent, the distinction has been made that 
competence is a legal term which is assessed by the courts, and that a person either is, or is 
not, competent. In those discussions, capacity is discussed as a term that is used for decision-
making as assessed by health professionals.  This position is outlined by Grisso, who 
surmises that there is little practical difference:  
“Most authors distinguish between assessments of decision-making capacity, which 
health care professionals can conduct, and determinations of competence, which are 
legal judgments left to the courts.  Although technically correct this distinction seems 
to break down in practice.  When clinicians determine that a patient lacks decision-
making capacity, the practical consequences may be the same as those attending a 
legal determination of incompetence.”
288
 
In legal and bioethical commentary there are also different viewpoints presented.  In Health 
Law in Australia, one of the earliest books to comprehensively discuss Australian medical 
law, the authors note that there are divergent views as to whether there is a distinction 
between capacity and competence, observing that the courts seem to suggest an important 
distinction.
289
  The Australian text itself does not distinguish between the terms.  In Medical 
Law in New Zealand the authors state that the same legal concept is at issue with both 
competence and capacity, and disagree with the conclusion in Health Law Australia, stating 
that neither case nor statute law reflect any distinction.
290
 
As a result of the ambiguity in the application of competence and capacity this thesis follows 
the New Zealand approach that the terms can be used interchangeably.  This is also how the 
terms are used in legislation: Right 7 (Right to Make an Informed Choice and Give Informed 
Consent) in The Code of Patient Rights refers to competence; however the PPPR Act uses 
both competence and capacity to denote the same legal concept.
291
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In the following section, the specific components that are required for competence are 
explored, and the need for a set of values included in this requirement is further discussed. 
Components Needed for Competence 
The usual state of being for most of us is that we are competent and are able to make our own 
decisions, not only about our own healthcare but also about all aspects of our life.  We can 
choose to live our lives doing what we perceive to be in our own best interests, or, crucially, 
what is not in our best interests.  As mentioned previously, competence is one of the three 
elements of informed consent and it has requisite elements. Buchanan and Brock discuss 
three components necessary for a person to competently decide about their health care: 
“capacity for understanding and communication”, the “capacity for reasoning and 
deliberation”, and the possession of “a set of values or conception of the good.”
292
  The 
authors therefore advocate an approach which acknowledges several components or elements 
required for competent decision-making.  This multi-faceted approach is usual; however the 
reference to a set of values is not always present.  For example, Beauchamp and Childress’ 
standards of competence omit this condition; their three kinds of abilities required for 
competence focus on the ability to formulate a preference, the ability to understand 
information and appreciate one’s situation, and the ability to reason through a consequential 
life decision.
293
   
It is often assumed that people make decisions in line with their best interests.  But this is not 
necessarily true and it is not necessarily as simple as that would suggest.  Sometimes people 
do things that are not obviously or entirely in their best interests, for example prioritising 
short-term gain (dessert) over long-term gain (weight loss).
294
  Further, some people may 
choose to place someone else’s interests above their own.  In the last chapter, the conclusion 
that was advocated was that there are other-regrading interests, a standard example being a 
mother experiencing difficulties during labour, whose choices are made for the safety of the 
baby, not herself.  Competence denotes only that autonomous beings are capable of making 
their own decisions, leaving it possible that these decisions are irrational, nonsensical, or 
contrary to what might be perceived by others to be in that person’s best interests.  For 
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example, if someone wants to go swimming in a river beside a large sign saying ‘warning 
hungry crocodiles’ it may be a competent decision, despite the questionable rationale (the 
person may relish risky activities).  However, while it is accepted that people who are 
competent are permitted to make any foolish decisions, if they are not competent then there 
are protections in place.  One form of this protection is for others who are competent to make 
decisions for them; in the Commonwealth jurisdictions this means to decide in someone’s 
best interests. As explained in Chapter Two, this can be traced back to the parens patriae 
jurisdiction of the courts.   
Sometimes the capacity to make decisions may fluctuate.  Any or all of the components of 
understanding, reasoning or communication may vary depending on the underlying cause of 
the impaired capacity.  There are four main types of conditions that adults can have which 
may cause a lack of capacity: organic brain disorders (such as dementia), intellectual 
disability, acquired brain injury and mental illness.
295
  It is important to note that, if a person 
has any of these conditions, it does not automatically render them incompetent.  In fact, often 
the person will be able to exercise their ability to consent, or refuse consent, to health care 
procedures.  This is because the components necessary for informed consent are not binary – 
either present or absent – but instead present to varying degrees.  We all understand, reason, 
and deliberate to differing degrees, with differing levels of skill and mastery. 
Competence is also task-specific.  Buchanan and Brock discuss competence as decision-
relative; where a person’s competence is related to making a specific decision.   
“A competence determination, then, is a determination of a particular person’s 




What this means is that a person may be competent to make one sort of treatment decision 
but not competent to make another sort of treatment decision.  Additionally, a person may be 
competent to make a treatment decision one day, but the next day they may not be.   
Beauchamp and Childress describe competence judgments as serving a ‘gatekeeping role’ for 
the decisions that patients may make.  When a person meets the required threshold of 
competence, then the gate is opened to the patient being able to determine his or her own 
health care.  This imposes an obligation of the health professional to honour that person’s 
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choice.  However if the person is assessed as incompetent to make the decision because they 
have failed to reach the threshold of required competence, there is then no such obligation 
and the health professionals may chose to ignore or override the person’s choice.  The gate to 
choice is closed to that person and others must make the decision on behalf of that person.  
This means that decisions made by an individual should be accepted – or not – depending on 
the individual’s level of capacity to understand and decide their own health care issues.  If the 
individual is incompetent it is permissible for the health professionals to override the decision 
and to move to other mechanisms for decision-making (dependent on the jurisdiction), such 
as using surrogate decision-makers or approaching the courts for assistance.
297  
 
Capacity to Understand, Reason and Communicate a Decision 
The first component that Brock and Buchanan discuss as a requirement for competence is the 
requirement for both capacity and the ability to communicate this capacity.  This dual 
requisite is central to understanding the components needed for competence.  Decision-
making capacity is different from the ability to communicate that decision.  Decision-making 
competence is therefore constituted by a set of capacities and possessions, where a person can 
have capacity for understanding and reasoning and deliberation – but if they cannot 
demonstrate their ability to do so then it is not possible for them to be considered competent.  
One of the end-of-life cases from New Zealand provides an example of the importance of 
communication; the patient had Guillian-Barré syndrome and may have been cognitively 
aware (and potentially may also have had capacity for understanding and reasoning and 
deliberation) but had no ability to communicate anything at all.  The patient was therefore 
necessarily deemed incompetent.
298
  Conversely, somebody with advanced Alzheimer’s 
disease or severe intellectual disability could have the opposite problem – they would 
probably lack capacity to understand, appreciate and reason, but may still retain the capacity 
to communicate.  Consequently, they might be deemed incompetent on the grounds that the 
communication does not represent a decision made with sufficient cognitive capacity.
299
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The MCA and PPPR Act both require that a person has the ability to understand information, 
and use that information, for decision-making competence.  As explained in Chapter Two, the 
preeminent legislation in the England and Wales dealing with incompetent adults is the MCA 
which, as the title denotes, discusses capacity, and describes a person lacking capacity when 
they are unable to understand, retain, use or weigh that information or communicate their 
decision.
300
  In New Zealand under the PPPR Act a person is presumed, until it is shown 
otherwise, to be: (1) competent to manage their own affairs; and (2) have the capacity to 
understand information relating to their situation, foresee consequences and communicate 
decisions about those matters.
301
  This also fits within the “gold standard of capacity 
assessment”
302
 the ‘MacCat T’ test which outlines four components: the ability to express a 
choice, that the person understood the information, that the person appreciates the 
significance of the information and the person is able to reason.
303
   
Impairment in any one of the components does not necessarily make the person incompetent 
to make any and every decision.  This is because impairment may be a matter of degree, and 
a component may be only mildly impaired.  Significant impairment, however, in any of the 
components can result in that person being deemed incompetent.  This is particularly true of 
the capacity to communicate because communication is essential for two reasons: (1) in order 
to determine the person’s ability to understand, reason and deliberate; and (2) so that the 
person can communicate their choice.   
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Possession of a Set of Values 
The notion that a person must possess a set of values, or a sense of ‘good’ as part of the 
criteria needed for competence is a contested issue.  The position in this thesis is that it might 
not be explicitly included in some accounts but that it has to be implicitly present.  How can a 
person reason and deliberate about consequences, and make choices based on these 
deliberations, if not by considering what would be a good outcome or a bad outcome?  Any 
balancing of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcome has to be informed by their own values.  For example, 
when a person is considering an outcome that is continued life at any cost – whether this is a 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcome is wholly dependent on that person’s own viewpoint.   
The ability to reason and deliberate is predicated on an ability to understand the information 
and circumstances, whilst the possession of a set of values, or a conception of what is good, 
informs the deliberation process to the extent that the decision-maker is able to make 
decisions consistent with his or her own concept of what a good or bad outcome would be, 
and what matters most.  This set of values must be: 
“at least minimally consistent, stable and affirmed as his or her own … Competence 
does not require a fully consistent set of goals, much less a detailed ‘lifeplan’ to cover 
all contingencies.  However, sufficient internal consistency and stability over time in 
the values relative to a particular decision are needed to yield and enable pursuit of a 
decision outcome.”
304
      
The requirement to possess a set of values is absent from the MacCat T test.  It has been 
included, not only for the reasons already demonstrated, relating it to a logical extension of 
the balancing of outcomes, but also because, as discussed in Chapter Five, decision-making 
on behalf of an incompetent person involves an attempt to determine what is in their best 
interests, and this necessarily requires consideration of their prior interests, values and 
character when competent.  Therefore, it seems artificial to state that, when a person’s 
competence is assessed, a set of values is not similarly a required factor.  This position is 
bolstered by s 4, para 6 (b) in the MCA where the substitute decision-maker must consider 
“the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity” in 
determining the incompetent person’s best interests.   
The requirement for a set of values is difficult because it can involve making judgment calls 
on others’ beliefs.  An example of how it could be used in practice is a patient refusing blood 
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products.  If this person was of the Jehovah’s Witness faith then this could be interpreted as 
an expression of their value system.  If, however, they had no such prior beliefs and the 
context was such that blood products were potentially life-saving then this decision would 
warrant further inquiry. It might suggest the person was inadequately informed or had failed 
to understand the information and circumstances or it might raise serious questions about the 
person’s competence.  Using a previous analogy, in the case of the swimmer who ignores the 
warning about swimming in the crocodile-infested waters, this may accord with their 
previous dare-devil approach to life, reflecting the value they place on risk and excitement.  
But otherwise, we may wonder if he was informed (for example, has he seen and fully 
understood the warning sign), or if his decision-making capacity is undermined, for example 
he may be drunk.  Appropriately, when a person makes an apparently poor decision (not in 
their own best interests or not consistent with their usual values) this leads to assessment or 
re-assessment of their competence.   
“Discerning whether current decisions are autonomous may depend, in part, on 
whether they are in character or out of character.”
305
 
A decision not consistent with a person’s character is therefore a flag that there might be a 
problem with competence.  Or it might just be a poor decision, or even more simply a 
decision which we do not understand or agree with.  It is often the case that when we judge 
someone to be competent we are less inclined to think critically about their decisions – but 
when we think they have impaired competence we tend to judge their decisions more 
carefully.  And when the decision does appear to be a poor one the person’s competence 
should be re-examined whilst remembering that competence varies in degrees. This 
recognition of the varying abilities of individuals to make decisions and give consent not only 
respects a person’s autonomy, it is also often legally required.  New Zealand’s Code of 
Patient Rights is one example of this:   
Right 7 (3) Where a consumer has diminished competence, that consumer retains the 
right to make informed choices and give informed consent, to the extent appropriate 
to his or her level of competence. 
An added difficulty in incorporating consideration of the person’s values into judgments of 
their competence is that values can, and (debatably) should, change as a person’s 
circumstances change – or at least the values become more informed, or informed from a 
different perspective even if they do not change.  However, we have to allow people to 
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change what they think is good and bad in relation to themselves, and the outcomes of their 
choices.  What then can be said of a set of values as a component of competence?  Choices, 
by necessity, will be referenced to some sense of good and bad, and what a person values.  
Judgments on a person’s beliefs, whether they are right or wrong, or reasonable or 
unreasonable, the same as ours or different, is not the goal, and care needs to be taken to 
ensure that a person’s competence is not determined on this basis. The possession of a set of 
beliefs and the relationship of those beliefs to the decision can be helpful in understanding the 
decisions people make and should be used to inform any assessment of competence.  The 
content of the decision is not the issue, rather the question is whether this content reflects a 
personal set of values, or at least is consistent with the espoused values and beliefs of the 
person. 
Summary of Part One 
A person needs to be competent, to the extent necessary, to participate in the informed 
consent process.  Informed consent reflects a fundamental aspect of healthcare; respecting the 
patient, and their right to make autonomous choices about their own health decisions.  An 
important duty of health care practitioners is to ensure that any decision that a person makes 
is autonomous, and an important aspect of ensuring this is determining that the person 
possesses the necessary competence, even if impaired.  The terms capacity and competence 
are used interchangeably in this thesis, to be consistent with New Zealand’s usage.  Although 
there is no singular definition for competence it is generally agreed that at least three 
components are necessary: the ability to understand, to communicate and to reason.  This 
chapter argues that a set of values is also necessary, proposing that any decision that a person 
makes, and especially healthcare ones, are related in some way to what the person perceives 
as a good or bad outcome.  This also has some value for the healthcare practitioner in 
determining competence.  In Chapter Three various accounts of interests were considered and 
how these too are linked to a sense of character, a sense of self.  This notion of congruence 
with character is one that is examined in more detail in Chapter Five, as it is integral to many 
concepts in decision-making processes. 
Part One has provided a discussion of how and where competence fits within the wider 
healthcare picture.  Part Two contains a discussion of what this means in relation to the 




interests a person has?  The answer to this question is a significant determination; 
incompetence does not negate a person’s attributable interests, and prior competence 
increases the number of possible interests. 
Part Two: Interests and the Relationship with Prior 
Competence 
Decision-making, and any assessment of competence, is a difficult process.  Decision-making 
for others also involves complex considerations which need to be understood before 
discussing end-of-life cases in detail.  The last chapter proposed that all competent people 
have interests that are both self-regarding and other-regarding, but the more pertinent 
questions for this thesis are: once a person becomes incompetent does this affect the interests 
that they may have?  Which of these possible interests depend on whether they have been 
previously competent? 
The role of precedent autonomy over current interests is one that has implications for the 
permanently incompetent patient.  Part Two of this chapter discusses transient incompetence 
to provide a point of reference to those who are permanently incompetent.  When someone is 
transiently incompetent the question is: ‘what action would the person want the substitute 
decision-maker to take?’.  Furthermore, is this a decision that has to be made now, or could it 
be deferred until the patient regains competence?  This is a very different question to ‘what is 
it in the person’s best interests to do’, however Chapter Five demonstrates that these 
questions have, at times, become conflated.  The interests that may be attributed to those in a 
permanently incompetent state depend on whether the patient has been previously competent, 
because if they have been, then their prior values, views and character can factor into the 
decision-making process. 
Permanently Incompetent Patients 
In the end-of-life cases compiled for this thesis, the patient is incompetent with no dispute 
over this diagnosis, and whether this status is medically or legally decided is irrelevant.  In all 
of the cases the patient is either a significantly cognitively impaired adult or a minor, and 




controversy over this categorisation.  From this group of permanently incompetent patients 
three possible states relating to their prior competency have been identified:   
(1) Patients who have been previously competent and have expressed views which 
might be able to guide future decisions in the event of incompetence (incompetent 
patients with an explicit prior view); 
(2) Patients who been previously competent, but whose views are not discoverable 
(incompetent patients with a previous self); 
(3) Patients who have never been able to express views due to their age or lack of 
cognitive ability (never able to express views). 
There are three reasons for grouping incompetent patients according to their previous 
competency.  The first is that prior competency generates more possible interests because the 
patient’s life will provide, for example, more possibilities for other-regarding interests, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  Secondly, there is a legislative difference in many 
jurisdictions between those who held a prior view and those who did not.  Thirdly, the 
acknowledgment of previous competency and prior views aligns with a perception of 
respecting the incompetent patient’s autonomy.  Whilst it is appropriate for prior views to be 
taken into any account of best interests, proper diligence needs to be shown as to how they 
are considered, and it is this aspect which forms the discussion in Chapter Five.   
Previously Competent 
In many of the end-of-life cases the involved patient was a previously competent adult.  Prior 
to becoming incompetent they had lived enough of a life for those closest to them to know 
something of their interests, values and personality.
306
  Essentially, they have ‘had a life’, in 
the way we understand living a day-to-day life, making their own autonomous decisions.
307
  
This is what is referred to by use of the terminology previously able to express views.  They 
had lived enough of a previously competent life such that they had made many decisions for 
themselves based (at least presumptively) on their own value systems and beliefs.  Being 
previously competent with regards to the best interest test means: (1) this person is often 
presumed to have made decisions (largely) in line with their own best interests and values – 
thus their prior decisions provide evidence for what their best interests might be; (2) this 
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person may possibly have interests they are not necessarily cognisant of, but which they have 
developed for various reasons; and (3) this person has possibly developed other-regarding 
interests through the sorts of things they have engaged with in their lives.   
One justification or argument in support of deciding that the permanently incompetent patient 
does have interests is the finding that individuals have interests developed when alive that 
survive death.  Surviving interests are discussed (and accepted) by Feinberg, and after-life 
interests are discussed (and accepted) by Sperling.
308
  In the taxonomy of interests, set out in 
Chapter Three, it was recognised that surviving interests should form part of the interests that 
should be taken into account.  What does this mean for the previously competent adult who is 
permanently unable to express any interests?  It would seem absurd to say there is a hiatus in 
terms of interests such that they had interests when they were competent, and have interests 
that survive their death, but while they are permanently incompetent they have no interests.  
Therefore, extrapolating from the accounts which assign interests after an even more 
permanent event – death, it becomes possible to argue that a permanently incompetent patient 
does have interests.  This is qualified by the following points: (1) the interests they have 
when permanently incompetent are not necessarily the same as those post death (for example 
an interest in their will being upheld); and (2) the interests they have when incompetent may 
not be the same as those they had when competent, so that there is a question as to how the 
interests they had when they were competent relate to the interests they have when 
permanently incompetent.  Chapter Five explores the prior views in depth, providing an 
extensive proposal for ascertaining the veracity of prior views and beliefs, which shows that 
these interests are important but that they need to assessed robustly.  To do this the system of 
grouping these need to be outlined, and this is what is undertaken in Part Two of this chapter.  
If a person is permanently incompetent what kinds of interests can they have?  If such a 
person is sensate, they can have self-regarding interests that are experiential; for example, a 
self-regarding interest in not experiencing pain or in having the best quality of life.  There are 
also self-regarding interests that a person may have regardless of whether or not they can 
actually experience them.  Examples of these are an interest in having dignity maintained, an 
interest in not being subjected to invasions or humiliations, the manner of dying and 
(specifically with regards to the previously competent patient) having your previous views 
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considered as to what you would want to happen to you in an incompetent state.  All of these 
interests that have been defined as self-regarding are derived from the three accounts of 
interests canvassed in Chapter Three.  These all acknowledged that there are interests that 
people have that are ulterior, or critical, or far-lifelong interests; interests that everyone has 
and, although which apply may depend on the different circumstances, are nevertheless in 
some measure intertwined with living a life with values, as the person has a stake, an interest 
in certain things.   
Precedent Autonomy 
“But I’ll still be me won’t I?”
309
 
It is a common occurrence that competent people submit to being rendered temporarily 
incompetent when they agree to undergo surgery involving general anaesthesia.
310
  This can 
pose particular dilemmas if an unanticipated decision is required during the procedure.  
Consider the surgeon, who upon operating, discovers something unexpected from the initial 
diagnosis, known as an incidental finding.  The dilemma for the surgeon is: should I act on 
this finding now, especially if by doing so it would mean the patient would not have to 
undergo another procedure later, or do I not do anything now and work out with the patient 
what they want to do when they have woken up?
311
  Essentially the surgeon, as a substitute 
decision-maker, is asking the questions: ‘which option would this particular patient want me 
take’, or ‘what is it in their best interests to do?’  These are two distinct, albeit related, 
questions – and the important thing is to be sure which one is the one that is being asked – 
and how they relate to each other.  Whilst the patient’s best interests would be a major 
component in the factors considered, if the surgeon knew for some reason that the person 
would not want the option that was in their best interests it seems unlikely that they would 
carry out the procedure.  This is because the person is going to regain competence, and in that 
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case it seems reasonable to consider foremost what they would want to happen, and therefore 
their autonomy trumps any objective view of their best interests.   
Conversely, when a person is not going to regain competence, such as the permanently 
incompetent patients in the end-of-life cases, the question asked is, ‘what is in this person’s 
best interests?’  This is very different to ‘what would the patient have wanted if they were 
competent?’  The difference between these two questions lies in the fact that one is a test of 
best interests, whereas the other is a test of substituted judgment.  Chapter Five proposes that 
these two questions are often conflated, with the answer to their best interests becoming 
analogous to the patient’s previously held views. 
When a person is only transiently incompetent the decision needs only to be made for that 
point in time, in anticipation of the patient regaining competence and being able to participate 
again and make their own decisions, and therefore only a short term decision is required.  
However, if a person demonstrates different degrees of cognitive change, should their 
previously held views be binding on their future self?  An often used example that describes 
this is a patient with dementia, as illustrated in the case study below.   
A person is living a fully autonomous life (P1) – Person 1, (T1) – Time 1.
312
  They 
then develop symptoms of dementia, notably exhibiting short-term memory loss, and 
signs of frustration which deteriorates into an inability to live independently.  But they 
still do many things that are consistent with their character such as caring about their 
appearance and enjoying music, are able to do many things for themselves such as 
dressing and eating, are able to fully participate in conversations, remember the past, 
and recognise family and friends (P1 and sometimes P2, T2).  At this point they could 
often consent to many routine healthcare procedures but this may depend on the time 
of the day (they may be more disorientated in the evening for example).  Or perhaps 
they break a hip and are admitted to hospital (being out of their normal environment 
is a documented cause of increased cognitive impairment in those with dementia).  
Eventually at T3 they lose any form of independence, no longer recognise family, and 
have little recognisable traits of the person they started out as P1 and have now 
become P2 or P3.   
This scenario shows the same person having different cognitive abilities over time, due to 
progressive cognitive decline.  P1 has what we might call full cognitive capacity for consent 
– the ability to form and communicate autonomous views.  P2’s ability to consent has been 
adversely affected compared to P1, but they retain the ability to communicate views.  P3 is 
obviously the most severely cognitively impaired.  P2 and P3’s ability to consent could 
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fluctuate daily or hourly, and be dependent on what the decision was (as discussed in Part 
One, and described as decision-specific competence by Buchanan and Brock).  It could be 
said that, while P2’s ability to consent has been compromised, they may not yet be actually 
incompetent.  Furthermore, different conditions could exacerbate decision-making ability.  P2 
with a broken hip, who then wants to get out of bed, would not be deemed capable of making 
that choice.  These kinds of competence determinations are difficult, and represent the 
challenges faced by many clinicians.  This difficult scenario is complicated considerably if 
P1’s precedent autonomy (what they wanted at T1) is in conflict with P3’s current interests.  
How much influence should the prior, competent P1 have over the future, incompetent P3?   
Dworkin engaged in this debate, famously expanding on an article written by a medical 
student which described Margo – a woman who was living a happy life, but had advanced 
dementia.
313
  What should happen if Margo had stated at T1 that as P3 she did not want to be 
treated with antibiotics for even a minor infection?  Dworkin posed the question of whether 
precedent autonomy (Margo previously stating that she would not want treatment) should 
overrule current interests (Margo with dementia was living an apparently happy life).  It 
could have been put to Margo at T1 – but what if you will be happy when you have advanced 
dementia?  And you will die a death where you suffer badly if you do not let your future self 
receive certain medications?  Seemingly, it would be in her best interests to reply, that if that 
was so, then treatment should be administered.  In Dworkin’s consideration of Margo’s 
Dilemma he opts for upholding her precedent autonomy, appealing to his notion of integrity 
(discussed in Chapter Three as being integral to a person’s critical interests).  Not respecting 
Margo’s previously competent wishes violates her precedent autonomy.
314
  Dresser is critical 
of this conclusion by Dworkin, and suggests the answer to how Margo’s previous wishes are 
treated lie with different criteria of personal identity theory (as it addresses the conditions of a 
person persisting over time).
315
  If Dworkin is correct that Margo’s precedent autonomy 
applies, then Margo is the same person at P3 as at P1.  If he is mistaken, then another model 
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of personal identity theory perhaps applies, which argues that the major changes between the 
person at T1 and T3 has the following consequence:  




What this means for the permanently incompetent patient is that their prior views on their 
future incompetence (their precedent autonomy) may be upheld, or might not be upheld, 
depending on which view of personal identity theory is taken.  The one qualification to this is 
that, in Margo’s case, her current interests were able to be ascertained to a greater extent.  
This is much more difficult with the groups of patients in the end-of-life cases.  What 
Margo’s case does highlight, when considering incompetent patients, is that there is a 
difference between the interests the previously competent person once had and the interests 
that the incompetent person has currently.  Does the patient have significant experiential 
interests that need to be taken into account, such as suffering?  The role that precedent 
interests have is an important one in the assessment of best interests, and therefore in the next 
chapter an extensive proposal is developed for ascertaining the validity of these prior views.  
The currently incompetent patient will, therefore, have precedent interests, one of these being 
precedent autonomy.  It is therefore important to further categorise what these interests may 
be, by grouping incompetent patients into those who have previously expressed specific 
views on future treatment, and those who have not.  This distinction is discussed in the 
following sections. 
Incompetent Patients with an Explicit Prior View 
The first group of permanently incompetent patients to be discussed are those who previously 
expressed a specific view.  When considering the prior views of somebody who is no longer 
able to express any current views there are two (very broad) possibilities.  One is that the 
person had views on their current situation which are known, the other is that the person did 
not have any known views.  Therefore, I am proposing that there are two ways that prior 
views can be interpreted.  The first is narrowly, whereby a person’s prior view has to relate in 
some way to their current condition.  This would include a range of possible views with 
varying degrees of relevance to their condition.  The other possibility is a wider 
interpretation, in which somebody’s prior values and beliefs are taken as prior views.  This 
concept is described by the term previous self and refers to someone’s values and beliefs, 






how they have lived their life, and generally the kind of person that they were.  Essentially, 
this is the difference between competent patients who have previously been able to express 
views and either have, or have not, done so.  This difference leads to the two ways that prior 
views can be interpreted, either narrowly or widely.   
For the purposes of this thesis, the narrow definition of prior views is applied.  This is 
because it provides a more transparent language around the discussion.
317
  In such 
circumstances, the now-incompetent patient who has expressed a prior view can have this 
explicit view taken into account, and – this is key – their previous self also.  Where there is no 
specific view then it is only the incompetent patient’s previous self which is being 
considered.  When referring to any incompetent patient who was previously competent the 
term prior self is used to cover both of these interpretations.   
All competent adults face the possibility that they can be rendered permanently incompetent 
at some stage in their life, and in all four jurisdictions considered in this thesis any competent 
adult can appoint a substitute decision-maker to make decisions for them if they become 
incompetent.
318
  For some permanently incompetent patients who have previously expressed 
views, these are attestable, well evidenced, views.  The textbook example is the patient with a 
progressive illness, who, knowing what is likely to happen, has written an advance directive 
with extensive advance care planning.  This is one way a competent person can try to ensure 
their views and preferences are respected and honoured if they become incompetent.
319
  In 
this situation it should be possible to ascertain their probable prior wishes regarding future 
provision of treatment, or the withholding or withdrawing of treatment.  It is a testament to 
the medical profession and their expertise with this delicate task that very few cases have 
been brought to the courts where an advanced directive exists.
320
  However, Chapter Five’s 
discussion of prior views does not require these views to be as formal as, for example, an 
advance directive.  To constitute prior views, the previously held ‘wish or view’ can be as 
simple or unpremeditated as the following: a person saying to a friend “I wouldn’t like to live 
like that” in reference to a permanently incompetent person.  This stance is in line with 
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legislation governing previous statements.
321
  However, critically, there must be something 
relatable to the person’s state when they subsequently become incompetent for it to count as a 
relevant or significant previously held view, however tenuous the connection may be.
322
  
Obviously, different weightings should be given to this type of casual statement compared 
with an advance directive, but it is also not as simple as the advance directive outweighing 
the statement.  For example: 
Louisa Elliot had written a formal document ten years prior to her incompetence, 
stating that no extraordinary treatments should be given if she was in a seemingly 
permanent coma, but she had since experienced major life changes.  She said to her 
family the week before she became permanently incompetent “I would want treatment 
for as long as possible”.   
Which previous, competent view should be taken into consideration?  The answer to this 
question lies in the consideration of interests that should be taken into account, something 
that is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.   
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the incompetent person with an explicit prior view 
is a person who was previously competent, who lived a life considering their own interests, 
and who expressed at some point in time, however tenuous, a view or views about what they 
would like to happen to them if they became incompetent at some time in the future.   
Incompetent Patients with a Previous Self 
Within the group of previously competent patients the second group are those who did not 
make any explicit views regarding what they would like to happen if they became 
incompetent (or at least any views they might have had are not able to be ascertained).  It is 
therefore their previous self that is being taken into consideration.  There are a range of 
individuals who fall within these parameters, as the following example shows.   
Jane Bingley is eighteen years old when she becomes permanently incompetent, with 
little life experience or test of her character or values.  Eric Northman is 59 when he 
becomes permanently incompetent. There had been no major life changes or 
variations of behaviour in his life recently.   
Neither Jane nor Eric have explicitly stated views about their future wishes. Jane’s whānau 
can only surmise from what they knew about her, and how she lived her life, what she may 
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have wanted.  Eric’s whānau can point to certain traits that Eric possessed, and a 
steadfastness of character as the basis for their opinion about what he would have wanted.  
An earlier battle with a life-threatening illness, for example, where he ‘never gave up’ could 
point to an attitude of preparedness to deal with suffering.  This is in contrast to the case of 
Jane, who at eighteen may find it more difficult to possess a level of certainty in her 
character, and it may also be harder for others to extrapolate values from her life.  However, 
there is recognition in both legislation and common law that the person’s prior beliefs, 
personality and character, can be used to ascertain what they may have wanted, including 
what they believed to be in their best interests.  This is what is referred to in this thesis as 
their previous self.  If the starting point for assessing an incompetent person’s best interests is 
their prior views, and there is a low threshold for what these views constitute, then there is an 
obvious consequence which is to incorporate the patient’s character and values into the test 
for their best interests.  This is examined in detail in Chapter Five. 
With the group of patients who have no explicit prior views, a vacuum is created whereby 
their previous life becomes the focus, and the conduit for their supposed prior views, beliefs 
and character.  There are fundamental differences between a patient’s prior views, and their 
previous self, which is at times conflated by the judges as is discussed in depth in Chapter 
Five.  The term previous self refers to their personality, how they have lived their life, and 
generally the kind of person that they were.  It is a way of assessing their values and in the 
MCA is acknowledged under ss 6 (b) and (c) where the “beliefs and values” and “the other 
factors” the person would be likely to consider must be considered by the substitute decision-
maker where those views are “reasonably ascertainable”.  It may not be quite as obvious 
where the spectrum for those who were able to express views, and did not do so, lies, but it is 
demonstrated by two of the most influential cases on decision-making for adult incompetent 
patients which lie at either end of this scale.  The first case is that of Bland.  Anthony Bland 
was eighteen, an age where most teenagers about to enter adulthood have not given much 
thought to ending up in a permanently incompetent state and what this would mean.
323
  His 
relative youth also meant that, like most teenagers, he had not have as many opportunities to 
show how he would have responded in different situations to adversity.  A man who had had 
such an opportunity was David James, whose values in James were extrapolated from the 
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way that he had approached a previous life-threatening diagnosis of cancer.
324
  In both cases, 
the family put forward views, purportedly from the patient, that could be said to be safely 
relied upon.   
Never Competent 
The third group of incompetent patients to consider are individuals who never had a chance, 
or the ability, to express any views.  Two examples of patients who most commonly fall into 
this category are very young minors and people with severe cognitive impairment since birth 
or an early age.  One difficulty with the case of the individual who has never been able to 
express any views is that the substitute decision-maker is forced to try to determine best 
interests without that particular type of information specific to the individual.
325
  In essence, 
nobody has any idea what the particular individual would want, and any pretext of “let us 
imagine what they might say if they suddenly became competent” is, at best, a fiction.
 326
  
The lack of prior competence necessitates trying to determine the best interests about the 
individual without any useful information either directly or indirectly from the individual 
themselves.  The prior wishes of the incompetent patient, where they can be identified, are 
considered to be an important factor in ascertaining the best interests of the patient.  Without 
any prior views, ostensibly objective interests, as opposed to subjective interests, become the 
central factor in the decision-making process.
327
  While everyone can be said to have 
objective interests, such as the preservation of self, no one can tell a competent person that 
they must act upon them, for reasons of autonomy and freedom.  For example, where a 
patient has cancer (with low probability of cure), an objective interest in prolonged life can 
conflict with their subjective interest in not suffering from the side-effects of chemotherapy 
side-effects, for whatever time is left.  One difficulty with the best interests test (as explored 
in Chapter Six) is that the person-specific focus has lacked clarity of what is subjective and 
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what is objective, and furthermore, in the case of the never competent patient, there is a gap 
in what is often considered to be the subjective component. 
Essentially, this discussion is focused on answering a particular question, which needs to be 
addressed with regards to interests and permanently incompetent patients: can a person only 
have interests if they have been previously competent?  If yes, then the group of never 
competent patients have no interests.  But, as discussed in Chapter Three, there are many 
interests that can be attributed to an individual which arise from sentience.  There is 
agreement that everybody has interests at a rudimentary level in certain common and basic 
things, such as not experiencing prolonged pain for no purpose.  By this account, individuals 
in a permanently incompetent state do have interests, regardless of whether or not they have 
previously expressed these.  Therefore, the answer, that having interests is not dependent on 
prior competency, leads to another question regarding how these interests can be determined.  
If the patient has never had any meaningful engagement with possible interests, if they have 
never articulated a stake in something, then how do we determine what their interests are?  
Because of this difficulty, it seems that we may have to use an objective best interests test 
whereby interests are assigned to a person, completely independent of who that person is, and 
in a way that reflects our beliefs about the interests that are common and shared by all.  
Certainly, this appears to be what the courts have done in some cases.  As discussed in 
Chapter Three, objective interests, such as an interest in dignity, are legitimate interests and 
can be attributed in this way.  Objective interests that are other-regarding are more 
problematic.  It is much harder to determine what other regarding interests might be, in never 
competent individuals, and also to whom and how these other-regarding interests could 
apply.  At this juncture, it is sufficient to point out that patients who have never been 
previously competent do have interests, and that identifying these is problematic.   
Summary of Chapter Four 
When considering best interests determinations, and decisions on behalf of incompetent 
patients, there are two distinct categories of incompetent patients – those who have never had 
a chance to express previous wishes, and those who have had this opportunity. This is critical 
to any approach to best interests which attempts to take account of patients’ prior views or 
beliefs.  Further categorising those who have been previously competent into those who 




veracity of views, as is outlined in Chapter Five, and for assigning certain weighting to any 
prior wishes, as addressed in Chapters Seven and Eight.  Throughout the cases examined 
there has been a persistent inconsistency in the extent to which previous wishes are adhered 
to, and confusion over the important distinction between respecting someone’s previous 
views as if they are the sole determinant of best interests, compared with an approach which 
recognises and interprets prior views as important but as only one of several factors to be 
considered in deciding what is in someone’s best interests.   
From the extensive investigation of interests and competency it is possible to conclude that 
the best interests of any permanently incompetent person is not able to be discussed in a way 
that ignores any interests that they previously had.  It is also possible to highlight a particular 
range of interests that a person may have, interests that are derived from their lives.  Many 
virtue ethicists discuss the importance of a person’s narrative and this description embodies 
what is referred to in this thesis as the previous self.  This term, although perhaps misleading 
in the sense that it implies that a person can be two separate entities, is intended to convey the 
notion that a permanently incompetent person is not someone who has descended upon the 
courts without their own past, their own personal history, their own narrative.  Someone who 
has a previous self does not necessarily have to have been previously competent either, 
although that will usually be the case.
328
  What it does denote, is that a person has lived 
enough of a life from which their interests can be derived and discussed.  Therefore, a young 
child could not be discussed in terms of having a previous self, but older children and adults 
could be.  This is made more difficult when there are no prior views to rely on or utilise.  This 
also demonstrates why, even when there are prior views, it should be acknowledged that prior 
views cannot, and should not, be the only consideration – because even people who have 
previously expressed views have other interests besides those that they explicitly expressed. 
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“What is it about differently abled people, that we attribute noble 
characteristics to them?  It’s the way everyone thinks blind people are really 
nice.  But they’re not, not always .  They’re just like the rest of us.” 329 
In this chapter the uncontentious position that an incompetent person’s prior views are an 
important factor in decision-making for incompetent patients is first established, and then the 
more challenging question is addressed of how and indeed whether these views can be 
applied in end-of-life cases.  Any prior views of the permanently incompetent patient are at 
least considered, if not seen to be the most important aspect, in the legislation and common 
law in assessing their best interests.
330
  The significance of the previous wishes that the now 
incompetent adult expressed is reflected in the legislation that now governs many decisions 
regarding best interests in the four jurisdictions discussed in this thesis.
331
  As outlined in 
Chapter Two, there are differences between countries in their approaches to an incompetent 
person’s prior views, but all of the common law jurisdictions do acknowledge that the prior 
views should in some way inform decision-making regarding the person’s best interests.  In 
this chapter the differences between the jurisdictions are discussed in more detail, with 
reference to specific cases, and the conclusion is reached that the best interests test, where 
there are strong prior views, can become a substituted judgment test.  This is a major shift in 
the fundamental purpose of the best interests concept, and one that therefore needs to be 
examined in closer detail.   
Given the implications of prior views in assessing best interests, an important question 
emerges: how certain is the substitute decision-maker that these prior views are valid?  By 
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using the term valid the intent is to convey a query as to how safely the substitute decision-
maker can rely on the information regarding the person’s prior view or previous self.  The 
aim is to be able to say whether, with a degree of accuracy, the treatment ‘is what he or she 
would most likely have wanted’.  This could relate to the reliability of the evidence of the 
prior views, or it could relate to the prior views themselves; for example, were the views well 
informed or uttered under duress?  Are any prior views a true reflection of what the patient 
would want in their current circumstances?  What role should the views of whānau play in 
determining the likely views of incompetent patients?  This chapter assesses the prior views 
of incompetent patients, establishing a framework of how these views can be properly 
weighted, and then discusses the judiciary’s observations against this background.  The 
question of validity is fundamental to ascertaining prior views, and this chapter examines this 
in-depth; in doing so an outline is proposed to determine how valid the prior views may be.  
This is a three-part assessment tool which is designed to ascertain how safely the substitute 
decision-maker can state what the incompetent person’s views were.  After outlining the 
proposal in detail it is then discussed in relation to eight cases, each selected for the way 
demonstrates different aspects of how prior views can work in these difficult end-of-life 
cases.   
Part One: The Importance and Veracity of Prior 
Views 
The first part of this chapter proposes that there are three problems concerning the use of a 
person’s prior views or beliefs in end-of-life decision-making.   
(1) The significance problem.  Why should the prior views matter at all?  If best 
interests is a weighing-up tool why should what the person wanted in the past 
matter now? 
(2) The conflict problem.  The prior views may clash with the patient’s current 
interests.   
(3) The epistemic problem.  If prior views and beliefs do matter (and the answer to 
the significance problem tells us that they do) how does the substitute decision-
maker know what they are? 
The bulk of this chapter deals with the epistemic question, but the first two difficulties are 




The Significance Problem 
The significance problem asks why a substitute decision-maker should care about the prior 
views of the incompetent patient.  Of what significance have the prior views, or prior self to a 
best interests assessment?  If best interests is an (objective) weighing-up tool why should 
what the person wants matter?
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  There are three key answers to this: (1) ethically it matters 
because it is respectful for their autonomy; (2) to ascertain what is in an individual’s best 
interests requires that the person, their values and beliefs are considered; and (3) 
pragmatically it matters because legislation says that it does.  In some jurisdictions the test is 
substituted judgment at first instance, and then the person’s best interests if their views are 
unknown.  Obviously the reason there is legislative provision for prior views is because they 
are held as important, so it is, then, rather circular to use it as a reason to show why prior 
views matter.  However these three reasons can be used as arguments to show prior views do 
matter – and that there is both a moral and legal standing for saying that they do.   
Respect for Autonomy 
The respect for competent patients making fully autonomous, informed choices is now 
enshrined in many countries, and the four jurisdictions discussed in this thesis are amongst 
these.  The increase of deference to the principle of autonomy is discussed by Veitch.  In 
Chapter Two of his book he discusses four examples which show how legalisation (denotes a 
civilisation where individual autonomy and self-reliance, rather than dependency and 
community, are the guiding principles) has displaced medicalisation (a society with a moral 
community and a holistic vision of welfare).  The four examples showing this shift in social 
organisation are: (1) increasing resort to litigation to seek individual redress; (2) erosion of 
trust in doctor-patient relationships; (3) willingness to challenge doctors’ opinions; and (4) 
contractualisation of health care services.
333
  The result of this legalisation is that respect for 
autonomy has become an integral part of medicine and the law.  When the two intersect at the 
extreme edge of decision-making there is still the perceived burden to respect a person’s 
autonomy.  This individualistic outlook is one, I argue, that has been manifested (at times 
inappropriately) in the concept of best interests.   
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The concept of informed consent stems from respecting a patient’s autonomous right to 
choose what happens to their own body, as discussed in Chapter Four.  An extension of this is 
an advance directive whereby a person’s precedent autonomy can decide for their future 
incompetent self.  This is a similar premise to that of the substituted judgment test whereby 
the substitute decision-maker makes the decision based on what the person would have 
wanted when they were competent.  Conversely, the best interests test has no such 
requirement to prioritise the patient’s precedent autonomy, except that the patient could have 
an objective, self-regarding interest in their prior views being taken into account, stemming 
from their competent self’s future-orientated interests in having some say over their future 
incompetent self.  The best interests test asks the question: what is in this patient’s best 
interests?  By prioritising the incompetent person’s prior views this appears to epitomise 
respect for this patient’s autonomy.  How should, or even can, the decision be made if the 
person’s individuality is not being considered?  And surely, this is accomplished by 
respecting their prior views?  Undoubtedly, prior views should be taken into account, but not 
to the point where what is happening is a fictionalised version of autonomy.  To properly 
respect an incompetent patient, a robust process should take place, assessing whether the 
prior views are actually those of the patient, and how safely they can be relied on.  The 
critical question to ask is – how valid are the prior views?  This question links directly to how 
strongly the patient’s autonomy is being respected.  It is incongruent to purport to be doing so 
if the reflection on these prior views is not vigorous.  The following hypothetical case shows 
how this distortion arises.  
Emily Willoughby is dying.  She has a congenital condition with a high likelihood of 
predictable, inevitable decline resulting in loss of control over her body.  Knowing 
this, while competent, she makes an informed choice and expresses her desire, both 
verbally and in writing, to receive life-prolonging treatment for as long as possible 
until ‘there was no hope’.
334
  Her condition progresses to the point that she is no 
longer competent, she has a tracheotomy and no bodily control.  She then gets an 
infection which needs to be treated with antibiotics.  Her doctors think it is in her best 
interests to withhold this medication; her family disagrees, citing her previous wishes.   
There are two ways that Emily’s prior views could be approached in assessing her best 
interests, and both of these approaches have been utilised by the courts.  (1) The views can 
become a mechanism by which we can ascertain what the person themselves may have 
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wanted, and therefore a tool to help determine what the best interests of the person may be.
335
  
Emily’s prior views regarding her future condition could be utilised in a way that aligned her 
prior views – continued treatment – with what is in her best interests.  This is essentially a 
substituted judgment test, and has been implemented in some jurisdictions’ legislative 
reforms regarding decision-making for the incompetent patient.  (2) The best interests of the 
patient includes a wide variety of interests, (the best part of the test necessitates a weighing-
up exercise), and prior views are one of those factors that are weighed up.  Emily’s prior view 
for treatment would therefore be weighed against her doctors’ views of her best interests, her 
family’s views, her experiential interests, and any other considerations.  These are very 
different approaches.   
The substituted judgment test is an expression of the importance of autonomy in decision-
making for the incompetent patient.  The usual interpretation of substituted judgment, as 
described in Chapter Two, is that the decision-maker makes decisions about treatment for the 
patient based on what they think the patient would have wanted themselves.  One of the 
criticisms of this model is that often the substitute decision-maker performs poorly at this task 
in terms of making the decision that the person themselves would have made.
336
  This means 
that the decision becomes based on faulty assumptions and does not actually uphold the 
patient’s autonomy at all.  The best interests test purports to circumvent this concern by 
acknowledging the prior views, but as one part of the equation, not the whole answer.  This 
may mean that substitute decision-making based on best interests makes it a better decision.  
The difference between the two guidance principles regarding decision-making for the 
incompetent patient is considerable and, I submit, partly responsible for some of the 
confusion that has permeated the best interests test.   
The permanently incompetent, but previously competent patient has no current autonomy in 
their existing state.  But that does not mean that they do not have any autonomy.  The 
relevant autonomy that they may have is precedent autonomy, and the relevant interests that 
they may have are future-orientated interests in their precedent autonomy being upheld.  If 
their precedent autonomy is held to apply to their future self this is applying the view that the 
previously competent person and the now-incompetent person is the same person.  This is of 
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some debate philosophically, as discussed in the last chapter.
337
  Essentially the courts have 
aligned with Dworkin on this issue, whereby a prior competent self can make decisions for 
the future incompetent self, and thereby that is respecting a person’s autonomy.
338
   
Respect for autonomy can therefore be relied on as a reason for respecting someone’s prior 
views, and later in this chapter the ramifications of this are further explored.  These 
ramifications do in some way indicate that it is not always clearly understood that it is 
precedent autonomy being upheld rather than current autonomy.  A particular point needs 
further clarification: it is not that prior views should be excluded as a factor in an incompetent 
person’s best interests; on the contrary it is entirely correct where possible.  However, any 
suggestion that a ‘patient would want this’, should be considered as inaccurate, as there is no 
way of knowing at that particular time what the patient does or does not want – if indeed 
they are capable of wanting anything – hence the need for a decision to be made on their 
behalf.  This is bestowing the incompetent patient with current wishes that are simply not 
able to ascertained.  This is due to the adherence to a doctrine that autonomy is one of the, if 
not the most, important moral principles to respect.   
The Individual Patient 
The second reason why prior views are important is because these views represent the 
manifestation of interests that people may have (summarised in Chapter Three) and some of 
these interests are related to the differentiation between patients who have been previously 
competent and those who have not (as described in Chapter Four).  Reflection about a 
permanently incompetent patient, who has been previously competent, means discussing 
someone who has lived a life, with many interests both self-regarding and other-regarding.  
These can include all categories and qualities of interests explored in Chapter Three, for 
example critical, future-orientated, life-long, but whatever terminology is used to describe 
them they are both experiential and non-experiential.  Interests in being healthy, being a good 
person, advancing your career, reading lots of books, caring for your loved ones are all 
examples of interests that different people may have.  The longer the life you have led, the 
more opportunities you have had to not only express interests, and develop many interests, 
but also make it clearer to those closest to you what those interests are.  A competent person 
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is able to express and act on decisions which they perceive to further their own best interests 
– or not – and these will routinely involve self- and other-regarding interests.   
The exploration of interests is another reason to care about the prior self of a patient.  To 
make a decision that is in a patient’s best interests, all of their interests need to be canvassed.  
If only their medical condition mattered, this would be a narrow approach and has been 
rejected as such.
339
  Considering prior views as a factor in the best interests test allows for 
considerable emphasis on the particular person, as is correct in a test focusing on the 
individual’s best interests.  The difficulty is in maintaining the correct function of these 
views.  There is a strong argument that a permanently incompetent patient has a surviving 
interest in their prior views being applied.
340
  However, there is a difference between any 
views ascertained enabling a better decision to be made on the individual’s behalf, and using 
those views as one of several interests that could be ascribed to the individual.  Prior views, 
therefore, are possible manifestations of the interests that an incompetent person had when 
they were competent.  They are not a category or type of interest, as expressed in Feinberg, 
Dworkin or Sperling’s distinctions, they are at best the expressions of future-orientated 
interests.  This point is elaborated upon later in this chapter, following the next sections 
which outline the safety of inference from the prior views.  To ascertain a person’s interests 
then questions about beliefs and values must factor into the decision-making.   
Statutory Guidance 
The third reason that prior views are important is because, where a person was previously 
competent, their prior views or previous self is taken into consideration for their best interests 
in legislation governing substitute decision-making.  The legislation was outlined in detail in 
Chapter Two, so it is sufficient for the purposes of this section to reiterate that consideration 
of prior views (in some form or another) is present in the legislation of each of the countries 
examined.
341
  Therefore, any practical approach to considering the best interests of patients 
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must consider the different legislative approaches.  The legislative approach is also based on 
the respect for precedent autonomy, and as already discussed, is based on an assumption that 
the patient’s identity continues even if they are incompetent.
342
     
The Conflict Problem 
There is more than one potential conflict that arises once a person has been previously 
competent, and has therefore been able to previously express views.  The identification of 
different interests and how they should fit within the best interests concept has been 
incomplete in some judgments, and this is something that is examined in some detail in 
Chapters Six and Seven.  Specifically, with reference to prior views, there is a potential 
conflict between the patient’s current interests and previously expressed views. 
The Patient with Current Views 
“People are not the best judges of what their own best interests would be under 
circumstances they have never encountered and in which their preferences and desires 
may drastically have changed.”
343
 
If a patient has said that they want treatment to be continued for as long as possible, this is a 
view that they expressed in the past while competent.  For example, we could say that they 
have a non-experiential self-regarding view in their previous wishes being adhered to, but 
they cannot be said to have a current interest in treatment continuing for as long as possible – 
as their current interests are something that are unknown.  The patient may have a current 
view, but there is no way of ascertaining what this is (and it would have to be treated with 
caution according to the requirements of informed consent) hence the need for a substitute 
decision-maker.  A previously expressed wish often blends into a current view, as shown by 
the following example (although the judge was not necessarily condoning this viewpoint): 
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“The case put forward on behalf of M’s family is based substantially on what they say 
were, and still are, M’s wishes and feelings.”
344
 
Being permanently incompetent does not of course denote that the patient has no current 
views that they can express.  As explained in Chapter Three, incompetence does not preclude 
a range of possible abilities that the patient may have, including awareness and 
responsiveness.  Where a patient is able to experience anything, they then have self-regarding 
experiential interests, but may not able to communicate what those interests are.
345
  The 
evaluation of these interests is, of course, very important; hence they are discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven.  However, for the purposes of the expression of these experiential interests as 
their current views, it needs to be understood that: (1) a previously held competent view is 
not their current view; (2) permanently incompetent patients may have a current view, but if 
they have no way of communicating it, there is no way of knowing what it is; and (3) their 
self-regarding, experiential interests (for example in not experiencing pain) are not equivalent 
to their current view.  When a clear distinction between current interests and previous wishes 
is adhered to then the correct question is whether a patient’s precedent autonomy should 
override current considerations.  This is a crucial difference between the two guidance 
principles of substituted judgment test and best interests, where substituted judgment 
prioritises precedent autonomous wishes over any other interests.
346
   
The Epistemic Problem  
The significance problem asks why prior views matter and the answer to this query gives 
three reasons: (1) as a substituted judgment test it respects the person’s precedent autonomy; 
(2) prior views and values are a way of focusing on the particular patient; and (3) the legal 
embodiment of these first two reasons is the incorporation of prior views into legislation for 
incompetent patients.  Given that these views do matter, and that they can be the determining 
factor, the veracity of these views becomes critical.  The only possible way of ascertaining 
                                                          
344
 W v M [2011] EWCOP 2443 (Fam) at [6]  Emphasis added.  Baker J further stated in the same paragraph 
“whilst I take those statements into account, they are not binding and in all the circumstances I do not consider 
they carry substantial weight in my decision.”  The weighting of prior views is examined in the section in 
Chapter Seven “Prior Views and Other Interests”. 
345
 Many incompetent patients may be able to express certain experiential interests, for example “that hurts, this 
tastes horrible” but be unable to balance those against other of their interests. For example, they may not be able 
to understand that, without the injection or bad tasting medicine, they will die or endure much worse suffering. 
As already explained the incompetent patient who is the subject of this thesis is usually unable to even express 
this level of interaction.   
346




what a patient most likely would have wanted to happen to them with end-of-life treatment 
decisions is working out what, if any, prior views they had.  It is not, therefore, suggested that 
prior views should always be considered unsafe or not considered at all, but rather that what 
is being accepted in some cases as ‘the patient’s view’ is not necessarily a genuine 
representation.   
There is no way of knowing what the incompetent patient actually wants at this precise 
moment in time.  Even with the best evidence of an explicit prior view, nobody has any way 
of actually knowing or verifying if the permanently incompetent person: (1) might hold 
different interests from when she or he was competent (for example, Margo’s dilemma, as 
explored in Chapter Four, and the conflict problem as explored above); or (2) changed his or 
her mind while still competent, but left no record or evidence of that change; or (3) actually 
holds any views relating to the choice at issue, or – in the case of the permanently 
unconscious and infants – can hold any views at all.  Even if the evidence for the prior views 
is strong and it is highly unlikely that the patient will change their mind, it is still a 
possibility, and therefore any indication claiming that ‘the patient would have wanted this’ 
should be subject to some scepticism.  ‘Would have wanted’ indicates that their prior 
competent self wanted a certain treatment decision for their future incompetent self.  This is 
different to ‘wants’ (a current view that cannot be ascertained) or ‘would want’ (a certain 
treatment decision if they could communicate). 
Is there a problem with courts indicating that decisions are in line with what the patient 
themselves would have wanted?  Using such expressions gives judges a way to show that 
they are respecting the patient’s autonomy, but they may do so by falsely attributing to the 
incompetent person views that they no longer hold.  There are two ways in which that 
concern may apply. It may mean that the patient, by virtue of being unconscious or 
incompetent, no longer holds any view about the treatment decision.  In that situation, 
whether we regard the attribution of the interest as a fiction seems to depend on the view we 
take about surviving or critical interests.  If we agree with Dworkin, Feinberg and Sperling 
that there exists a form of interests that can survive even death, then it seems that we – and 
hence, the courts  – can meaningfully attribute those interests to the individual even after they 
have permanently lost awareness of them.  
Of course, for those who are sceptical of the notion of surviving interests, such attribution 




present difficulties when those prior interests seem to conflict with the current, experiential 
interests of the now-incompetent patient.  For judges who make use of such reasoning, 
though, it may be said that, while they are taking a position on a contested area of philosophy, 
they are not engaging in an approach that is necessarily problematic.  Indeed, in taking such 
an approach, they would be aligning themselves with some esteemed philosophical company.  
The second sense in which courts may be falsely attributing interests would arise if they were 
basing decisions on views that the now-incompetent patient never possessed, or about which 
the patient changed their mind.  Whatever we think about the notion of surviving interests, it 
seems essential that the individual at one time harboured those interests.   
Consequently, the most important questions that can be asked with regards to prior views are: 
(1) how can the substitute decision-maker can know what the prior views of the incompetent 
patient were?  (2) How safely can the substitute decision-maker rely on those views?  These 
questions are now considered in detail for the remainder of this chapter.  The following 
section will discuss the expectations a reasonable person could have regarding the use of any 
prior views in providing insight into their current incompetent situation.  A detailed proposal 
is then outlined, based on this critical analysis, which is designed to test the veracity of prior 
views and beliefs.  The second part of this chapter comprises an examination of specific cases 
using this proposal.   
Expectations Regarding Prior Views  
The distinction between the two groups of patients identified in the last chapter, those 
permanently incompetent who were able to previously express a view – and whether or not 
they did so – is critical.  Essentially, these groups signify two possibilities for the 
permanently incompetent, but previously competent, patient: (1) the patient has expressed a 
view prior to their incompetence, which relates in some way to their current incompetent 
state; and (2) the patient made no explicit prior view, but has a previous self: they have lived 
a life from which their beliefs, their character and their attestable values can be extrapolated 
in helping to determine where their best interests lie.  There is both common law and 
legislative recognition for the prior views and the previous self that these categories denote.  
This chapter examines what this actually means in practice, teasing out the differences 




At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that prior views are not interests in themselves, 
but this position requires further clarification.  Whilst they are not interests per se, Chapter 
Three argued that a person has a future-orientated interest in their prior views being 
considered.  If it is true that a person has an interest in having their prior competent views 
applied to their current incompetent situation, then there is a subsequent interest in having 
their prior views accurately determined.  Whilst these are clearly connected, they are not the 
same claim.  To legitimise the stance that the veracity of prior views matter, it is helpful to 
consider the categories of interests discussed in Chapter Three.  This type of interest, which 
matters not for itself, but only for its impact on the fulfilment of our other interests, has 
precedence in the interests canvassed.  For example, the upholding of a prior view could be a 
far life-long interest as discussed by Sperling or even a critical interest under Dworkin’s 
tuition.   
There is obviously not only a wide range of possible views that someone could express, there 
is also a wide range of ways that these views could be expressed, as well as variances in the 
evidence for these views.  A discussion of the consequences of this observation will be 
presented when the proposal for veracity is outlined, because it is often the distinction 
between these points that is conflated in the cases considered in this thesis.  For those who 
have expressed a prior view it is generally accepted that this prior view must in some way 
relate to their current condition as a qualifying condition for being considered.
347
    
There is also a difference in the evidential strength of the views ascertained.  Evidential 
strength may be taken in two ways:  (1) how strong it is as evidence of best interests in 
relation to the current condition of the person – in this sense strong evidence would mean 
prior views which are very specifically related to the current condition; and (2) it may be 
taken to refer to how well evidenced it is that the person actually held a particular view.  Is 
this direct knowledge of what the person said or thought, or is it second hand, or an 
inference?  In this thesis (2) is used to describe evidential strength, whilst (1) is about how 
specific the views are in relation to the current condition of the person.  In assessing the prior 
views of patients, the judiciary have at times blended the distinctions that can be made 
between the specificity of the views that patients have had, and the evidence that was 
provided for those views.  What should happen with these very different starting points?  A 
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framework is now proposed that clarifies these different views and demonstrates how they 
can be evaluated.   
Drawing on this previous discussion, it is reasonable to make the following observations of 
what can be expected from a substitute decision-maker when considering prior views in the 
context of best interests: 
(1) Any prior views should be subject to a robust evaluation in order to determine 
their validity. 
(2) Where there are documented prior views, the evidential strength of these views 
should not be conflated with an inference of their validity. 
(3) A patient’s previous self should not be interpreted as evidence for prior views, and 
any move by a substitute decision-maker to construe the patient’s previous self 
into their current situation should be treated with extreme caution.  
(4) There should not be any fiction of respecting current autonomy in a situation 
where the person, by definition, has none.   
(5) When discussing any prior views the substitute decision-maker should be clear 
that they are respecting the patient’s precedent autonomy. 
It is not contended that judges have been unaware of these features, since many of the judges 
do acknowledge and discuss what the purported views are based on, but rather that there has 
been little critical analysis of how this should, or should not, impact on the conclusions 
reached.  This is perhaps exacerbated by an implicit – and sometimes explicit – assumption 
that ‘no one wants to live in a permanently incompetent state’.  Rightly or wrongly the 
undeniable consequence of this supposition is that there is a low threshold for finding in 
favour of views supporting stopping treatment.
348
   
Ascertaining Authenticity of Prior Views  
Earlier investigation in this chapter provided an outline as to three broad problematic areas 
when considering a permanently incompetent person’s prior self: (1) the significance 
problem; (2) the conflict problem; and (3) the epistemic problem.  It was argued that there are 
epistemic issues which arise from the assessment of prior views; issues which need to 
considered carefully given that prior views will be considered as part of the best interests test 
for the previously competent patient.   
                                                          
348




The application of prior views should therefore be a robust process.  This is not always 
something that has been done particularly well by the judiciary (as discussed in Part Two of 
this chapter).  In order to assess how well the judges are doing at assessing the validity of the 
prior views it is necessary to develop a scale that this can be measured against.  This thesis 
outlines a proposal to ascertain authenticity of prior views, and develops three broad 
categories which can be used to show the range of views that may be considered in end-of-
life cases.  The following examples show the difference between a prior view and a previous 
self, as relating to the distinctions between current and previous times.   
Scenario 1: A person states at T1, at a time when they are in a competent state S1, 
what their wishes are if they become in a permanently incompetent state (S2 at T2).  
This statement says that if, at a future time T2, they are in a particular state or 
situation S2 they have particular goals of the care (Rx, S2) that they would wish to 
achieve.
349
  This is an example of a prior view. 
Scenario 2: A person is in a permanently incompetent state (S2 at T2).  They did not 
state at T1 – a time when they were in a competent state, S1 – what their particular 
wishes would be at T2 if they were in S2.  This person was developed and competent 
at T1 and was engaged in a full life.  This is an example of a previous self.   
This distinction between (S1 at T1) – a competent, prior time and (S2 at T2) – the situation 
referred to at T1, which is now the current time, is crucial, and it will be referred to it 
extensively. 
The incompetent person, at T2, is unable to state what their wishes are, so a substitute 
decision-maker needs to assess what, if any, their previously held competent wishes were.  
The goal for any substitute decision-maker is to make the best decision possible based on the 
incompetent person’s best interests, and, as already discussed, this will need to take into 
account their prior views.
350
  These prior views should not be used by any substitute decision-
maker without scrutiny, therefore judges – as proponents of the most rigorous standards – 
should use them with the highest degree of scrutiny.  Initially there are two distinct parts to 
trying to ascertain what the person may have wanted.  The first is identifying the content and 
source of information, and the second is evaluating that information and applying it to the 
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decision.  Once these steps have been followed the third step is to make a judgment on the 
veracity of any views of the prior self.  The following proposal separates all the strands that 
become entangled when trying at T2 to ascertain a person’s prior views or previous self at 
T1.   
Investigation I: Identifying Content and Source of Information 
Firstly, it should be acknowledged that the judges often had the benefit of first-hand exposure 
to the evidence, including the family members’ testimonies.  Judgments are not the same as 
transcripts, and therefore the information available for analysis may only be a small summary 
of what the families said.  However, the judgments are the judicial representation of these 
views and can therefore be evaluated as such.  There are two mechanisms for information 
gathering at T2 regarding the views of a patient at T1.   
(1) Explicit: the individual’s explicit expressions of views.  This is a previously expressed 
wish or statement at T1 that has some significance for their situation S2 at T2.   
There are two sources of explicit information:    
(a) Written or direct records.  For example an advance directive. 
(b) Report of witnesses.  At T1 someone heard the person say something specific or 
general about their views on S2.   
(2) Inferred: inferences about what the patient’s views at T1 probably were, using the 
person’s previous self.  Where a person at T1 has, or has not made any expressions 
regarding what their wishes might be at T2, inferences from their previous self may 
be made about the person’s views.  These inferences might be made on the basis of 
the person’s character or on the basis of specific behaviours or beliefs but they have a 
previous self with a life story or narrative from which we might infer their views and 
values.  It is important to note that the inferences made about a person apply to both 
groups of previously competent patients – those who did express an explicit view as 
well as those who did not.  The fact that somebody has expressed a previously explicit 
view does not mean that other information should be ignored. 
There are two sources of inferred information that can be gathered for the person at 
T2: 
(a) Observation of witnesses – friends, family, others.  The claim is that the person’s 
character leads to certain inferences; or that they behaved in certain ways; for 
example “he hated hospitals with a vengeance”. 
(b) Factual information – information that can be gathered independently.  For 
example, the person’s digital footprint – what have they posted on Facebook or how 
have they described themselves in blogs?   
Investigation I is designed to identify the content and the source of the information; it does 






Investigation II: Evaluating the Information  
There are four critical judgments to make regarding the information gathered at T2 for 
the person at T1, which are indicated by (a) – (b) under two headings (1) and (2):  
(1) Regarding the source of the information:  
(a) Reliability of evidence.  There are two aspects to this.   
(i) How reliable is this information from a purely evidential standpoint?  For example: 
‘how sure are you that she said that?’ 
(ii) What was the source of the information?  Was it written or verbal?   Was it from 
the person themselves or from observations of them?    
(2) Regarding the views it is believed the person had:  
(b) Strength of view.  How ardently did the person hold the view?  Was it consistently 
expressed over time?  How long before T2 did the person express the view?  Was it 
expressed to more than one person?  If it is an inference of their view, what is the 
basis for this?  This may be about how often or strongly the person said what their 
view was or the lack of direct evidence from them.   
(c) Relevance of view.  How closely aligned to the person’s current situation is the 
view or inferences made?  Does the prior expression or view apply to the current 
situation?    
(d) The status of the view or inference.  Was any view or inference based on good 
information and comprehension, consistent with their known values and preferences?  
How informed was this view or inference?  Since T1 have there been any obvious 
changes that might indicate a change of view?  Is it of any importance that at T2 the 
person is or is not suffering?  Was it a view that the person expressed consistently 
throughout their life or was it a throwaway comment in a moment of high (or low) 
emotion?  In regard to observations: how safe is the inference from these to any views 
– meaning how well founded in what was observed is the imputed view?  It is 
important to note that these are not necessarily completely distinct categories – rather 
they are a useful heuristic.  For example, if someone had told more than one person, 
this could be used both to corroborate that she or he actually expressed such views, 
and as evidence that it was a relatively settled and strongly held view (especially if he 
or she had told the witnesses on separate occasions).  This is evaluating the reliability 
of the content of the view, unlike the first section, which is evaluating the reliability 
of the source of the information.   
Investigation III: Validity of the Inference  
Validity of the inference.  By identifying the sources of information in Investigation I, 
and making critical judgments on this information in Investigation II, the substitute 
decision-maker is able to state as accurately as possible what the person’s views were 
at T1 and therefore how safely we can infer from this what their most likely view at 




From this three part assessment proposal it is therefore possible to discern four broad 
categories of views, ranging from explicit to inferred, and specific to general.  This provides a 
useful tool with which safety of the prior view or previous self can be generalised.  The 
following table demonstrates this. 
Table 1: Four Categories of Views 
 Specific 
Precisely related to the person’s 
current state 
General 
Generally related to person’s current 
state 
Explicit 
ie Prior Views 
Explicit-Specific 
An explicit comment at T1 
relating specifically to their 
condition at T2 
Safety: ‘strong’ 
Explicit-General 
An explicit comment at T1 relating 




ie Previous Self 
Inferred-Specific  
A life story at T1 that has some 
specific relevance to T2 
Safety: ‘medium’ 
Inferred-General 
A life story at T1 with only general 
relevance to T2 
Safety: ‘weak’  
This table provides a useful heuristic for the case analysis, but the strength of the view still 
needs to be examined under the details of the proposal.  Part Two of this chapter illustrates 
how these categories can be evaluated within end-of-life cases, and also how an inferred-
specific previous self may be as safe (or safer) than an explicit-general prior view.  The next 
section demonstrates how the proposal can be applied to a hypothetical scenario.   
Applying a Hypothetical Case 
In the following scenario an outline has been designed which incorporates ‘easily applied’ 
facts to examine, as the nuances of this approach will subsequently be examined when 




Daisy Sullivan: Repeatedly Daisy said to her family, while competent: “if I ever 
become in a PVS (S2) please do not continue treating me, please do not prolong my 
life”.  This is what I will call her view at T1 about a treatment at some future time 
(T2) if in S2.  She had made those statements while working as a doctor in intensive 
care, so she had seen many patients in such a state.  Then a catastrophic event 
happened and she was left in a slightly different state, near PVS but not quite S2.  
This is a different situation to the one she had advanced her wishes on at T1.  How 
can the substitute decision-makers be sure that her view at T1 should apply to T2? 
Lily Sullivan: Lily had lived her life at a frenetic pace.  She was a naturopathic 
healer.  She took regular homeopathic remedies, ate reasonably healthily (although 
was not obsessive about it, and would have the occasional treat) and if she was really 
sick would seek a medical doctor’s opinion.  When she suffered a catastrophic event 
and became permanently incompetent her family were convinced that she would not 
want to be like that, pumped full of pharmaceutical drugs – the Lily they knew at T1 
would not have wanted treatment continued.  How do the substitute decision-makers 
know what Lily would have wanted at T1, and should this apply at T2? 
Investigation I 
 
(1) The nature of the information for Daisy is an explicit-specific prior view, as she 
expressed to others – (b) report of witnesses – at T1, the wish to not continue 
treatment if she was in a situation similar to S1.  It has some relevance to her 
current condition at T2.   
(2) For Lily the information available is an inference that she would not want 
treatment continued based on her previous self, and largely appears to be from the 
observation of witnesses under (a).   
Investigation II 
The first part of evaluating the evidence is to make sure that from an evidentiary standpoint, 
it can safely be relied on. 
(a) Reliability of evidence: Regarding (a) (i) the reliability of the evidence, there is no 
reason to doubt the evidence in either scenario.  If the facts showed a different 
scenario, perhaps if the family members stood to inherit a lot of money, or if they had 
different religious views from the patient then these could be considered as flags for 
enquiring into the motivations more clearly.  But with regards to Daisy and Lily, there 
are not different opinions amongst family members as to what she actually said or was 
likely to have said.  The family has said that this was Daisy’s wish, and that Daisy 
herself expressed it.  There is also clear evidence that Lily was a naturopath who only 




information, it is common in the cases discussed in this thesis that the family state 
what the person would want.  How this assertion be dealt with?  If it is a statement 
from the person, then it can be deemed to be a prior view, as shown in Daisy’s case.  
However, if the family is saying ‘Lily would not have wanted this’ then this is not 
necessarily her view, and should be categorised as the family inference of her wishes 
based on her way of living.  This may make it less reliable in some cases.   
(b) Strength of view: Daisy’s view could be characterised as ‘strong’, as it was made 
repeatedly to more than one person.  The inference from Lily’s previous self could be 
‘medium’ as her life story shows that there are some grounds on which to infer the 
view that she would not want treatment.  However there are also factors in her life 
that could show that her family’s interpretations of her previous self are not 
necessarily correct.  There is evidence that she sought medical care in the past so was 
not averse to conventional medicine, although it is a further inference to say that she 
would choose pharmaceutical drugs over continued life as it was.  Is it really that she 
would choose this?  Or is it the bias that to many, her existence is not a worthwhile 
one, that is actually creeping into the equation?  
(c) Relevance of view: Daisy’s situation S2 differed from S1 on which she advanced 
wishes on at T1.  However, her position as a doctor means that she clearly understood 
the situation at S1 and the fact that S2 does not differ significantly means that it is still 
highly relevant.  Lily’s situation is different.  Her previous views on medicine and 
perhaps the busy way she led her life are useful indicators here, but not of particular 
relevance. 
(d) Status of the view: there is a clearly expressed prior view from Daisy, who 
expressed the same view repeatedly, and who had superior understanding of what T2 
could mean for a patient.  For Lily there is an understanding of her life as someone 
who was probably uncomfortable to some extent with conventional medicine, but not 
someone who completely rejected it.   
Investigation III 
Validity of inference: the substitute decision-maker can then state with confidence that 
Daisy at T2 would most likely not want treatment to be continued.  This is based on a 
thoughtful and considered critical analysis of the information provided at T1.  In 




maker can state that, more likely than not, Lily would not have wanted treatment 
continued.  Note that this may also be the family’s or friends’ view of what Lily 
would have said at T1 about T2, but the whānau’s inferences do not have any special 
reliability or validity.  What they do have, is special access to what Lily was really 
like – the substitute decision maker relies upon this to make an inference.  But the 
whānau rely upon it also.  Here it is important to distinguish the reliability of the 
evidence on which the inference is based, from the reliability of the inference itself.  
The first is a matter of evidence (was Lily really a naturopath who relied on 
homeopathic remedies?), and the second is a matter of the validity of the inference 
(can it be validly inferred from Lily’s actions that she would not want to be treated at 
T2?)  The validity of inference should not be confused with the reliability of the 
evidence.  The family’s inference from what Lily was like to what she might have 
said at T1 about her condition at T2, is not a piece of evidence.   
Summary of Part One  
In decision-making for the incompetent patient, their prior self, if they had one, is 
undoubtedly important.  An attempt to untangle the difficulties that arise when evaluating 
previously competent views is, therefore, a crucial part of any discourse on best interests.  To 
help with this process three main areas of contention have been identified when looking at 
prior views, and these have been grouped under the following headings: the significance 
problem, the conflict problem and the epistemic problem.   
The significance problem asks why do the prior views matter at all?  The answer is that they 
matter because of the respect that is given to an individual’s precedent autonomy and because 
of this respect, the consideration of prior views and previous selves are – and should be – 
found in the legislation governing best interests.  This should not be confused with the patient 
having current autonomy. 
The conflict problem recognises that the incompetent person, who has been previously 
competent, has the potential for conflicting interests between their previously competent 
wishes and any current interests.  For example, this conflict could arise between a previously 
expressed wish for treatment as long as possible and an experiential interest in not 




The epistemic problem acknowledges that there is no way to know with certainty what the 
incompetent person would want.  If the patient has not been previously competent, then this 
is where that enquiry ends.  If, however, they have been competent prior to the event that has 
left them permanently incompetent, this provides the substitute decision-maker with vital 
information.  The significance problem holds that substitute decision-makers should care 
about prior views, which leads to the conclusion that we do need to consider what the person 
said or did in the past.  This information is considered to be integral to the process of best 
interests, because it respects the component of the test that makes it specific to an individual, 
and it can come in two forms, the person’s prior views or their previous self.  The 
consequence of not knowing what an incompetent patient would want, but having a legal 
system which gives weight to that person’s previous views or beliefs, means that the key 
approach when looking at a person’s prior views or previous self is to ascertain the veracity 
of these prior values.   
In order to determine veracity in any meaningful way, any inferences about what a person 
may have wanted should be thoroughly examined, and then the decision can be based on the 
best information possible.  A careful step-by-step analysis, as set out above, has asserted that 
any incompetent patient who has been previously competent can fall within four broad 
categories.  These are set out in the table which categorises the prior views and previous self 
under four broad labels: explicit prior views which are either specific (specifically relates to 
their condition) or general (relates generally to their condition); and a previous self which 
provides inferred information that is either specific (where their life story is informative) or 
general (where their life story has no particular relevance).  The proposal for veracity set out 
an intensive investigation into each of these four categories and provides a way of 
determining how safe the inference from the person’s life is.  The judicial engagement with 
the veracity of views is one that has been ineffectual in some cases, and this forms the 
discussion in Part Two.   
Part Two: Case Analyses 
The first part of this chapter set out the problems with using prior views of incompetent 
patients, and provided some ways to navigate these.  Using this extensive discussion several 
end-of-life cases are reviewed in-depth in Part Two, with reference to the template as a way 




Consideration is first given to three cases where the patient’s previous self has been used in 
the best interests assessment, then five cases are examined in which there were explicit prior 
views.  These have been chosen because they demonstrate a range of views from within the 
four categories identified in Table 1. 
Cases With No Clearly Expressed Prior View 
In most end-of-life cases concerning an incompetent adult patient, a reasonably sudden event 
has occurred, which lessens the chance that the patient has had pre-warning of their 
condition, and they are consequently less likely to have had extensive discussion about what 
they would want to happen to them.  The legislative changes over the last decades appear to 
be in favour of acknowledging that, although incompetent patients may not have expressed a 
clear view prior to their current condition, this does not necessarily preclude any inclusion of 
their possible views into the test of what is in their best interests.  The “values and beliefs” of 
a person referred to specifically in British and Canadian legislation is an example of this.
351
  
The roots of this kind of consideration lie in the common law, where judges considering end-
of-life decisions decided that an incompetent patient’s ‘personality’ could be taken into 
account as one of the possible manifestations of a person’s values and beliefs.  But what does 
it actually mean to take the personality of the patient into account when considering best 
interests?  In what way could the personality of the patient be relevant?  Is a person who 
enjoys a cup of tea and a good book more likely to want to be in a permanently incompetent 
state than someone is an outdoors, go-getter type?  The language of “values and beliefs” 
would, presumably, mean a stronger sense of the patient’s previous self, however for the 
jurisdictions that rely on the common law, the notion of personality still persists.   
Thea Stilton was an outgoing, exuberant person, described by many as ‘the life and 
soul of the party’.  She would set herself many ambitious goals, and just last year 
climbed Mount Everest.  Geronimo Stilton was a quiet, shy man who preferred his 
books to parties.  He loved his family and enjoyed his work with disadvantaged youth.   
These rather stereotypical descriptions are chosen because they are (deliberately) clichéd and 
yet are typical of the way that incompetent patients are often described.
352
  Where do such 
descriptions lead?  If a description of a person ‘who lived life to the full’ is followed by the 
proposition that they ‘would not want to continue living under such conditions’, there is a 
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reasonable assumption that their personality is being taken into account.  This is not 
necessarily based on what could be called values, except if further evidence could be 
provided for a life beyond ‘living it to the full’.  The notion that an exuberant outgoing person 
is less likely to want to be in a PVS than someone who is an introverted homebody may, to 
some, seem a reasonable presumption, but any careful consideration of it leads to the 
conclusion that it is merely applying stereotypes.  The problem with the application of 
stereotypes is that they are highly generalised and do not take into account individual 
differences.  It is likely that claims that a patient would, or would not want to live in a certain 
way based on stereotypes would be difficult to substantiate.  
However, does the prospect of permanent incompetence make such inferences seem more 
problematic than they would look in another scenario?  For example, if the decision was 
whether to amputate the limbs of an unconscious patient in order to save their life, is it wrong 
to draw inferences from such factors as I described earlier?  This was the situation in 2002 for 
Olivia Giles who contracted meningitis aged 36.  Faced with such a decision, her family 
clearly thought there was a quality of life decision to be made in relation to her predicament: 
“One evening the doctors told them they were going to have to amputate all four of 
my limbs, above the elbows and knees, and asked whether they should do that or 
switch off the life-support machine and let me go.  My family decided I would be so 
dependent that it wouldn’t be much of a life.  But the next day the plastic surgeon who 




In this case, would it be more understandable to talk of mountain climbing versus book 
reading habits to decide on limb amputation?  Perhaps so, but again not necessarily.  The ‘go-
getter’ type of person could also be easily said to be the type of person who embraced 
challenges and could therefore be more reasonably expected to adapt to the loss of limbs.  
The issue here is that there is a myriad of ways that generalised comments can be interpreted, 
and what should be done in each case is to assess how safely any inference can be made from 
what is known of a person before any treatment decisions are made.  The problem, as is 
demonstrated in the following sections, is primarily with the validity of the inference.   
There are two main problems with somebody’s general personality and how they lived their 
life being subsumed into the best interests test.  Firstly, it can lead to dangerous assumptions, 
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something which should be avoided, as set out in the expectations determined in Part One.  
For example, if the patient is Catholic and in a MCS, it may be assumed that they would want 
to receive treatment for as long as possible.  But the mere fact of their Catholicism does not 
actually tell us what that particular person would want at all.
354
  It is an overgeneralisation to 
say that all Catholics adhere to all the teachings of the Church.  This is where evaluating the 
information under Investigation II of the proposal could help with how much weight should 
be given to this: (1) going to mass regularly and frequently is evidence that the person is a 
Catholic; and (2) going to mass regularly and frequently can be evidence for the inference 
that the person is likely to follow Catholic doctrine.   
The second problem with personality being subsumed into the best interests test is that it can 
create a fiction of respecting autonomy in various guises.  This fiction is twofold:  (1) of 
respecting current autonomy in a situation where there is no capacity for autonomous 
decision-making; but more often though, (2) giving the impression that by incorporating the 
previous self into the decision-making the courts are upholding the patient’s precedent 
autonomy. 
This fits within the significance problem identified earlier, which explains why prior views 
are important.  To say that Anthony Bland would have wanted treatment withdrawn is 
misleading, as we do not know what he would have actually wanted, and there is no way for 
us to know this.  It implies the existence of an Anthony Bland who previously chose certain 
treatment decisions.  There is not actually any such person.  In contrast what ‘he would have 
wanted then’ could be a fiction, but not in the same sense, because there actually was an 
Anthony Bland at that time who could have wanted things.  This is not just a theme from the 
countries discussed in this thesis.  Its prevalence in American courts has also been noted, but 
at least the focus on the best interests test does avoid the lengths that the American judiciary 
will go to, for example, asking what the incompetent patient would decide if they could be 
competent for five minutes: 
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“Asking what such patients would decide is like asking, as one court put it, ‘[I]f it 
snowed all summer would it then be winter?’”
355
 
The following section discusses cases where the patient has not clearly expressed a prior 
view, beginning with two cases where the patient is in the inferred-general category, before 
evaluating one that is an example of an inferred-applicable view. 
Inferred-General Cases 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland – Common Law Precedent for Previous Self 
Often there are no particular views from the patient on the matter before the courts, other than 
what can be presumed from the way they have lived their life and what the family says about 
them.  Bland is not only a good example of this, it is instrumental in understanding the 
principles of best interests.
356
  It is the most quoted case in the Commonwealth regarding 
incompetent adult patients, and the judgments in this case have contributed in innumerable 
ways to not only the common law but also to the legislative meaning of best interests.
357
  It 
was decided in 1993, prior to the MCA; it was the first case under common law to sanction 
the withdrawal of treatment from an incompetent adult in the United Kingdom and, as such, it 
provided a blueprint (though one that differed somewhat between judges and courts) for the 
best interests test.
358
        
Anthony Bland, aged 21, had been in a PVS for nearly three years when the Airedale NHS 
Trust applied to withdraw ANH from him.  The trial judge in Bland stated that there was no 
evidence of what Anthony Bland’s prior views might be.   
“Of course Anthony Bland is unable to express views of his own and there had been 
no occasion for him to express any view as to how he might view his situation if some 
terrible tragedy such as this befell him.”
359
 
Accordingly, this is a case where there have been no prior expressions on the patient’s 
particular situation.  It was, consequently, up to those closest to Anthony Bland to put 
forward their views on what he may have wanted at T1 – not what he would want at T2, as he 
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was not capable of wanting anything – and what kind of a life he had led.  His father’s 
evidence to the Court of Protection describes a ‘normal’ boy: 
“He traced for me Anthony’s brief life – explaining how he was a thoroughly normal 
boy.  He described him as not a very clever boy but with a good personality – 
sensitive and willing.  His great interest was football and Liverpool his chosen team.  
He said that he was not religious but that he had attended Sunday School in the 
Church of England.  His assessment of Anthony Bland’s situation was expressed in 
these clear terms: ‘He certainly wouldn't want to be left like he is.  I would feel that he 
should be removed and the family feel the same.  I was angry when the advice from 
the coroner was received.  I can see no point whatsoever in continuing treatment.’”
360
 
Therefore, there were no applicable or general prior views on his current condition.  There 
was only evidence of his prior interests, predominantly – and ultimately tragically – football 
(his condition was caused by severe overcrowding at the Hillsborough Football Stadium in 
1989).  The only other evidence was what those closest to him assert that he would want to 
happen in his current condition.  But how does it stand as evidence of what Anthony Bland 
would have wanted at T1?  It is not evidence of his views, but is instead an inference from his 
life, made by his family – and from what else the family know of him.  They are inferring 
from their knowledge of him what he may have wanted at T1.  How relevant is the 
information to establishing what Anthony Bland’s views were, and how strong is the 
evidence that those were his views?  Effectively there is only evidence of his previous self.  Is 
it more than likely that this evidence was accurate and reliable as set out by Investigation II 
(1) (a)?  Balancing up the considerations, it can be claimed that it is, as there was no reason to 
distrust Anthony Bland’s family and their assertions that they knew their son well (on the 
evidence available from the judgment).  But did what they know of him validate the inference 
they made as to his views at T1?  How relevant to Anthony Bland’s condition is this 
evidence?  The only finding possible is that it is not germane to the situation.  An assertion 
from his family, and nothing from Anthony Bland himself in contemplating his current 
situation, necessarily provides a conclusion that ranks low on the relevance scale, and 
therefore the safety of inference that Anthony Bland ‘would not want to live like this’ is not 
robust.  It is not suggested that this could (or should) have had an impact on the findings of 
the courts, but rather that there should have been reflection on the particular nature of 
Anthony Bland’s views (or lack thereof) and what this meant.  The courts linked the family’s 
views of what Anthony Bland would have wanted, which have been shown to be uncritically 
assessed, to his best interests.  Such an inference was criticised in the above section 
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discussing reasonable expectations for a substitute decision-maker.  In the Court of Appeal, 
Butler-Sloss LJ weighed up the family’s views alongside the patient’s personality: 
“In assessing the best interests of Anthony Bland, however, his views, personality, 
how others including his family saw him before his accident will form part of that 
assessment, although that evidence has a subjective element.”
361
 
In the House of Lords Lord Goff cited Re J in his support of the idea that the best interests 
test encompasses the patient’s personality:  
“Of course, consistent with the best interests test, anything relevant to the application 
of the test may be taken into account; and if the personality of the patient is relevant 
to the application of the test (as it may be in cases where the various relevant factors 
have to be weighed), it may be taken into account, as was done in In Re J. (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33.”
362
 
It is therefore established at common law that a person’s previous self should be considered 
as a way to ascertain their best interests.  What is lacking in Bland is any way of ascertaining 
how this should be done.  Stereotypes were referred to earlier, and in that context, it is easy to 
wonder if Anthony Bland had been a quiet reclusive teenager, who would have welcomed the 
drama of being the focus of his family’s continued misery, would that have impacted upon 
the courts’ decisions?  I suspect it would not (and quite rightly so, but there probably would 
have been a lack of transparency about this).  Dworkin bolsters the idea that a person’s 
previous life informs their current best interests, although predicates this on them being aware 
of it:  
“When patients remain conscious, their sense of integrity and of the coherence of their 
lives crucially affects their judgment about whether it is in their best interests to 
continue to live.  Athletes, or others whose physical activity was at the centre of their 
self-conception, are more likely to find a paraplegic’s life intolerable.”
363
 
The following case deals more directly with a discussion of personality and how it applied to 
the patient.   
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Re G – Inferring Views from Personality  
A New Zealand case, Re G, exhibits a judge using a patient’s way of life and their personality 
to inform end-of-life decision-making.
364
  Similarly to Bland, the issue was whether to 
withdraw treatment from an incompetent adult patient, and this was decided before any 
legislation was in place to govern the decision-making process.  Mr G was not in a PVS, 
however “his quality of life [was] no different from a person in that condition”.
365
  Fraser J, 
after considering both the substituted judgment and best interests test, decided that the: 
“proper course for me is to adopt the “best interests” test but to give weight to the 
likely wishes of the patient and to the views of the patient’s family and carers.”
366
   
Subsequently he separated the patient’s prior views from the patient’s best interests (and in so 
doing avoided one of the criticisms levelled at judgments in Part One).  This may be due to 
canvassing the substituted judgment test alongside the best interests test.  However, the 
judgment did not avoid all possible criticism.  The following excerpt shows how Mr G’s 
previous self was used in the judgment: 
“Affidavits from family and friends show that Mr G has lived a full and active life 
professionally, with his family and in his varied social and recreational interests.  
There are a number of comments from the people who knew him best to the general 
effect that he was uncomfortable with and found it difficult to cope with frailty, 
illness and suffering.  While he does not appear ever to have expressed any wish as to 
what might be done in the event of him being in the situation in which he now is, his 
family and the friends who have made affidavits are unanimously of the view that if 
his wishes could be ascertained he would not want to continue in his present state and 
would choose not to continue with the life-saving treatment.  I agree that this is an 
entirely reasonable inference from his character and general philosophy of, and 
approach to, life as described in the affidavits.”
367
 
Mr G’s whānau sought to infer his wishes from their knowledge of him.  It is reasonable to 
assume that they had good knowledge of him (whatever evidence they have about his 
previous self is strong) but how relevant are the views for which they had evidence?  They 
knew things about his personality and his character, which was of some relevance to 
inferences about Mr G’s views about how he would have felt about his current state had he 
said anything about it.  It is of more relevance than the evidence in Bland, as it related to an 
aversion to fragility and illness which could be related to a general dislike of dependence, 
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leading to a conclusion that the inference was safer than the one in Bland.  Fraser J’s 
judgment separated the possible prior views from the best interests test and he canvassed the 
whānau thoroughly, which produced an in-depth portrait of Mr G.  However, his claim that 
there was “an entirely reasonable inference from his character” made by the whānau that Mr 
G would not want to live in that condition is not necessarily supported.  Mr G’s current 
condition meant that he was not suffering, it could have been this he objected to with illness, 
and therefore he may have wanted to stay in his current condition.  Fraser J also gives 
credence to the notion that by living “a full and active life professionally, with his family and 
in his varied social and recreational interests”, Mr G would not want to continue treatment.  
The italicised part of the quotation, that if Mr G’s views could be ascertained he would not 
want to continue treatment, is Fraser J implicitly using the legal fiction of respecting his 
autonomy.  His wishes cannot be ascertained.  They are not known, and although his previous 
self does seem to strongly support withdrawal of treatment, more scrutiny of his previous self 
may have provided a safer inference of his possible views, or at least a more honest appraisal 
of them.  As it was, there is a leap of inference regarding the strength of evidence from the 
whānau, which was overwhelming, and its relevance to his current interests. A more 
transparent statement would have held that at T1 it was more likely than not that at T2 he 
would want treatment discontinued. 
What did the consideration of his previous self achieve?  It bolstered the overall perception of 
it being a reasonable decision to withdraw treatment, because Fraser J linked Mr G’s previous 
self, accepting the whānau’s entreaties that he would not want to be kept alive, to his best 
interests.  I am endeavouring to clarify that the impression given of the patient’s current 
wishes being upheld in Re G is subject to further scrutiny, and offering possible explanations 
for this.  The following case provides an example of a safer inference from the previous self. 
Inferred-Specific Cases 
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James – Best Interests under the 
MCA 
The James case was the first to consider future treatment under the MCA, which had been 
enacted post-Bland.
368
  The family’s arguments were formed using Mr James’ previous self, 
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arguing that in the MCA under s 6 a person’s “past feelings” and “beliefs and values that 
would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity” must be considered.   
David James was a 68 year old man who was admitted to hospital following complications 
with his stoma.  He had had the stoma fitted while being successfully treated for colon cancer 
eleven years prior to this event.  Whilst in hospital he contracted an infection which resulted 
in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, an acute kidney injury, and persistent low blood 
pressure.  He ended up in the critical care unit requiring ventilator support.  Between May 
and December he suffered further setbacks; he had a stroke and also required CPR.
369
  The 
NHS Trust petitioned the court to approve declarations that it would be lawful, and in Mr 
James’ best interests, in the event of Mr James clinically deteriorating, to withhold CPR, 
invasive support for circulatory problems and renal replacement therapy.  There was no issue 
around withdrawing any treatment he was currently receiving, the issue was over future 
provision of treatment.  His family disagreed with doctors over withholding any future 
treatment regardless of outcome.  They maintained that he would want all possible treatment 
no matter how small a chance of success (the chance of him leaving the critical care unit was 
put at less than 1%), and pointed to Mr James’ tenacious attitude during his cancer diagnosis 
and subsequent recovery.  In this case there was no prior explicit view, instead his family 
convinced the courts that: (1) his current interactions with them showed that he would want 
future treatment; and (2) his prior beliefs also pointed to receiving treatment for as long as 
possible.  The judges from the three courts all had different approaches to Mr James’ prior 
beliefs.
370
  How they were weighed up is discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, but all of the 
judges declared that they should be factored in some way. 
In the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Peter Jackson refused to grant the hospital the required 
declaration, and found that although Mr James’ condition was grim, he was not convinced 
that there was no chance of recovery.
371
  The Court of Appeal overruled this decision, 
however the Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in their 
                                                          
369
 He was considered to be in a MCS, though this was construed as a misleading statement, see Section “Prior 
Views and Other Interests” in Chapter Seven for more detail. 
370
 As fitting within the criteria in Chapter Two.   
371
 An NHS Trust v DJ [2012] EWHC 3524 (COP) at [84].  There was an unfortunate comment made by one of 
the attending doctors: “I have collected significant evidence that leaves me with the view that DJ would prefer 
to be dead rather than be unable to make music…[The judge Mr Peter Jackson responded:]  Not surprisingly, 
DJ’s family has been distressed at the use to which Dr Danbury put this snippet of information.  In his second 
report and in his oral evidence he retracted without further comment the observation about making music.” at 




judgment and only upheld its decision because Mr James’ condition had deteriorated 
markedly between the two prior hearings.
372
   
Under Investigation I of the proposal Mr James had made no explicit prior view; the 
inferences were made from observation of his family about how he had approached cancer 
previously, and were therefore based on his previous self.   
“[Mrs James] felt that his experience of cancer threw light on his values and wishes in 
the situation in which he found himself.  Even though the surgeons had then been 
pessimistic DJ had never said he had had enough.  She and the family believed he 
would feel the same about his current predicament.”
373
 
Assessing the evidence in Investigation II, the source of inference was reliable, nothing in the 
judgment points to disagreement amongst the family; indeed it was the opposite.  The 
strength of view and the relevance are more difficult to ascertain.  The marked difference 
between the two conditions and the difference in predicted outcome (presuming that a 
recovery from cancer would not involve long-term cognitive impairment compared to any 
form of recovery from his current condition) means that the relevance of these prior views 
should be rated as fairly low.  But contrast this previous self with Anthony Bland’s, and 
David James’ life story is one that is so much more applicable than the inferred-general 
views that were ascertained in the Bland case.  The strength of the inference is unknowable.  
It is quite possible that Mr James felt very strongly, but the low relevance to his current 
condition must be acknowledged.  The status of the purported views appear consistent with 
Mr James’ character and his previous battle with cancer.  The finding at Investigation III, 
based on Mr James’ previous self, is that it was more likely than not at T1 that Mr James 
would have wanted treatment continued at T2, and it is therefore likely that his inferred-
specific view favoured continuation of treatment.   
The Previous Self in End-of-Life Cases  
Permanently incompetent patients who only have a previous self as a source of information 
can fall within two broad parameters.  The first is inferred-general where their life story has 
no particular relevance to their current condition.  The second is inferred-specific which 
denotes a life story that does have some particular relevance to their current condition.  
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Where there have been no explicit views, the courts have sought the views of family, where 
appropriate.  It seems rational that information about a person’s prior views or life is most 
reliable when it comes from that person.  With this group of patients it is not possible to 
ascertain specific views, vis-à-vis the solution to the significance problem which states that 
there are clearly established reasons why we should care about their previous self.  Even if 
the philosophical reasons can be disputed, the legislative mandate that exists in the common 
law jurisdictions clearly shows that prior beliefs should be factored into substitute decision-
making.  Despite the previous self having such a potentially important role there has been 
little judicial assessment of the reliability of the source of information, which is coupled with 
an implicit representation of family views as inferior (as shown by the Court of Appeal in 
James, where they were easily overridden).  On face value, it makes sense to rely less on 
views which are less reliable.  But this is not what actually happens.  What is happening in 
these cases is that the patient’s previous self is not being rigorously assessed; instead, their 
inferred views are shallowly applied, and subsequently used to bolster the impression that the 
courts are upholding their autonomy.  What the judges should be doing is trying to find out 
what the person might have thought at T1 about their current situation at T2, and then 
applying this view (with the weight given the view linked to how safe the inference is).  Note, 
for example, that the judges in Bland do seem to get it right (at least some of the time), but 
the judges (in the Court of Appeal) in James seem to go awry. 
Often, the courts only choice is to infer from what the families maintain would be the 
patient’s wishes, as they remain the only link to any appraisal of the patient’s previous self.  
There is a difference between what the family are saying their loved one would have wanted, 
and what the patient would have wanted at T1.  Making a best guess as to the patient’s 
interests at T1 is a different sort of thing from attributing interests to patients who cannot 
have them at T2.   
The proposal for veracity is one way that this could be more robustly ascertained.  This is 
because the question asked is ‘what views, evidenced in the past, might be relevant to his or 
her current situation’ not ‘what does he or she want now’.  
Realistically, there is no way of knowing for certain what the incompetent person’s actual 
views at T1 were, regardless of what opinions have been gathered.  Where there is no explicit 
view, the substitute decision-maker can look to the person’s previous self.  There is 




in assessing what their previous view might have been on their current situation and their best 
interests on the basis of this view.  There is a wide range of possible evidence of character – 
this was shown in the cases regarding a teenage Anthony Bland, and David James in his 
sixties who had battled cancer – and from there possible values can be extrapolated.  It needs 
to be made clearer that the views described are assumptions, and a more rigorous exploration 
of the role that these wishes play should be applied by the courts.   
Cases With Explicitly Expressed Prior Views 
In addition to having a prior self, a previously competent person may have made a more 
specific statement at T1 that in some way related to their situation at T2.  This is 
supplementary information that should be taken into account, but it is not necessarily a 
replacement for the information gleaned from their previous self.   
Explicit-General Cases 
An explicit-general remark is a statement from the previously competent person that relates 
to their current condition, but is broad in its possible application.  This is demonstrated in the 
following Canadian case. 
Scardoni v Hawryluck – Two-tier Threshold for Considering Prior Views 
Scardoni v Hawryluck (Scardoni) is a similar case to James in some respects: the instigator in 
both instances was the family.
374
  They both disagreed with the medical opinion on 
withholding future provision of life-prolonging treatment and in both cases the purported 
views on what the patients would have wanted were upheld by the courts.
375
   
Scardoni illustrates a divergent view from what is considered the majority opinion in cases of 
those who are permanently incompetent.  In this case the patient’s previously held and fairly 
general view – that “where there’s life there’s hope” and therefore treatment should be 
provided to her for as long as possible – and how to interpret and apply these views, were at 
the centre of proceedings.  The family and the medical practitioners did not agree on the 
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proposed treatment plan, and so the matter went to the CCB.
376
  Ultimately the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice agreed with the family that treatment should not be withheld, on the 
basis of the patient’s previously held competent beliefs.  Two aspects of the Scardoni case 
make it particularly pertinent for this chapter.  One is the way in which Mrs Scardoni’s 
adherence to Catholicism was discussed, and the other aspect is how the relevance of prior 
views was evaluated.  Both of these are discussed in conjunction with the proposal for 
veracity in the following sections.   
Joyce Holland was 81 and suffered from advanced Alzheimer’s disease.  Her daughters, 
Patricia Scardoni and Margaret Holland, had been appointed her welfare attorneys before she 
was diagnosed with the condition.  At the time of the court hearing Mrs Holland was 
incompetent, although the extent of her responsiveness was disputed.  All parties agreed that 
she was conscious, repeatedly got infections which led to painful bedsores, she needed a 
tracheotomy and was on intermittent ventilation.  Mrs Holland’s doctors wanted to withhold 
treatment from her, as the treatment, in Dr Hawryluck’s words, took a “terrible toll” on the 
patient.
377
  Specifically, they wanted to dispense with treatments undertaken in the intensive 
care unit and treat all infections locally in the ward, administering pain relief and providing 
her with as much dignity as possible without using all life-saving measures available.  Her 
daughters refused to consent to this treatment plan, and gave evidence at the Board’s hearing 
that Mrs Holland had expressed the maxim “where there’s life there’s hope”.
378
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“.  .  .  they thought they were doing the right thing.  They were fighting for their 
mother’s life and could not be faulted for advancing what they believed were her 
wishes, values, beliefs and best interests.”
379
 
Following their refusal Dr Hawryluck made an application to the CCB, who directed that the 
daughters give consent pursuant to s 37 of the HCCA.
380
  The Board found that Mrs Scardoni 
and Mrs Holland had not complied with the principles for substitute decision-making set out 
in s 21.  The daughters appealed, and Cullity J allowed the appeal, finding an error of law in 
how the Board interpreted ss 21 (2) (a) and (b) of the HCCA.
 381
   
The HCCA directs the substitute decision-maker in s 21 (1), under the heading ‘Principles for 
Giving or Refusing Consent’, to make the decision based on a prior expressed wish if it is 
applicable to the circumstances: 
21 (1) (1) If the person knows of a wish applicable to the circumstances that the 
incapable person expressed while capable and after attaining 16 years of age, the 
person shall give or refuse consent in accordance with the wish. 
If there is no specific wish, such as in Mrs Holland’s case, then the substitute decision-maker 
must act in the person’s best interests.  The following provision, s 21 (2) which has the 
heading “Best Interests” therefore applies.  This section takes into account the person’s 
“values and beliefs” and “any wishes”: 
21 (2) In deciding what the incapable person’s best interests are, the person who gives 
or refuses consent on his or her behalf shall take into consideration, 
(a) the values and beliefs that the person knows the incapable person held when 
capable and believes he or she should still act on if capable; 
(b) any wishes expressed by the incapable person with respect to the treatment that are 
not required to be followed under paragraph 1 of subsection (1).
382
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These two sections effectively create a two-tier threshold, whereby the first hurdle is a 
substituted judgment test under s 21 (1) (1), and if there is no wish applicable then the 
decision must be made in accordance with the principles of best interests as set out in s 21 
(2).  Section 21 (2) (a) refers to the previous self of the now-incompetent person, and s 21 (2) 
(b) is referring to an explicit-general prior view, as applicable in this case with the phrase 
“where there’s life there’s hope”.  From these two sections it is possible to discern that there 
was a strong legislative purpose in emphasising the importance of a patient’s autonomy, and 
this was articulated in the judgment:  
“For the purpose of consent to treatment, the interests of a patient’s individual 
autonomy are reflected in s. 21(1)1.  Where the wishes of the patient are not known 
with sufficient exactness to satisfy the requirements of that provision, they may still 




The HCCA, therefore, provides a two-tier system, linked to prior wishes, for substitute 
decision-making.  These provisions aim to respect the patient’s autonomy, with best interests 
(as informed by prior wishes) only factored in if no previously autonomous wishes about the 
particular decision can be ascertained.  This is legislative recognition of the importance of 
prior competence, and effectively sets out that a person’s previous self and prior views should 
be taken into account, whilst prioritising an explicit wish over the previous self.   
There are two particular aspects of the Scardoni case that need to be examined in more detail.  
The first is the relevance of her wish to her current condition in Investigation II (2) (c) of the 
proposal, and second is the status of the view in Investigation II (2) (d).   
Relevance of View 
The evidence given by Mrs Holland’s daughters at the Board’s hearing stated that she 
believed “where there’s life there’s hope”.  Under Investigation I of the proposal this is an 
explicit wish, though it was a general expression of views as expressed by the phrase explicit-
general (and in s 21 (2) (b) “any wishes expressed” under the HCCA).  The evidence itself 
can be called reliable, the daughters were in agreement, and both stated that it was their 
mother’s view regarding hope where there was life.  The Board held that this was too general 
to be considered as a prior capable wish under s 21 (2) (b), but Cullity J found that it would 
establish too high a standard if the patient needed to have contemplated specific 
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circumstances for this to apply, although the Board was open to find that she had not 
expressed a wish “applicable to the circumstances” under s 21 (1) (1) on the evidence.
384
   
There was obviously disagreement as to what constituted a “wish” under the HCCA.  In 
trying to decide this question, it was asked: is a very general wish too general to be 
considered?  In regards to s 21 (2) (b), Cullity J found the Board had wrongly interpreted as 
to what constituted expressed wishes:  
“Expressed wishes that, for example, are held to be outside s.  21 (1), because they are 
insufficiently specific to satisfy the substitute decision-maker – or the Board – that 
they were in the contemplation of the patient when capable, may still permit an 
inference with respect to what the patient’s wishes would have been in the changed 
circumstances.  In my opinion, s.  21 (2) (b) directs that they be considered in 
determining the patient’s best wishes and the Board erred in law in finding to the 
contrary.”
385
   
In Scardoni the two-tier system clearly allows for this general type of wish as Cullity J found.  
The view that Mrs Holland expressed was undoubtedly vague because the concepts of life 
and hope are ill-defined.  Its relevance was discussed by the judge, who found that Mrs 
Holland’s explicit view did not apply because she was too close to death (and therefore there 
was no hope because her life was barely flickering).
 386
  
How high should the standard for relevance be set?  Under the proposal, because there are a 
multitude of factors being considered, the extent of the relevance of the prior view can be 
considered.  With Mrs Holland’s case her view, while an explicit one, is also general and 
must be considered as such.  What can help with the veracity of the view in Investigation III 
is considering the status of the view, which is discussed in the next section.   
Status of View 
Mrs Holland was Catholic, and both her daughters testified that these religious beliefs were at 
the root of the view that treatment should be continued.  The Board considered whether this 
belief was justified in light of the Church’s teachings, concluding that while the Church 
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maintained an adherence to the sanctity of life ethic, it also promoted the importance of dying 
with dignity.  Cullity J found that s 21 (2) (a) was erroneously interpreted because the Board 
concluded that Mrs Holland’s particular Catholic beliefs were not relevant.  The judge said 
that this ignored the legislative purpose of s 21 (2) (a), that personal beliefs are relevant to the 
statutory concept of best interests.  The correctness of the belief is not relevant.  The Board 
did little to evaluate the status of the view; they could have asked such questions as – is the 
proposed view one that is consistent with all the information garnered of Mrs Holland?   Was 
she a devout Catholic, regularly attending Mass, and ‘living’ the faith?   Or was it something 
that was in the background for her?   Those questions could have helped with the conclusion 
that she believed in “where there’s life there’s hope”, as her daughters had linked this belief 
to her Catholicism.  The pitfall to avoid was a lack of consideration – regardless of the 
answer to those questions – of what can be ascertained of Mrs Holland’s own views?  The 
question is not whether what the Catholic Church teaches is acceptable in this situation, 
unless it was related to her personal view, for example if she had said, at T1, “if I am ever in 
a permanently incompetent state please follow the Church’s teachings”.  Or if her statement 
had seemed to rely on a misunderstanding of the Church’s teachings, for example, “as a 
Catholic, I want to be kept alive as long as possible”.  But this was not the situation.  Instead, 
Mrs Holland’s Catholicism was subjected to a reasonableness test by the Board, and her 
extrapolation from those beliefs was found to be wrong.  Overall, the status of the view 
appears to be consistent with Mrs Holland’s prior beliefs and values, but it is a general view, 
and as such should be considered as a factor for consideration, not an overriding interest.  If 
Mrs Holland’s Catholicism was used as a basis for an inference about how she would have 
wanted to be treated, then it does make sense to interrogate what her Catholicism meant to 
her.  However, this case shows that there is a danger of inferring that someone’s stated 
religious or philosophical belief corresponds to what the “experts” understand of that belief 
system.   
Scardoni is a case where the views expressed were sufficiently vague as to be open to 
interpretation; an interpretation found by the court to justify continuing life-prolonging 
treatment against medical practitioners’ advice.  Obviously, Mrs Holland’s medical condition 
may be significant here, as she was not in a PVS, which distinguishes her case from Bland, 
Re G and Re Durksen.  But was her explicit-general wish really sufficiently robust to 
outweigh other interests that she had?  It is possible that the overwhelming emphasis on 




wish which does not hold up under scrutiny, as shown when examined in relation to the 
proposal for authenticity. 
The next section discusses explicit-specific views to explore the presumption that these are 
the safest explicit prior view to rely on. 
Explicit-Specific Cases 
In this section four different cases are analysed, where the prior view can be rated as explicit 
– they made a specific, and applicable statement at T1 related in a direct way to their situation 
at T2.  The first case is relatively straightforward and upholding the patient’s prior view is 
readily justified.  The discussion then moves to consideration of some more difficult cases. 
Re Durksen – Consistently Expressed Prior Wishes Applied 
Re Durksen is a relatively straightforward case of an explicit-specific prior view, and 
(probably) as uncomplicated as possible in terms of the veracity of the prior view.
387
  Mr 
Durksen had been a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer, but was in a PVS after a light 
plane crash.  Regarding the relevance and the strength of view, four of his colleagues testified 
that he would not want to be in such a state: “Bob said that if he were ever in that situation, 
he wouldn’t want to be kept alive.”
388
  His daughter also said he would not want to live that 
way, and wanted the court to “allow my father to die in peace and [with] integrity.”
389
  Under 
Investigation II, regarding strength of view, there were multiple witnesses to a consistently 
expressed prior view.  Additionally, as a police officer, Mr Durksen had been exposed to 
situations not unlike the one he was now in himself, and the views he expressed to his 
colleagues appeared to unequivocally show that he had related these prior experiences to his 
views.  So far, it appears that Mr Durksen’s view for withdrawal of treatment was both 
extremely well evidenced, and highly relevant.   
But is this necessarily true?  Is the phrase ‘in that situation’ a specific reference to PVS?  It 
seems plausible that it was, or something very like it, and it also seems plausible that a person 
who has seen people in this situation would not want to be in it himself.  How would this 
view have come across if instead he had wanted to be kept alive in a PVS?  Would it have 
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been considered less plausible under Investigation III?  In that situation it is perhaps 
understandable that when an expressed view is outside the ‘norm’ or majority view that a 
higher standard of evidence is needed.  This is reflected in other aspects of healthcare, for 
example when assessing competence the reasonableness of the decision can impact further 
investigation into whether the patient is competent to make the decision.  It is common with 
patients of Jehovah’s Witness faith to robustly assess their refusal for blood products, as this 
is outside the standard for most patients.
390
  In Chapter Four the components for competence 
were assessed, and it was there argued that the values of a person should be incorporated into 
the process.  Part of the rationale for this was the ability to then have a benchmark against 
decisions that are at odds with what might be considered the norm.  It is not the decision that 
is being judged (although it may seem like it if requiring a higher standard of evidence) but 
that the person themselves fervently believed it.  In Re Durksen there was no information that 
pointed to any doubt that at T1 Mr Durksen expressed a competent, consistent, informed view 
to many colleagues that he would not want treatment continued at T2.   
So, unlike the previous cases, where the inference could be said be on the less safe side of the 
scale, in Re Durksen the inference deduced from T1 at T2 is representative of a strong 
explicit-specific view.   
Re C – MCA Underutilised  
Re C is an interesting case to examine regarding a patient’s prior views, as there is extensive 
discussion of these in the judgment.
391
  CW was 16 when he was in a car accident, rendering 
him in a PVS.  When he was 21, his twin brother, parents, sister, and his medical carers 
petitioned the courts for his treatment to cease, advocating on his behalf, that his prior views 
were against continued treatment. 
The facts in this case are similar to Bland with two major differences: CW had specific views 
about being in a PVS, and the MCA had been enacted.  In Bland, a very non-specific set of 
thoughts about his prior views was put forward, but the case was still decided in favour of 
ceasing treatment.  It is, therefore, not surprising that the same conclusion was reached in this 
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case.  What is surprising was the way in which CW’s prior views were utilised.  The 
following paragraph sets out the extensive evidence for CW’s explicit-specific view: 
“While there is no written or oral advance directive in respect of the circumstances in 
which CW now finds himself his family are clear that he would not have wished to 
continue living in his current circumstances with no quality of life.  He expressed 
views that he would not like to be kept alive artificially.  They are certain that had he 
been able to he would not have given his consent for the continuation of his life with 
no physical dignity and no way of communicating.”
392
… “CW’s mother, brother and 
sister believe from their knowledge of him that CW would not want to remain alive in 
his present state.  HW says that CW “feared above all else” being helpless and totally 
dependent on others and he had stated his wish not to survive in such circumstances 
several times.  AW refers to a conversation he and his brother had a few weeks before 
the accident when CW said that his worst fear was to be left as he now finds himself.  
His brother’s feelings about being helpless and terminally ill have been well known to 
his brother, mother and sister for some time.  EW says that this is certainly not a life 
which CW would have wanted and if he had had the option to make the decision 
himself he would say that he wanted “to pull the plug”.”
393
 
With such comprehensive discussion of CW’s prior views, it is curious that the only 
references to the MCA are “having regard to sections 1, 2 and 3” and “sections 1 and 4” 
Ryder J found that CW lacked capacity and that he was given every possible opportunity to 
improve, and consequently participate, in the decision-making.
394
  Section 4(6) of the MCA 
states that the substitute decision-maker must consider the “person’s past and present wishes 
and feelings”.  This gives a clear mandate to state that CW, at T1, clearly wanted treatment 
withdrawn at T2.  Instead Ryder J embarks on a summary of the common law, including 
Bland to decide that ANH could be withdrawn.  Whilst s 15 MCA “puts those considerations 
on a statutory footing and gives statutory authority to the procedure for best interest 
declarations by the court”,
395
 it is suggestive of omission to not discuss the particular 
legislation as it relates to CW.  Had the judge done so there would have been strong evidence 
for finding that CW’s prior wishes favoured discontinuation of treatment, “his worst fear was 
to be left as he now finds himself”, and therefore a stronger case that it was in his best 
interests to do so.  Under Investigation II the view was repeatedly expressed, to more than 
one family member and therefore the view could be safely relied on.  However, Ryder J does 
so by employing the fiction of what CW “would want” if he could say so himself.  This is 
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referenced to the family’s assertions, but as already discussed it is actually a finding that most 
likely CW at T1 would have wanted treatment withdrawn at T2 when he was in S2.    
To reference Bland, a case that was placed at the opposite end of the spectrum (inferred-
general as opposed to explicit-specific), is puzzling.  If prior views do not have any weight in 
the consideration of best interests, then the lack of reference to the view makes sense.  
However, if they do carry some weight, which is unequivocal under the MCA, then they 
should have been canvassed and used to bolster the decision.   
Burke v General Medical Council – Setting the Limits on Patient’s Prior Requests for 
Treatment 
Leslie Burke was competent when he took his case to the High Court.
396
  He suffered from 
cerebellar ataxia, a congenital degenerative brain condition that resulted in him being in a 
wheelchair, but mentally unimpaired.  Eventually, those afflicted lose the ability to 
communicate, although they are likely to retain full cognitive abilities even during the end 
stage of the disease.
397
  Mr Burke was concerned that the General Medical Council guidelines 
on incompetent patients would result in ANH being withdrawn from him – and he did not 
want this to happen.  His case eventually went to the European Court of Human Rights where 
his appeal was not upheld.  Although many view this case as one about a patient trying to 
compel a doctor to treat, it also provides insights for the place of prior views in the best 
interests test.
398
   
At the High Court level the Burke case was heard by Munby J (who was incidentally the 
Official Solicitor for the Bland case, arguing in favour of not withdrawing treatment from Mr 
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Bland).  Perhaps some of his previous rhetoric seeped through, as his lengthy judgment ruled 
in Mr Burke’s favour.   
“The claimant wants to be fed and provided with appropriate hydration until he dies 
of natural causes.  He does not want ANH to be withdrawn.  He does not want to die 




He was critical of the best interests test: 
 “Best interests may be the legal test but it is on its own a poor signpost to sound 
decision-making in an area as grave and difficult as this.  In this and other areas of 
medical and non-medical decision-making the quality of the ultimate decision can 
only be enhanced by the adoption of a rigorously reasoned process of evaluation.”
400
 
He did not, however, elucidate as to how this differed to the reasoning and weighting exercise 
inherent in the best interests test, although he applied the test in a way that effectively 
equated best interests with autonomy: 
 “If the patient is competent (or, although incompetent, has made an advance directive 
which is both valid and relevant to the treatment in question) his decision as to where 
his best interests lie, and as to what life-prolonging treatment he should or should not 
have, is in principle determinative.  Important as the sanctity of life is, it has to take 
second place to personal autonomy.”
401
 
The alignment of a patient’s wishes as the deciding factor in regards to best interests 
effectively make it a substituted judgment test, where the prior, competently expressed, view 
overrides all other considerations.  In some jurisdictions this is dictated by the legislation, for 
example the HCCA in Ontario.  But no such legislative scheme existed in England and Wales 
under the MCA.  The Court of Appeal did not merely overturn Munby J’s decision, they were 
critical of all aspects of the judgment, especially that he equated best interests with autonomy.   
“A theme running through Munby J’s judgment is that, provided that there are no 
resource implications, doctors who have assumed the care of a patient must 
administer such treatment as is in the patient’s best interests and that, where a patient 
has expressed an informed wish for a particular treatment, receipt of such treatment 
will be in the patient’s best interests.  This theme thus equates best interests with the 
wishes of the competent patient.”
402
 
The Court of Appeal decided that the “concept of ‘best interests’ depends very much on the 
context in which it is used” and was not relevant to the case as they placed much greater 
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weight on the evidence that Mr Burke was likely to be competent until the very final stages of 
his disease, regardless of his concerns of what would happen after he was not competent.
403
 
“Turning to Mr Burke’s concern that ANH may be withdrawn, contrary to his 
expressed wishes, so as to cause him to die of hunger and thirst while he is still 
competent, we have been unable to follow Munby J’s reasoning and fear that he may 
have lost the wood for the trees.”
404
 
The safety of the inference in Burke can be said to be the strongest possible.  Whilst 
competent at T1, with full knowledge (as much as is reasonably possible in any medical 
condition), he stated exactly what he wanted to happen to him.  There could be very little 
doubt at T2, that his view at T1 was what he would want.  From this there are two very 
different judgments: Munby J’s, whereby autonomy is equated with best interests; and the 
Court of Appeal, whose decision is underscored by the emphasis on a competent patient who 
is unable to demand treatment, whilst commenting: 
“Indeed, it seems to us that for a doctor deliberately to interrupt life-prolonging 
treatment in the face of a competent patient’s expressed wish to be kept alive, with the 
intention of thereby terminating the patient’s life, would leave the doctor with no 
answer to a charge of murder.”
405
 
Does this mean that a person can demand at T1 that they would want treatment continued at 
T2 if in a PVS?  Apparently not, as this statement was qualified by the Court of Appeal when 
they discussed best interests in relation to a person in a PVS:   
“While section 26 of that Act requires compliance with a valid advance directive to 
refuse treatment, section 4 does no more than require this to be taken into 
consideration when considering what is in the best interests of a patient.”
406
 
Therefore a currently competent patient could request continued treatment, but an explicit-
specific view at T1 does not have the same weight.  This leaves questions for jurisdictions 
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where there is a hierarchy prioritising prior views over best interests; if a patient had said they 
wanted to be maintained in a PVS would they be?  The following case provides some 
guidance for this in Alberta. 
Sweiss v Alberta – The Difficulty with Advance Directives 
In the Canadian case of Sweiss v Alberta, the patient had Islamic beliefs which he declared in 
writing, signing a declaration that he followed all Islamic rules including Sharia law.
407
  He 
knew he was seriously ill, and wanted to adhere to the teachings regarding removal of life 
support.  Removal of life support systems under Sharia law was only allowed in certain 
circumstances – which Mr Sweiss did not fall within because he retained brain function 
(however limited) and his heartbeat or breathing had not stopped.  The evidence was 
obviously strong, as is the relevance, and therefore there would a strong basis for adhering to 
this belief.  The Court of Queen’s Bench ruled that it was just one of several factors that had 
to be taken into account:   
“Where possible, the wishes or religious beliefs of the patient should be given 
considerable weight, subject, however, to the patient’s best interest.”
408
 
This is a considerably different approach to that where the starting point is the patient’s own 
wishes, as in Ontario, where Mrs Holland’s Catholicism was considered in Scardoni.  
However, rather than having a belief which generally reflected a Catholic belief in the 
sanctity of life, Mr Sweiss specifically said at T1 that at T2 any treatment decisions were to 
be based on the rules of Islamic Sharia Law.  In contrast to Burke the judge found that an 
advance directive could direct continued treatment:  
“Thus, as the law currently stands, it appears that if a personal directive directs that all 
possible measures be taken to keep the patient alive, whether or not he is brain dead 
or no longer breathing on his own, the direction must be followed despite the fact that 
life support may be required for an indefinite period of time.”
409
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Summary of Chapter Five 
“I can say straightaway that when one examines the law, one finds obviously that the 
views, if one can interpret them, of what the patient might be and the views of the 
family are highly material factors.  At the end of the day they are not however the 
governing factors when considering best interests.”
410
 
At the beginning of this chapter three problems were set out in regards to the prior views of 
incompetent patients.   
(1) The significance problem: do prior views matter, and if so why? 
Prior views matter, both ethically and legally because: 
(a) respect for autonomy, but this should not be confused with a fiction of 
respecting an incompetent patient’s current autonomy; 
(b) focus should be on the individual patient, and therefore their prior values, 
beliefs and interests matter; and 
(c) even without these moral requirements (but because of them) prior views 
matter because they are provided for in all legislation governing substitute 
decision-making. 
(2) The conflict problem: how to identify between the patient at T1 and their views at 
T2. 
The incompetent patient has no current view that is ascertainable.  They may also 
have a previous view that conflicts with their current experiential interests. 
(3) The epistemic problem: since prior views matter, how can the substitute decision-
maker know what they are? 
The simple answer is that any substitute decision-maker cannot know what the 
patient currently wants (which the conflict problem tells us) but it is possible to 
apply what they previously wanted, or may have wanted, at T1 to their condition 
at T2.   
Having claimed that the logical extension of the significance of prior views is a close 
investigation into those views; a proposal for the veracity of the incompetent patient’s prior 
self was advanced.  Part of this important step requires the categorisation of previously 
competent patients into those who have expressed a prior view, and those who have not.  
Further grouping is required in order to demonstrate differences between patients who had 
previously expressed wishes, and those who had a previous self that was being used by the 
courts as evidence for what they would have wanted.  These have been categorised into four 
specific groups of cases, as identified in Table 1 which was generated from Investigation I of 
the proposal for veracity: inferred-general, inferred-specific, explicit-general and explicit-
specific.  Once this has been identified, the difficult process of evaluating the information 
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needs to be performed, and this has been set out under Investigation II of the proposal: (a) the 
reliability of evidence; (b) strength of the view; (c) relevance of the view and (d) status of the 
view or inference.   
In Part Two of this chapter eight cases have been analysed with reference to the proposal for 
veracity.  The picture that emerges does not fare particularly well against the stringent criteria 
in the proposal.  It may be helpful at this stage to reiterate the expectations regarding prior 
views set out in Part One, against the analysis of Part Two. 
(1) Any prior views should be subject to a robust evaluation to determine their 
validity. 
The overall analysis of end-of-life cases, coupled with the detailed analysis of the 
cases in this chapter, point to an indiscriminate pattern of applying the incompetent 
patient’s prior views.  Although, generally, they are given weight to (as appropriate, 
however Re C illustrates that this does not always happen) close analysis reveals 
fundamentally different approaches.  These differences are demonstrated by the next 
three points. 
(2) Where there are documented prior views, the evidential strength of these should 
not be conflated with an inference of their validity. 
James is a case where the strong evidence of his family was perhaps confused with 
the relevance to his current condition, and therefore his inferred-specific view was 
taken as valid.  Re Durksen showed how a strength of view (he repeatedly stated at T1 
that he did not want to be in a PVS) can be related to the validity (he had extensive 
experience in his profession with PVS).  Burke is also an example of strong, relevant 
views.  However, his views were in favour of treatment continuing.  Yet the outcome 
in cases was different despite both being strong evidentially and relevant.   
(3) A patient’s previous self should not be interpreted as evidence for prior views, and 
any move by a substitute decision-maker to construe the patient’s previous self 
into their current situation should be regarded with extreme caution.  
Bland and James show the breadth of possibilities that a patient’s previous self can 
occupy.  Whilst, in Bland, there was no overt statement to the effect that the court 
considered it to be Anthony Bland’s wish for treatment to stop, it was implicitly 
present in the judgment.  How could his personality – in any helpful way – be taken 
into account?  The notion of the introvert versus extrovert personality types can have 




impression that the decision was in his best interests.  By comparison, the family in 
James had a much stronger basis for their assertions that Mr James would have 
wanted treatment to continue.  It is not that there is never any basis for interpreting a 
previous self as evidence for what the patient may have wanted at T1, it is that courts 
should be careful when doing so.  Mr James’ previous self is a good example of the 
Supreme Court making reasonable inferences from the evidence.  There may be a 
lower threshold for views that accord with the norm (which is perceived as not 
wanting to live in a PVS or MCS) and therefore Mr James’ previous self is subject to 
increased scrutiny.  There is also the danger that a person’s previous self, such as Mrs 
Holland in Scardoni can be interpreted in a way that that manifests certain 
assumptions.  Mrs Holland was Catholic, and her prior view “where there’s life 
there’s hope” was subject to an evaluation which considered the correctness of her 
belief against Catholic doctrine.  The appeal judge appropriately criticised this 
approach, placing the emphasis on Mrs Holland’s own beliefs.   
(4) There should not be any fiction of respecting autonomy in a situation where the 
person, by definition, has no current autonomy. 
In Re G the judge was satisfied that, if Mr G’s wishes could be ascertained, they 
would favour discontinuation of treatment.  The reality of the situation was that Mr 
G’s wishes could not be known, and therefore a more accurate version of this 
statement is: when previously competent it is likely Mr G would not have wanted 
treatment to continue for his future, incompetent self.   
(5) When discussing any prior self the substitute decision-maker should be clear that 
they are respecting the patient’s precedent autonomy. 
It is clear that a person’s precedent autonomy is the only form of autonomy that can 
be upheld in the case of a permanently incompetent person.  Despite this, it seems that 
this is often not clearly articulated in many end-of-life cases.   
Assessing the prior self of a previously competent patient is one way to ascertain what a 
patient’s prior interests may be.  How else can an individual’s interests be assessed if not in 
relation to themselves, their views and their values?  This is reflected in the prioritising of the 
incompetent patient’s previous self in the common law and statutory regimes.  The next 
chapter discusses three narrow applications of the best interests test, and how the focus on the 




“It is arguable that, in a field where the law has not developed, where ethical 
principles remain controversial and where each case turns on its own facts, the 
law should not pretend to too great a precision .”411 
The focus of the best interests test is the individual.  On that point there is agreement, 
regardless of how it is applied; the difficulty lies in interpreting this emphasis.  Firstly the 
person’s interests need to be ascertained, and then they must be evaluated to decide what is 
the best of these interests – should the decision be to treat or not?  To operate or not?  To 
withhold treatment or not?  How is the focus on the individual best achieved?  In the previous 
chapter a discussion was presented of the prior views that a permanently incompetent person 
may have had and how these have been interpreted to be (in various ways) part of the best 
interests consideration.  Respect for prior views is not the only factor regarding best interests 
that may be considered, and if the patient had no prior competent self, then the interests that 
are possible to be appraised are fewer, but not less important.  In Chapter Three several 
deductions regarding interests were discussed: (1) the sheer range of interests that people may 
have; (2) the different ways in which things become interests (for example, through 
experience, through relation to health or well-being); (3) the different types of interests 
(including subjective and objective, and experiential and non-experiential); and (4) the 
subject of the interests (the person him or herself, or others).  The possibility of tensions 
between people’s interests was also raised.  Simple examples include the common tension 
between a person’s life style choices and their health.  It is important to note that the range of 
things that can count as interests is not much reduced by the fact that the person in question is 
incompetent.  After all, incompetence is itself a wide-ranging category, including, but not 
restricted to people who have no experiences. 
Against the background conclusion reached in Chapter Three that there are a wide range of 
interests, three different ways that best interests have been interpreted by the courts will be 
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discussed.  What they all have in common is that the judges have applied the test narrowly, 
and chosen a particular aspect of it to apply.
412
  The flexibility of the best interests test, whilst 
important for the interpretation of best interests for each individual, has also meant that some 
startling differences emerge. Questions which arise from these differences, and are 
consequently examined in this chapter, include: (1) does a permanently incompetent patient 
have any interests?  (2) Should best interests be interpreted as best medical interests?  (3) Is 
best interests an objective or subjective test, and, if objective, should it be interpreted as what 
the reasonable person would want?  The answers to these questions reveal narrow approaches 
that the courts have taken at times, which is at odds with a flexible and malleable concept.  
The conclusion to these possible interpretations is that a qualified-objective approach is best, 
whereby good evidence of a patient’s preferences are considered, as well as other interests.      
Possible Interpretations of Best Interests 
Judges have struggled to find a consistent voice when describing what kind of test best 
interests is.  In this chapter approaches are demonstrated that limit interpretations of best 
interests to certain claims: (1) that only experiential interests matter; (2) that only medical 
interests matter; or (3) that best interests can be defined as objective or subjective and 
reduced to what the reasonable person would want.  In determining what interests should 
apply to permanently incompetent patients there is likely to be a three step process: (1) 
identification of all possible interests; (2) deciding which of the full set of possible interests 
can be identified and specified in the particular case; and (3) making a final decision on 
which further subset of these will constitute the patient’s ‘best interests’.  In the following 
sections an analysis is presented of judges ascribing interests in a narrow way to incompetent 
patients, and then Chapter Seven provides a critique of how interests are measured.   
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Application One: Only Experiential Interests Matter 
“Several opinions in the House of Lords decision in the Bland case I mentioned 
simply assumed that only experiential interests can matter, at least legally, and 
therefore had no difficulty in deciding that it could be neither in nor against Anthony 
Bland’s interests that his life support be discontinued.”
413
 
This is a rarely used approach whereby a person’s state – sensate or non-sensate – dictates 
whether or not they have any interests.  Under this category, only experiential interests are of 
any relevance, and the test could be applied to adults or minors.  Because only experiential 
interests have value, it applies to patients who are not sensate, and from this fact of their 
medical condition, it is assumed that they do not have any interests at all.  Despite few judges 
finding that only experiential interests are applicable, this approach merits further discussion 
for three reasons: (1) it demonstrates significant differences between different judges’ 
application of best interests; (2) it provides a challenge to the conclusion regarding interests 
that was put forward in Chapter Three – that permanent incompetence does not preclude 
having interests; and (3) it raises fundamental questions about the relationship between 
personhood and the permanently incompetent patient.   
Lord Mustill in the House of Lords in Bland had a firm stance predicated on the patient being 
sensate, which denied Anthony Bland any interests in his current state:  
“Unlike the conscious patient he does not know what is happening to his body, and 
cannot be affronted by it; he does not know of his family's continuing sorrow.  By 
ending his life the doctors will not relieve him of a burden become intolerable, for 
others carry the burden and he has none.  What other considerations could make it 
better for him to die now rather than later?  None that we can measure, for of death 
we know nothing.  The distressing truth which must not be shirked is that the 
proposed conduct is not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best 
interests of any kind.”
414
 
Lord Mustill decided that treatment could be withdrawn, but not because it was in Anthony 
Bland’s best interests for his life to be ended (because he was not capable of any such 
interest).  He based his conclusion on the finding that the initial provision of treatment to 
Anthony Bland was in his best interests because there was the possibility of recovery, but 
once the clinical advice overwhelmingly supported the supposition that there was no hope 
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regarding recovery then his interest in being kept alive disappeared which justified 
withdrawal: 
“Thus, although the termination of his life is not in the best interests of Anthony 
Bland, his best interests in being kept alive have also disappeared, taking with them 
the justification for the non-consensual regime and the co-relative duty to keep it in 
being.”
415
    
In effect, Lord Mustill decided that Anthony Bland was receiving treatment without his 
consent and therefore lawfully it should be removed.
416
  This raises an interesting question 
about Anthony Bland’s possible interests.  If it truly was a matter of complete indifference to 
him whether he lived or died, then why did the law not only allow, but actually require, that 
treatment be stopped?  If the PVS patient himself has no interests tied up in the decision, then 
why could attention not have been paid to the interests of other parties, such as his family, or 
the other patients who may benefit from the freeing up of resources?  Is it possible that, in 
requiring treatment that is non-beneficial to be stopped, the law is in fact recognising that 
Anthony Bland had a (non-experiential) interest, perhaps in bodily integrity or dignity?  In 
adopting a default position of ‘no consent, no treatment’, it is possible that the courts have 
implicitly recognised an a priori interest in being left alone, an interest that is attributed even 
to patients who are deemed to be without interests. 
Lord Keith also appeared to endorse a position equating interests with the prerequisite that 
they should be experienced, though not quite as explicitly: 
“In the case of a permanently insensate being, who if continuing to live would never 
experience the slightest actual discomfort, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make 
any relevant comparison between continued existence and the absence of it.  It is, 
however, perhaps permissible to say that to an individual with no cognitive capacity 
whatever, and no prospect of ever recovering any such capacity in this world, it must 
be a matter of complete indifference whether he lives or dies.”
417
 
Presumably Lord Keith meant that to any individual lacking cognitive capacity, it would be a 
matter of indifference to that individual whether he or she lives or dies.  This would include 
Anthony Bland, at least on Lord Keith’s account.  This was based on Anthony Bland’s 
current experiential interests.  But, on a wider conception of interests that include non-
experiential and other-regarding interests, this limitation on what is relevant for existence is 




 One of the main ratio decidendi in the Bland decision is that it is only lawful to treat an unconscious patient 
who cannot consent to treatment when it is in his or her best interests to do so; if it is no longer in a patient’s 
best interests to be treated, it is no longer lawful to treat them and it is therefore not unlawful to discontinue.  
NHS Trust v A [2005] EWCA Civ 1145; [2006] Lloyd's Rep Med 29. 
417




not a legitimate approximation of the kinds of interests that are taken into account.  Hoffmann 
LJ (in the Court of Appeal, decided before Lords Mustill and Keith’s judgments) challenged 
the concept that the only interests that matter are those we experience, giving support to the 
category of non-experiential, self-regarding interests:  
“I think that the fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that we have no interests 
except in those things of which we have conscious experience.  But this does not 
accord with most people’s intuitive feelings about their lives and deaths…  Most 
people would like an honourable and dignified death and we think it wrong to 
dishonour their deaths, even when they are unconscious that this is happening.  We 
pay respect to their dead bodies and to their memory because we think it an offence 
against the dead themselves if we do not.  Once again I am not concerned to analyse 
the rationality of these feelings.  It is enough that they are deeply rooted in our ways 
of thinking and that the law cannot possibly ignore them.”
418
   
In one sense, it would be right to say that a person who has no interests (who does not have 
the cognitive capacity for any) does not care what happens to them.  But, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, there are a wide range of possible interests, and many of those are not 
dependent on our knowing about them, and so in this way Lords Mustill and Keith are taking 
a very narrow approach to the question of interests.  
What could explain this very diverse approach to interests?  In the next section it is asserted 
that the interpretation, whereby only experiential interests matter legally, is derived from a 
perspective which equates being insensate with having no personhood.  This notion, of only 
experiential interests being of importance, has stemmed from a false perception of what it 
means to be a person, and the difference between a person and personhood which is discussed 
in the following section.   
What Does it Mean to be a Person? 




To most people, the question of what it is to be a person may seem ridiculous.  It appears 
easy to define what persons are: they are human beings with recognisable physical 
characteristics that make them different from other species.  The matter begins to look less 
straightforward, though, when we turn our minds to harder cases.  Are foetuses persons?  
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Some, such as Kuhse and Singer, argue that there is not a salient difference between a viable 
foetus and a newborn baby.
420
  Further to that and for the purposes of this thesis, what about 
those who are permanently insensate beings?  What is recognisable about them in any way 
(other than physically) as the person they once were, as they cannot communicate any of their 
current desires?  It is often this upsetting difference between the person that the whānau once 
knew, compared to the person in the hospital bed, which brings about a willingness and peace 
in saying goodbye to them.  This difficulty, this reality of a medically induced problem which 
enables people to be kept technically alive long past any sign of continuation of their 
personality or responsiveness or awareness, has provided new challenges for the notion of 
personhood.
421
  The distinction between what a person is, and what it means to have 
attributes of personhood, is one that is implicitly employed in many ways in substitute 
decision-making.  If someone no longer resembles the person that they were and are 
completely unable to interact on any level, are they still a person?  Or is someone in a PVS a 
human being which is a separate entity from persons?    
If the view that personhood is needed as a prerequisite to be a person is accepted, then all 
human beings are not necessarily persons, and all persons (in some accounts) are not 
necessarily human beings.
422
  There are a range of views expressed by bioethicists, from 
those who see personhood as a special moral category (defined in various ways) to those who 
reject this, and hold that being a human being is sufficient to have moral standing.  The 
following section examines these views in sufficient depth to inform the discussion regarding 
the judicial application of interests.  The intent is not a comprehensive exploration of 
personhood – this is a subject on which there is endless debate and the nuances of these 
arguments are not relevant for the purposes of this thesis.  It is sufficient here to point out the 
range of views on personhood, show some shared agreement on what it entails, and then to 
demonstrate how this relates to end-of-life cases.   
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Definitions of Personhood   
Judges have tended to take a particular view regarding personhood without examining the 
alternatives.  For example, some judges have equated attributes of personhood (and being a 
person) as central to the existence of interests.  This is a mistake because even if the patient is 
a non-person, they may still have interests (though not those we would attribute to a person).   
Most accounts of what it means to be a person equate it with personhood:  
“A person is a creature who usually has capacity for rationality, is a social being 
consisting of part of a specific culture, and usually uses a language to communicate 
with other persons.  A person also maintains the ability to experience things and to 
hold different mental states with regard to their external surroundings as well as their 
internal state of affairs.”
423
 
In Sperling’s account, personhood and person have a close conceptual connection, where 
characteristics of personhood are necessary to be a person.  This connection is rather 
complicated by the distinction outlined earlier in this chapter, that personhood and persons 
may not necessarily denote the same entity, but they are often described as dependent on each 
other.  There are many conceptualisations of personhood; attributes often include sentience, 
self-consciousness, the presence of spirit, soul or power.
424
  Gillett favours an interpretation 
that defines personhood as the capacity to act intentionally.
425
  Harris defines persons as: 
“beings with the capacity for valuing their own existence.  In the case of human 
beings, they become persons when the capacity to value their own lives develops and 
will cease to be persons when they have lost that capacity.”
426
 
So, on Harris’ account, infants and younger children are not persons, and neither are those in 
a permanently incompetent state.  Green identifies personhood as a social construct which 
can be decided by a consensus of “reasonably mature individuals”.
427
  Doerflinger criticises 
this view, asserting that it leads to the conclusion that: 
“there is nothing inherent in any human being that obliges us to respect that being as a 
person.”
428
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But in some ways Green is correct.  Persons might not be able to be defined by consensus, 
but it does seem that society decides when a human being does, or does not, have certain 
rights and interests, including the right to life, and that those decisions are linked with some 
of the features of personhood described above.   
Buchanan and Brock describe those who are permanently unconscious as not a person: 
“Some of the strongest candidates for being included among the necessary conditions 
[for being a person] are the following cognitive capacities: 
(a) The ability to be conscious of oneself as existing over time – as having a 
past and a future, as well as a present. 
(b) The ability to appreciate reasons for or against acting; being (sometimes) 
able to inhibit impulses or inclinations when one judges that it would be 
better not to act on them. 
(c) The ability to engage in purposive sequences of actions. 
… If any of these three, or anything even roughly similar to any of them, is at least a 
necessary condition of being a person, then it appears that the permanently and 
profoundly demented patient ...  is not a person”
 429
 
It would certainly seem to be the case that a permanently incompetent human being would 
also fail these tests of personhood.  But, since they could also have interests, it seems to 
follow that Buchanan and Brock do not restrict interests to persons (to entities who have 
personhood).
430
   
Referring back to the Bland case, all of the judges discussed the patient’s characteristics in a 
way that demonstrated that he lacked any personhood according to any the definitions so far 
explored.  Where they differed was in the conclusions that this observation led to.  Lord 
Mustill (and possibly Lord Keith) concluded that this meant that human beings in a PVS lack 
interests.  For example, Lord Mustill discussed Anthony Bland in relation to personality:  
“… I still believe that the proposed conduct is ethically justified, since the continued 
treatment of Anthony Bland can no longer serve to maintain that combination of 
manifold characteristics which we call a personality.  Some who have written on this 
subject maintain that this is too narrow a perspective, so I must make it clear that I do 
not assert that the human condition necessarily consists of nothing except a 
personality, or deny that it may also comprise a spiritual essence distinct from both 
body and personality.  But of this we can know nothing, and in particular we cannot 
know whether it perishes with death or transcends it.  Absent such knowledge we 
must measure up what we do know.  So doing, I have no doubt that the best interests 
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The issue for many regarding personhood is that, if a particular entity is lacking it, for 
example a foetus or someone in a PVS, this means that different rules may apply.   
“Most personhood theorists think that once personhood has disappeared (as in 
permanent vegetative state) or before it has arisen (as with the fetus and embryo), the 
life has no value; it is the personhood that is valuable, embodied, in the case of 
humans, in an organic living body but in the case of other possible forms which 
persons might take, not necessarily so embodied.”
432
 
For the discussion in regards to judicial recognition of interests, the question is this: if a 
permanently incompetent person has no personhood then are different interests ascribable?   
The consequences of a permanently incompetent individual having no interests at all, taken to 
its reductio ad absurdum, means that there would be no reason to treat the patient with respect 
or dignity, or to show any consideration for their prior views.  Whilst those proposing this 
view would probably protest this consequence, when the patient is attributed with no interests 
this severely undermines the foundation for any reason to treat them with respect, which is 
surely a minimum requirement for these very vulnerable patients.  A lack of personhood 
should not mean that the permanently incompetent have no interests at all, which many 
theorists have argued.
433
  But what if the permanently incompetent patient fits within some 
descriptions of personhood, but cannot communicate this ability?  The following section 
examines this dilemma. 
The Opposition of the Mind and Body 
“I was put in a bed in the intensive care ward; countless tubes ran in and out of my 
body.  I could see and hear and I knew exactly what was happening to me.  But, 
except for being able to blink my eyes, I couldn’t move.  I couldn’t swallow, or talk, 
or wee, or breathe.  When the last vestiges of movement left my hands, I had no way 




The year before Bland was decided, New Zealand courts considered the question of 
withdrawal of treatment from an incompetent patient.  In Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General, intensive care doctors at Auckland Hospital, together with the Auckland 
Area Health Board, applied for a declaration clarifying whether in law they would be guilty 
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of culpable homicide if they withdrew ventilator support from a 59 year old man, Mr L, 
suffering from Guillain-Barré syndrome.
435
   
“The disease affected the nervous system of the patient by destroying the conductivity 
of the nerves between the brain and the body. The result was to leave the brain, 
though still living, entirely disengaged from the body. The patient survived in a state 
of “living death”, totally unable to move or communicate and there was no prospect 
of recovery. However, because the brain, though damaged, was not dead, the patient 
was not medically brain-stem dead pursuant to the medical definition of “death”. The 
patient had existed in that condition for 12 months. Eight specialists who had 
examined the patient and undertaken extensive testing were unanimous that the 
ventilatory support of the patient could not be medically justified. 
In stark terms, Mr L has a living, but impaired, brain which is entirely disengaged 
from his body.  So he cannot move muscle or limb.  He lies lifeless and motionless, 
unable to communicate by even elementary means.  His condition is so severe that he 
has no prospect of recovery.”
436
 
This condition meant he was effectively trapped in his own body.  He could not move at all 
and all methods of communication were permanently shut down.  This was described in the 
judgment by Thomas J in terms that were echoed in Bland:  
“Whether a body devoid of a mind or, as in the case of Mr L, a brain destitute of a 
body, does not matter in any sensible way.  In their chronic and persistent vegetative 
condition they lack self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in any cognitive 
sense.  They are the ‘living dead’.”
437
 
It must be noted that he was not in a clinically defined condition of brain death which 
requires that the brain stem be effectively dead. Nor was he in a PVS or similar state, where 
the patient has no real awareness or ability to suffer.  He was in effect suffering from the 
opposite condition: he could not move any part of his body meaningfully but his brain was 
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still operative.  There was some discussion in the judgment as to whether Mr L may have 
suffered some brain damage, but there was no discussion regarding his awareness of what 
was happening to him, and around him.  The Guillain-Barré syndrome had struck Mr L 
severely and quickly.  Most patients recover to various degrees and less than five percent die 
from the condition.  However, Mr L had been in the same state for twelve months and 
medical experts agreed that there was no hope for his recovery.  Thomas J issued a 
declaration that it would not be culpable homicide if treatment was withdrawn: 
“… I do so in the conviction that Mr L deserves the description of ‘living dead’ as 
much as if he were brain-stem dead.”
438
 
The judges in Bland quoted from Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General with 
approval.  In both cases, the patient is described as being in “living death”.  Judges in both 
cases found that treatment should be discontinued.  Also, in both cases there was a disconnect 
between the mind and the rest of the body – one was working whilst the other was not.  This 
actually represents a major difference, one which does matter “in any sensible way” in 
comparison to Thomas J’s assertion that it did not.  What is this salient difference?  In Bland, 
the body functioned, except for the brain, whereas in Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General the body could not move and the brain may have been functional.   
There was no discussion of the difference between a permanently unconscious patient and a 
patient with Guillain-Barré in Bland.  Likewise in Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-
General there was no discussion of the implications that Mr L possibly had an intact brain but 
just had no way of communication.
439
  It is very likely that Mr L overheard discussions 
regarding his care, was told of the intention to remove his ventilator, heard his family saying 
goodbye – all without being able to reply.
440
  Thomas J’s statement that he lacked “self-
awareness” and “awareness of the surroundings in any cognitive sense” is simply not able to 
be known.
441
  By describing Mr L in these terms, he was effectively removing any possibility 
of personhood, something that perhaps made the decision easier.  Mr L may have possessed 
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many of the characteristics of personhood; he could have had awareness and consciousness 
and an ability to reason.  Mr L could also have possessed all of the components needed for 
competence examined in Chapter Three; he could have had the capacity to reason, to 
understand and possess a set of values that he could evaluate these against.  The tragedy with 
Mr L is that he may just not have been able to communicate his personhood, and, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the ability to communicate capacity to understand and reason is a 
necessary component of competence.  The implication of this is that it supports a distinction 
between personhood (or being a person) and competence.  Mr L was quite likely to be within 
the definition of a person (on some of the same criteria) but he was not competent.  Therefore 
personhood may be necessary for competence, but it may not be sufficient. 
There is no indication that Thomas J gave any consideration to the fact that Mr L could 
possibly hear, and understand, the conversations regarding his death.  He could have argued 
that this presented a stronger reason to withdraw treatment – because Mr L would have been 
aware of being on a ventilator and of all the indignities that his body was being subjected to, 
and could therefore have a strong experiential interest in treatment being withdrawn.  Instead, 
while acknowledging that Mr L’s mind and body were separate and using this as a 
justification for treatment withdrawal, he did not thoroughly examine the implications of it 
being the brain that was the living part of the living death.  In effect, the judge ignored any 
experiential interests that Mr L may, and probably did, have.   
There was also evidence of an explicit-specific prior view, which, as shown in Chapter Five, 
can be used to prioritise the patient’s prior, competent self where a safe inference can be 
made:  Mr L’s wife gave evidence that Mr L had expressed an aversion to being paralysed: 
“Jack said to me ‘It would be bloody horrible to be like that [upon seeing someone 
almost totally paralysed].  I would hate it’.”
442
 
This could have been used as evidence for what Mr L probably wanted currently, although he 
had no means of communicating any preference.  Is this any different from applying his 
previous views at T1 to T2?  If this explicit-specific statement was taken as his current 
wishes, because he had awareness and the ability to formulate a choice, does this compete 
with upholding a wish expressed prior to incompetence where the patient is not able to 
formulate any choices?  There is no way of knowing in either case if the patient had changed 
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their mind, and therefore the information in both should be considered similarly.  Mr L’s 
dismay at the thought of paraplegia could, however, be used as extra weight for withdrawal 
of treatment, especially when coupled with the possibility of any awareness that he may have 
had.    
The notion of personhood (though not stated as such) is central to both of these cases, 
because, if either Anthony Bland or Mr L had demonstrated any of the characteristics of a 
person – that is acting intentionally, having capacity for self-awareness, and exhibiting 
sentience – there would have been a debate about the quality of life rather than just accepting 
that he had “no life at all”, as described by the various judges.  Keown describes the 
personhood debate in terms of dualism; a concept simplistically described as denoting the 
idea that the mind and body are separate.  He points out that the Bland judgment endorsed the 
idea that a human being consists of both a “body” and a “person”, as illustrated by Sir 
Stephen P: 
“To his parents and family he is “dead.” His spirit has left him and all that remains is 
the shell of his body.”
443
 
This judicial recognition of dualism in the Bland case is “both novel and surprising” 
according to Keown.
444
  The view that this was what the judges were doing was also 
supported by McEwan: 
“Judges at all levels employed language which demonstrates a judicial notion of a 
metaphysical separation of mind and body”.
445
 
Again an extensive debate on the philosophical merits, or lack of, regarding dualism is not 
needed, except to point out that if Keown is correct, and there is a judicial endorsement of 
dualism, it has few supporters: 
“This sort of dualism, which thinks of the body as if it were some kind of habitation 
for and instrument of the real person, is defended by few philosophers indeed 
(religious or otherwise).  It renders inexplicable the unity in complexity which one 
experiences in everything one consciously does.”
446
     
It also shows that there is a lack of clarity in thinking – if the mind and body are separate, and 
we have opposite cases of one working whilst the other does not, how can the conclusion in 
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both be that the patients are in living death and that treatment can be withdrawn in their best 
interests?  Futility of treatment was used in the Bland case – it was not in his best interests to 
continue to receive life-prolonging treatment.  But, in Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General this argument should have been shifted to wider considerations of Mr L’s 
self-regarding interests in dignity and the anguish he was possibly suffering of being trapped 
in his own body with no means of communication.  Rather ironically (compared to 
conclusions drawn elsewhere in this thesis regarding the propensity for applying self-
regarding interests)
447
 the lack of evaluation of Mr L’s best interests and his particular 
circumstances, was, unfortunately, not the primary focus of the argument.   
Perhaps if Mr L’s case was being discussed now it would have a different result.  Brain scans 
could probably be used to elicit information from Mr L if he did indeed have capacity, and 
some form of communication could be used to ascertain – and implement – his current 
wishes.
448
  But, as it was in 1993, treatment was withdrawn on the basis that he was 




The narrow approach, whereby only experiential interests matter, is therefore a difficult one 
to justify.  In the following section the approach which prioritises either a medical view or the 
patient’s medical condition is discussed as the most important consideration in the best 
interests test.    
Application Two: Deferment to a Medicalised View 
In James, discussed extensively in Chapter Five, Sir Alan Ward discussed Mr James’ medical 
interests in relation to his prior wishes:  
“But the patient’s wishes are not the deciding factor in working out his best interests 
and do not determine what treatment he should receive.  The patient’s own wishes 
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have a part to play, as I shall show, in the final question of what is in his best interests 
but his wishes do not dictate what is in his best medical interests.”
450
  
What he meant by this is unclear.  There are two possible interpretations.  The first is that 
“medical interests” refers to the collective medical opinion of what is in Mr James’ best 
interests; an opinion that constitutes what the majority of a reasonable body of medical 
professionals would agree upon (known as the Bolam test).  The second, and more likely 
interpretation, is that he was referring to Mr James’ medical condition.  Both of these 
possible interpretations have been utilised in prospective end-of-life judgments, and therefore 
each warrants the further discussion which is set out in the next two sections. 
Bolamising Best Interests 
“When McNair J. delivered his direction to the jury in Bolam v. Friern Hospital 
Management Committee just over forty years ago, it can only be a matter of 




The Bolam test, as articulated in the case that it derives its name from, is this: 
“A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 




The test was formulated in relation to negligence over practices undertaken for electro-
convulsive therapy, which appears somewhat incompatible to a guiding principle for medical 
treatment.  The resulting confusion in its application to best interests was demonstrated in 
Bland, and opinions as to how best interests would apply fell into two distinct camps.  These 
approaches are described by Foster and Miola’s generalised typology of medico-ethico-legal 
decisions: “professional medical ethical decisions” are those that the law decides are best 
decided by the medical profession.
453
  A “legal decision” is when the law takes charge and is 
the final decision-maker on whether a treatment decision is right or wrong.
454
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The first of these approaches held that courts were deciding whether the medical profession’s 
assessment of the patient’s best interests was legal, and was therefore a professional medical 
ethical decision.  This effectively ‘Bolamised’ best interests.  This coined term denotes that 
the judges were deciding whether the doctors had properly assessed Anthony Bland’s best 
interests.
455
  Was the collective medical opinion, that a “reasonable body of medical 
professionals” would agree withdrawal of treatment was in Anthony Bland’s best interests?  
If so, then the judges were not independently making the assessment of best interests 
themselves:  
“Different doctors may take different views both on strictly medical issues and the 
broader ethical issues which the question raises.  It follows that the legal question in 
this case ...  is not whether the court thinks it is in the best interests of Anthony Bland 
to continue to receive intrusive medical care but whether the responsible doctor has 
reached a reasonable and bona fide belief that it is not...  Accordingly, on an 
application to the court for a declaration that the discontinuance of medical care will 
be lawful, the courts only concern will be to be satisfied that the doctor’s decision to 




In the second approach, a legal decision, the court was making a decision about the patient’s 
best interests, independently from the medical profession, where the medical opinion factored 
in but was not considered to be the overriding factor.  Lord Mustill (again) was the outlier in 
the House of Lords:
 457
 
“But I venture to feel some reservations about the application of the principle of civil 
liability in negligence laid down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee 
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 to decisions on ‘best interests’ in a field dominated by the 
criminal law. I accept without difficulty that this principle applies to the ascertainment 
of the medical raw material such as diagnosis, prognosis and appraisal of the patient’s 
cognitive functions.  Beyond this point, however, it may be said that the decision is 
ethical, not medical, and that there is no reason in logic why on such a decision the 
opinions of doctors should be decisive.”
458
 
These two methodologies represent disparate approaches.
459
  The Bolamisation in Bland was 
summarised by Miola as “an abrogation of responsibility to the medical profession”, which is 
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probably a fair assessment of this way of interpreting best interests.
460
  However, these 
disparate approaches, as to whether best interests is a medical or judicial decision, appears to 
have been settled.  While the courts do rely on the evidence of the medical experts, and give 
it great weight, it has become clear that it is for the judges and not the doctors to decide what 
is in the best interests of the patient.
461
   
“It is, I think, important that there should not be a belief that what the doctor says is 
the patient’s best interest is the patient’s best interest.”
462
   
The determination that it is the courts’ role to evaluate the patient’s best interests appears to 
have been the result of three factors: (1) the recognition that best interests encompasses a 
wide range of interests;
463
 (2) recognition that judges have a role to play in the proceedings 
beyond ascertaining the doctor’s assessment of best interests;
464 
 and (3) the development of 
legislation which requires the substitute decision-maker to make decisions in the patient’s 
best interests.   
Medicalising Best Interests 
“As I see it, this review of s. 21(2) reveals that although a patient’s beliefs and prior 
expressed wishes are mandatory considerations, there is no doubt that the medical 
implications of a proposed treatment will bear significant weight in the analysis.”
465
 
Another way to view best interests is to interpret it as asking what is in the patient’s best 
medical interests.  This places the greatest emphasis on their current experiential interests, 
and the possible futility of the treatment that they are receiving.
466
  Whilst these are both 
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important aspects of their interests to consider (and therefore is discussed in much more detail 
in relation to quality of life arguments in Chapter Seven), again it is isolating one factor – 
their medical condition – from a range of possible interests.  This position is easier to posit 
when the patient was not previously competent, because then there is no means of 
ascertaining the patient’s views and therefore there is no access to any possible interests that 
may overrule the solely medical considerations.  Despite the undoubted importance of a 
patient’s current experiences, and ascertaining any likelihood of recovery, these are not the 
only considerations.  When taking a wider view of best interests and considering a particular 
patient who had previous views, there could be a number of possible interests that they may 
value more, for example an other-regarding interest in their family not seeing them suffer.   
However, in support of this view, legislation that lists the considerations that must be taken 
into account when considering best interests often lists medical factors.
467
  It is difficult to 
discuss medical interests in isolation beyond this point, and therefore further analysis of this 
issue is undertaken in Chapter Seven.   
Application Three: Objective and Subjective Test 
The fundamental basis for a best interests test being interpreted either objectively or 
subjectively has been the subject of much judicial discussion.
468
  There has been a problem 
with these terms because the various definitions given to them has created confusion.  Much 
of the confusion stems from the uneasy juxtaposition between respecting patients’ views, and 
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ascertaining their best interests, which has led to an uneasy alliance – complete with shifting 
goal posts – between what is considered best interests and what is considered substituted 
judgment.
469
  In this thesis an attempt is being made to elucidate the use of relevant terms, 
and this confusion is a prime example of where such clarification is needed. A plain 
interpretation of the terms may help.  ‘Objective’ denotes that a decision is derived from an 
observation of measurable, evidential factors.  ‘Subjective’ denotes that the decision is made 
from a person’s particular beliefs or views.   
McLean offers an explanation for this confusion when describing two main ways in which 
best interests can be determined.  The first is as a strict best interests test, where an attempt is 
made to balance benefits and drawbacks.  The other approach, substituted judgment, is where 
the courts attempt to identify, as best as possible, what the person would have wanted – and 
this determines the outcome.  McLean says that this is not traditionally described as best 
interests, but it is just that different interests are taken into account, and it addresses a broader 
range of values a person may have held, such as previously expressed wishes.
470
  Pollock also 
discussed this close relationship, and summarised the approaches a major American case, Re 
Conroy, identified in relation to withdrawal of treatment; the following list explains the 
differences using terms that will be adapted in this section: 
“(1) purely-subjective test substituted judgment; explicit preference of the patient;  
(2) limited-objective test; combined elements of substituted judgment and best 
interests; combo of some good evidence of patient’s preferences with determination 
burdens outweighed benefits;   
(3) purely-objective test best interests; no evidence of patient’s preferences so 
balancing benefits and burdens.”
471
 
From this description it is possible to plot the current use of the best interests test; 
predominately it has been used as a limited-objective test, where prior views of the patient are 
known.  However, in some jurisdictions a purely-subjective test of substituted judgment 
should be performed if possible, and where there is no evidence of preferences a purely-
objective test is the only option.  Therefore, these categories will be utilised when discussing 
the best interests test, but with further development by submitting that a qualified-objective 
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test is optimal.  This test firstly assesses what the patient’s preferences were (which must 
contain a reference to their validity), and secondly, takes account of all other interests.   
In the next section various accounts are provided of judges stating that the test is objective, 
followed by a discussion justifying the qualified-objective approach outlined above.  Whilst 
the above scenario provides plausibility for best interests as both an objective and subjective 
test, neither is consistently applied. 
Best Interests as an Objective Test 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Cuthbertson v Rasouli provided a summary of what it 
means to interpret the best interests test objectively: 
“The substitute decision-maker is not at liberty to ignore any of the factors within the 
best interests analysis, or substitute her own view as to what is in the best interests of 
the patient.  She must take an objective view of the matter, having regard to all the 
factors set out, and decide accordingly... The intent of the statute is to obtain a 
decision that, viewed objectively, is in the best interests of the incapable person.”
472
 
This describes the approach that the substitute decision maker has to take: this person cannot 
substitute his or her views on the best interests of the patient; instead, the decision-maker has 
to rely on all the factors which go into a best interests analysis.  Therefore, it is supposedly an 
objective appraisal about whether the decision maker has taken into account all the things that 
he or she should have.   
In Burke, the much maligned Munby J’s account of best interests was rejected by the Court of 
Appeal: 
“It seems to us that it is best to confine the use of the phrase ‘best interests’ to an 
objective test, which is of most use when considering the duty owed to a patient who 
is not competent and is easiest to apply when confined to a situation where the 
relevant interests are medical.”
473
 
This is a particularly interesting observation in Burke in light of the discussion from Chapter 
Five regarding his strong explicit-specific view (at T1 – a competent, prior time) that he 
would want treatment continued for as long as possible (at T2 – when incompetent at a future 
time).  Why did the Court of Appeal not place more emphasis on the patient’s prior wishes?   
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Perhaps it had to do with what the view was – a wish for treatment continuation rather than 
withholding or withdrawal.  This consideration is examined in the following section; an 
observation that viewing the best interests test objectively at times leads to an implicit 
‘reasonableness’ criterion.   
The ‘Reasonable Person’  
The reasonable person criterion supposes that an individual would want a treatment decision 
to be made according to what a reasonable person would want in that individual’s 
circumstances.  An implicit tension with the best interests principle exists here in that the 
substitute decision-maker for a permanently incompetent patient is required to evaluate what 
is in the individual’s best interests.  Subsequently, there is a difficulty with incorporating 
what a reasonable person would want in the same circumstances into the evaluation of best 
interests, because it risks overriding the individual’s preferences regardless of what these are.  
In Chapter Four there was a discussion of three groups of incompetent patients: those who 
were previously competent and able to express views, and either did or did not do so, and 
those who were never previously competent.  These groups are important in regards to the 
reasonable person criterion because of the risk that identified that these prior wishes can be 
applied shallowly.  There are two reasons this is problematic.  Firstly, there are statutory 
regimes which prioritise a patient’s preferences, and secondly, because of the conclusion 
drawn in Chapter Five, that respect for a person’s precedent autonomy should be factored 
into the best interests test.  The following example demonstrates a prior preference being 
overridden, despite legislative provision for its inclusion. 
Arden LJ, in James, stated “that a reasonable individual in the light of current scientific 
knowledge would reject [treatment]”.
474
  This approach was adopted despite starting with Mr 
James’ own views, as dictated in section 4 of the MCA.  It was argued in Chapter Five that 
Mr James’ inferred-specific view was quite robust.  The Court of Appeal’s adoption of 
reasonableness was criticised in the Supreme Court: 
“Finally, insofar as Sir Alan Ward and Arden LJ were suggesting that the test of the 
patient’s wishes and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable patient would 
think, again I respectfully disagree. The purpose of the best interests test is to consider 
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matters from the patient’s point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must 
prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail.”
475
 
I agree with Lady Hale that the purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from 
the patient’s point of view, and that is in alignment with the MCA.  If a reasonableness 
criterion is then added, it may remove the very essence of what best interests aims to achieve 
– a decision made in the best interests of that patient.  Where there is a reasonably strong 
prior view, there should be no need to infer what the reasonable person would want.  There is 
evidence as to what that person would want.  Mr James’ purported view was contrary to what 
the reasonable person was proposed to have; this is an example of an implicit judgment on his 
quality of life.
476
  It may be because of what the decision-maker brings to the decision from 
their own experiences: 
“Our self-concerned habits lead to the easy judgment that what is best for others is 
merely what we judge to be best for ourselves; at which point, we simply adjudicate 
according to our own obligations and satisfactions rather than attempt to understand 
other people’s desires and beliefs.”
477
 
In James, it is relatively easy to criticise the use of the reasonable person criterion since there 
was good evidence pointing to the patient’s views.  However, where there is no such 
evidence, a reasonableness criterion may be useful, or even necessary.  With a previously 
competent patient, their prior self may be able to provide some helpful information as to 
whether they may or may not agree with what it is perceived most people would want in the 
circumstances.  In a void of information, referring to a reasonable person is sensible.  It 
seems intuitive that most people would not want to be kept alive by artificial means, in a 
condition such as PVS.  Therefore, keeping people alive in such a state, against the majority 
viewpoint, seems counter-intuitive.  No consideration at all of the reasonable person’s view is 
not suggested, but rather that the courts should not be introducing it where there is clear 
evidence of the individual’s view.  Where there is a void in information it becomes an easy 
step to conclude that a reasonable person would not want to continue living in a state such as 
PVS, and this needs to be a transparently applied observation due to the lack of alternative 
information, not despite of contrary information.   
Therefore, where there is some evidence of prior wishes, but it is not entirely conclusive, it 
may be legitimate to use a reasonableness test to supplement such evidence.  But, as shown in 
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the Court of Appeal’s judgment in James, even though there was clear evidence that Mr 
James would have most likely wanted treatment to continue, the judges decided that his best 
interests dictated that it should not.  This ignored the legislative intent for purpose of the best 
interests test. 
Best Interests as a Qualified-Objective Test 
Although substituted judgment is not the predominant test used in the Commonwealth 
countries considered in this thesis, its importance cannot be ignored.
478
  From the discussion 
in Chapter Five it is possible to infer that when best interests is the appropriate test, some 
form of substituted judgment will be factored into it.  In some jurisdictions, decision-making 
for incompetent patients will expressly set out, at the first stage, a substituted judgment test.  
Some legislation, such as the MCA, allows for the patient’s views to be subsumed into the 
best interests test: 
“Further, in most cases the court will be able to determine what decision it is likely 
that P would have made, if he had capacity.  In such a case, in my judgment, P’s 
balance sheet of factors and P’s likely decision can be taken into account by the court.  
This involves an element of substituted judgment being taken into account, together 
with anything else which is relevant.  However, it is absolutely clear that the ultimate 
test for the court is the test of best interests and not the test of substituted judgment.  
Nonetheless, the substituted judgment can be relevant and is not excluded from 
consideration.  As Hoffmann LJ said in the Bland case, the substituted judgment can 




In jurisdictions where prior views are a consideration, but not overriding, as Lady Hale sets 
out in James, the test will involve consideration of the views, but it will not be the deciding 
factor: 
“Best interests is not a test of “substituted judgement” (what the person would have 
wanted), but rather it requires a determination to be made by applying an objective 
test as to what would be in the person’s best interests.  All the relevant circumstances, 
including the factors mentioned in the section must be considered, but none carries 
any more weight or priority than another.  They must all be balanced in order to 
determine what would be in the best interests of the person concerned.”
480
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Therefore, a qualified-objective approach, which takes into account the patient’s views where 
known, but also makes an evaluation of objectively ascertained interests, is the approach 
most commonly used in the four Commonwealth countries in substitute decision-making for 
permanently incompetent patients.   
Summary of Chapter Six 
The evaluative nature of best interests dictates that it is broad and flexible in order to properly 
balance the various interests that the incompetent person may have.  Incompetent patients do 
not share all the same interests (though there may be a pool of interests that they could all be 
entitled to, for example an interest in not being submitted to ongoing indignity).  Therefore, 
any qualifier which confines it to certain values, or narrow interests, results in its 
misapplication, leading to the conclusion that a qualified-objective approach which provides 
for this flexibility is the only justifiable interpretation of best interests.   
Chapter Three canvassed a range of non-experiential interests that have both judicial and 
philosophical acceptance in regards to the permanently incompetent person.  Subsequently, 
Lord Mustill’s assertion in Bland that a patient in a PVS had no interests that could be 
evaluated took a narrow approach by viewing experiential interests as the only possible 
interests.  This chapter proposed that the probable basis for this confusion lies with the 
interpretation of personhood.  The assessment that a person who is permanently incompetent 
no longer has the characteristics of personhood may be viable, but this does not validate a 
conclusion that they do not have any interests.  Furthermore, experiential interests have been 
shown to be poorly understood in a case, Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, 
where there was every reason for them to be an influential factor.   
A deferment to a medicalised view of interests was discussed as having two possible 
applications.  The first was an interpretation whereby the courts adjudicated on whether the 
medical profession had properly assessed the patient’s best interests, effectively ‘Bolamising’ 
the best interests test, and lessening the judicial involvement.  Increasingly, statutory and 
common law rulings have rendered this version unacceptable by current standards.  It is not 
enough to defer to what the medical profession regards as the patient’s best interests, this is 




of deferment to medical interests placed the most emphasis on the medical condition of the 
patient, and this is explored in more detail in Chapter Seven.   
An analysis of an objective view of best interests leads to the conclusion that this risks 
invoking a reasonable person criterion.  Whilst appropriate in certain situations, ultimately its 
focus is not on the individual person.  Where there is a void in information it may be 
justifiable but where there is clear evidence of, for example, an explicit-specific prior view 
the inclusion of the reasonable person is at odds with best interests as a person-specific test.   
This chapter has, somewhat artificially, considered various applications of the best interests 
test in isolation.  Clearly this is not the purpose of an evaluative tool aimed at weighting and 
comparing various interests that an incompetent person may have.  This chapter has been 
structured in this way to demonstrate some fundamental confusions regarding interpretations 
of best interests.  In the next chapter these confusions are drawn on, as well as the other 
observations made in previous chapters, in order to consider cases where various interests are 





“I wish I had some clever answers to all these things, but that is not t he 
position.  If we did, presumably we would not be here.” 481 
In this penultimate chapter, the focus is on utilising the foundations laid in this thesis by the 
previous chapters.  Thus far, the principal emphasis has been on the question of how well 
judges are using the concept of best interests by breaking it down into different components.  
A test which aims to weigh up the best interests of a permanently incompetent individual 
should first of all seek to identify which interests the individual has.  This could be 
considered as Stage One.  Chapter Three discussed various accounts of interests to reach a 
conclusion that the descriptions self-regarding (consideration for one’s own interests) and 
other-regarding (consideration for others’ interests) could be used as a characterisation of 
some of the different kinds of interests that people may have.  This chapter presents further 
development of the argument advanced in Chapter Three that the other-regarding interests of 
the permanently incompetent have been overlooked, and that they are interests which could 
help the judicial decision-makers.   
Stage Two of evaluating interests requires a decision to be made about which interests should 
prevail; these prevailing interests will outweigh others because they are the interests deemed 
to be in the patient’s best interests.  There are a number of ways that judges could evaluate 
interests: (1) the judge could ignore them, and apply a different legal test altogether;
482
 (2) the 
judge could recognise one kind of interests, or a particular aspect of best interests, as shown 
in Chapter Six which examined various narrow applications of the best interests test; (3) there 
could be clear hierarchies of interests set out in either statutory regimes or common law.  
Often these pertain to prior views, and Chapter Five utilised the discussion from Chapter 
Four to analyse cases with a range of different previously competent statements, advocating 
for a proposal to ascertain the veracity of the prior self; (4) interests could be weighed up on 
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the basis of each case; and (5) hierarchies could be recognised, while seeking to avoid the 
consequences of the hierarchy by distinguishing differences at a lower level.  In this chapter 
all of the concepts discussed in the previous chapters are employed to provide consideration 
of some of the ways that interests fit together, and some of the ways that they do not.  This is 
reflected in the title of this chapter: conflicting and confluent interests.
483
   
Sometimes these interests are conflicting, and sometimes they will be confluent, but they are 
always difficult to evaluate and weight in a particular order that prioritises one or more over 
others.  And it should be difficult to rank them.  People may have conflicting interests, for 
example, in being pain free and dignified, on the one hand and living as long as possible on 
the other, making it difficult to say what their best interests are.  The cases analysed in this 
thesis concern the determination of life or death.  Any person (or judge) who does not 
appreciate this has missed the point (which they very rarely do).
484
  Some of these cases, such 
as those of conjoined twins, form the basis for extensive discourse, as in Simon Lee’s book 
on “Uneasy Cases”: 
“This is what I call not just a hard case but an un-easy one because the moral dilemma 




The conflicting and confluent nature of the incompetent person’s interests is what the best 
interests test is at its essence.  It is why there is so much difficulty in interpreting the best 
interests test.  In previous chapters these conflicts have been acknowledged but little has been 
done to engage with them.  This chapter addresses the more frequently occurring clashes of 
interests: sanctity and quality of life, parental views and children’s interests, and prior views 
and experiential interests; with reference to how this influences stage two of how judges 
reach their decisions.  From this discussion, a bigger question emerges: how does the concept 
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of other-regarding interests fit into the evaluation of interests, and what emphasis should be 
placed on them?  The conclusion of the thesis outlines broad guidelines that decision-makers 
should use when they assess the best interests of an incompetent patient.  This will be a 
summation of how it is possible to use the categories of self- and other-regarding interests, as 
well as evidence of a previous self, to assist in judicial decision-making for the incompetent 
patient. 
Conflicting Interests 
“The application throws up the harsh reality that there is no commonality of interest 
between the sisters in undergoing the operation.  It will benefit Alyssa by giving her a 
chance of a normal life but it will lead to Bethany’s death.  It confers no advantage on 
her.  What, then, is in the best interests of the children?”
486
 
It is not possible to set out all of the possible permutations of different interests the 
incompetent patient has, or may have, with all the different emphases of how they clash and 
how they could potentially clash.  Therefore, it is helpful to consider two different ways that 
they can clash.  (1) Intra-personal: the various interests an individual has clash with one 
another.  It may be because they are of different kinds (for example experiential vs critical, or 
future-orientated vs current).  Alternatively, they may be of the same kind, but both cannot be 
realised (for example, someone who has sets of critical interests which are incompatible).  
The following examples of these will be discussed in this chapter: (a) sanctity of life and 
quality of life; and (b) prior views and other interests.  (2) Inter-personal: the clashing of 
different people’s interests.  Seemingly, this question is relatively easily answered if the focus 
on the individual’s best interests is maintained.  However, the discussion in the following 
sections: (a) twin vs twin; and (b) parental views and child’s interests, will argue that inter-
personal clashes are not easily avoided.   
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Sanctity of Life and Quality of Life 
“Modern medicine is always poised to offer another procedure or therapy for 
prolonging life, but it often does so without considering the quality of that life. How 
much suffering is five more weeks worth? Or five days, or five hours?”
487
 
The tragic circumstances of conjoined twins where one is sustaining the life of the other gives 
rise to possibly the most acute ethical dilemma.  Essentially, both twins have strong self-
regarding interests that are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile as their most important 
self-regarding interest is, ostensibly, in continued living.  That is not to say that a self-
regarding interest only favours continuation of life, but in this case with no evidence of any 
other suffering it must be a consideration that it was an interest.
488
  One of the difficulties that 
the judges face is justifying an operation that would leave a child dead.  The principle of 
sanctity of life would therefore need to be addressed by the courts; all of the judges did so 
and declared that each of the twins had an equal right life.
489
   
The sanctity of life principle is an impersonal, deontological one, stating that it is wrong to 
deliberately kill, even if no-one’s rights or interests would be violated.  This is different from 
the right to life which relates to the individual, and can in theory be waived by that 
individual, or outweighed by competing considerations.  It does not necessarily mean that a 
particular individual has an interest in having their life prolonged.  The distinction between 
the deontological rule against deliberate killing is not always distinguished by the courts from 
whether a particular person has an interest in continued life.  Exemplifying the sanctity of life 
ethic, all of the jurisdictions considered in this thesis have prohibitions on any form of 
voluntary euthanasia or assistance to die, which prevents any deliberate killing, regardless of 
the person’s consent.
490
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In end-of-life cases the importance of the sanctity of life is often remarked on: 
 “A profound respect for the sanctity of human life is embedded in our law and our 




Therefore, the sanctity of life principle is undoubtedly entrenched in the common law, as 
exemplified by the judges in Bland and other leading cases.
492
  However, despite its 
importance, there are few definitions provided.  In Re A, Brooke LJ stated that the respect for 
sanctity of life comes from God and our Christian Western values and the protection of these 
values is the reason for laws against murder.
493
  In Bland, eight of the nine judges referred to 
sanctity of life, and they all acknowledged its importance, and also recognised the view that it 
can be overridden by other factors.  One judge, Lord Goff, linked it to legislation, Lords 
Keith and Mustill linked it to the State, whilst Hoffmann LJ stated that it is intuitive.
494
  
Although it is universally acknowledged, the weight attached to it varies somewhat between 
judges: Lord Goff, for instance, referred to it as “the fundamental principle”, whereas for 
Thomas Bingham MR it is something to which respect must be paid, but which is not 
“irrebuttable.”
495
  These differences highlight two further investigations.  Firstly, what is the 
definition, or possible definition of sanctity of life?  Secondly, if it can be “rebutted” when 
does this happen and by what considerations?    
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Brooke LJ’s account of sanctity of life accords with John Keown’s definition, and in fact 
Keown’s definitions are discussed (with approval) in Re A, and James.
496
  As argued by 
Keown, the sanctity of life principle holds that one should never intentionally kill an innocent 
human being.  The right to life is essentially a right not to be intentionally killed.
497
 
“The sanctity doctrine is not vitalistic.  The core of the doctrine is the principle 
prohibiting intentional killing, not an injunction requiring the preservation of life at all 
costs.  However, although the doctrine denies that human life is an absolute good, the 
principle that it may never intentionally be taken is an absolute principle, that is, one 
which has no acceptable exceptions.  Although the value of human life is not absolute, 
the prohibition on taking it is.”
498
 
There is a certain irony to the utilisation of Keown’s definitions in Re A and James as he is 
critical of the judicial application of the sanctity of life in Bland: 
“It appears then, that in Bland, as in Re J before it, the sanctity of life was not heard; 
that the choice as presented and perceived was between vitalism and Quality of life, 
and that the judges, unsurprisingly, opted for Quality of life.  Despite the fundamental 
importance attached to the sanctity of life by the judges who sat in Bland, it is by no 
means clear that any had the benefit of an accurate appreciation of it.”
499
 
The importance of the Bland decision for the sanctity of life ethic was also emphasised by 
Peter Singer, was in agreement with the decision:  
“On February 4, 1993, in deciding the fate of a young man named Anthony Bland, 
Britain’s highest court threw out many centuries of traditional law and medical ethics 
regarding the value of human life and the lawfulness of intentionally ending it.”
500
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The significant aspect of this discussion, for the question of decision-making for the 
incompetent patient, is the answer to the second investigation to determine when the sanctity 
of life principle can be rebutted.  In some circumstances it can when it conflicts with quality 
of life considerations.
501
  Due to the technological advances that today’s medical care can 
provide, patients can receive ventilator support or ANH for their natural lifespan, creating an 
increasing tension between sanctity of life and quality of life.  The courts state that everyone 
has a right to life, but that this right can be overridden by competing interests, such as an 
interest in not being subjected to prolonged suffering for no reason.  This is an objective 
interest that is dependent on the patient’s awareness.  Consequently, there is no simple 
equation because the quality of that life may preclude keeping the patient alive.  The 
following account of Anthony Bland’s life shows why this is a factor: 
“Since 15 April 1989 Anthony Bland has been in persistent vegetative state.  He lies 
in Airedale General Hospital in Keighley, fed liquid food by a pump through a tube 
passing through his nose and down the back of his throat into the stomach.  His 
bladder is emptied through a catheter inserted through his penis, which from time to 
time has caused infections requiring dressing and antibiotic treatment.  His stiffened 
joints have caused his limbs to be rigidly contracted so that his arms are tightly flexed 
across his chest and his legs unnaturally contorted.  Reflex movements in the throat 
cause him to vomit and dribble.  Of all this, and the presence of members of his 
family who take turns to visit him, Anthony Bland has no consciousness at all.  The 
parts of his brain which provided him with consciousness have turned to fluid.  The 
darkness and oblivion which descended at Hillsborough will never depart.  His body 
is alive, but he has no life in the sense that even the most pitifully handicapped but 
conscious human being has a life.  But the advances of modern medicine permit him 
to be kept in this state for years, even perhaps for decades.”
502
 
From this description of the life of Anthony Bland, all nine of the judges who deliberated as 
to whether withdrawal of ANH was lawful, decided that it was.  Their characterisations of 
him painted his life as not worth living, arriving at conclusions that equated a lack of 
personhood with a lack of any meaningful life.
503
  Again, because Keown is cited in end-of-
life cases, it is useful to recount his positions, as he maintained that the courts misconstrue 
adherence to a sanctity of life principle with vitalism.  Vitalism holds that human life is an 
absolute moral value and that it is wrong either to shorten it or to fail to lengthen it.  
Regardless of the pain, suffering or expense that life-prolonging treatment entails, it must be 
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administered: human life is to be preserved at all costs.
504
  Keown offers further guidance for 
the discussion when he distinguishes between two different interpretations of quality of life: 
(1) there is an assessment of the patient’s condition as the first step to assessing the 
worthwhileness of a proposed treatment and (2) the assessment is of the worthwhileness of 
the patient’s life.
505
  The latter is what the courts have striven to avoid, but as the next section 
discusses, this interpretation has infiltrated end-of-life cases. 
Experiencing a Quality Life 
There is a frequently occurring intra-personal clash in regards to an incompetent patient’s 
quality of life, and what kind of life they are experiencing, and their interest in continued 
living.  Decision-making for the incompetent patient should consider three possibilities 
regarding experiential interests, which have arisen from the end-of-life cases: (1) the patient 
has no sentience or awareness, for example a patient in a PVS; (2) the patient is sensate and 
can experience pain and other discomforts such as hunger, but is also capable of positive 
responses such as responding to whānau; (3) the patient may be sensate or they may not be, 
and there is no way of knowing which, for example, patients with Guillain-Barré syndrome 
and some minors.   
There are very different considerations to make if the patient is in the second group and can 
feel or experience anything at all.  They then have a raft of interests that are applicable by 
virtue of being able to feel something – whether that is pain, hunger, sorrow, distress, 
nightmares, helplessness, frustration, happiness, joy, warmth or touch.  Once a patient can 
feel anything it becomes an extremely difficult balancing exercise between what they may be 
experiencing, which with end-of-life cases is often associated with some form of suffering 
(quality of life) and their interest in living (sanctity of life).  Dresser points out how the courts 
have used experiential interests to implicitly make judgments on the quality of life of 
patients:       
“It is in the ultimate legal outcomes that we find evidence of judges’ views on which 
kinds of experiential interests give patients a significant claim to life-sustaining 
treatment and which do not.  I submit that in constructing their decisions on life-
sustaining treatment, judges have been acting as arbiters of the normative position on 
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quality of life.  Their decisions represent the community’s current consensus and 
disagreement on when nontreatment is a reasonable moral judgment.”
506
 
This theory by Dresser is validated when summarising the outcomes of the cases considered 
in Chapter Five.  In those cases where the family wanted treatment to be discontinued and the 
courts agreed (Bland, Re G, Durksen), the patient was in a PVS.  In those cases where the 
family wanted treatment to be continued, against medical advice, the courts sided with the 
family (James, Scardoni Sweiss v Alberta) the patient was in a MCS (or similar).
507
  The 
salient point seems to be whether the patient is sensate, and this is further evidenced by three 
cases from England.  In An NHS Trust v MB, the medical evidence was that M at 18 months 
old had the possibility of normal cognitive function for his age, as spinal muscular atrophy 
does not usually affect the brain, and it was M’s body that was shutting down.  Holman J 
found that it was in his best interests that treatment be continued, against advice from the 
medical profession and M’s court appointed guardian.
508
  In Central Manchester University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v A the same judge declined to issue a similar order in 
respect to twins who were both suffering a progressive neuro-degenerative disorder.  In that 
judgment he compared the twins’ condition to that of M, stating that they were opposite: 
“The circumstances of these two boys is the reverse. Their disorder does not relate to 
their muscles. It relates fundamentally to their brains.”
509
 
In W v M an adult patient’s family advocated the withdrawal of treatment from M.  Crucially, 
her diagnosis changed from PVS to MCS whilst the application was in the process of 
appearing in court, and permission to withdraw treatment was denied.
510
  In all three of these 
English cases, the patient’s sentience was the deciding factor.  Even when the family is 
fighting for continuation of treatment for their loved one in a PVS, their capacity for 
sensation and responsiveness is the issue.  In the Canadian case Maraachli v Dr Fraser, 
“baby Joseph”, as he became known as in the media, was clinically diagnosed as being in a 
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PVS, but his parents disagreed with this diagnosis.
511
  The judge upheld the CCB’s finding 
that the parents had not followed the proper procedure for substitute decision-making, but the 
parents refused to consent as directed, and Joseph was moved to an American facility for 
continued treatment.
512
  It appears, therefore, that courts have been reluctant to allow patients 
in a MCS to die, but will do so if the patient is in a PVS.
513
  Therefore, in cases where the 
whānau is fighting for treatment it is because they disagree with the PVS diagnosis, a very 
different basis for wanting treatment to continue.
514
  The salient difference, perhaps, could be 
in the demonstration of some form of personhood, as the families often state that the patient 
is showing some form of awareness.   
The principle of sanctity of life is therefore one that can be outweighed by the patient’s 
quality of life.  If that life has no demonstration of personhood then treatment is able to be 
withheld, if it is taken that personhood is a quality judgement.  But there is a disunion here 
regarding the medically agreed fact that while a person in a PVS cannot suffer, a person in an 
MCS presumably can.   
Twin vs Twin 
“The basis for the decision in the Conjoined Twins case is not legal principles but the 




Whilst in Bland the decision to withdraw treatment from a patient in a PVS appears to many 
as a reasonable one, or at least reasonably understandable, the decision to separate conjoined 
twins is perhaps more debated.
516
  This was even acknowledged by one of the judges in a 
subsequent interview:   
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“Fifty per cent of the population will agree with the decision – fifty per cent will think 
we have gone potty.”
517
 
Born just nine months apart, two sets of conjoined twins in the Commonwealth led to two 
legal applications for their lawful separation.  In both cases it was contended that if they were 
not separated both would die, and in both cases it was contended that in order for one twin to 
live an operation which would save that twin, but mean death for the other twin, was 
necessary.  These cases have been chosen as a common thread for the first two sections, as a 
way of demonstrating clashes where various interests, including an inter-personal clash, are 
in direct conflict.   
Seeking out medical practitioners experienced with conjoined twins, Rosie and Gracie 
Attard’s parents travelled from Malta to the United Kingdom for the birth in 2000 of their 
daughters (the court case used the pseudonyms ‘Jodie’ for Gracie and ‘Mary’ for Rosie which 
will be used to avoid confusion).  Their parents did not want them to be separated and did not 
consent to the operation.  In 2001, Alyssa and Bethany Nolan were born in Australia.  Their 
parents did consent to the operation, and the girls’ medical condition was more precarious 
than the Attard twins.
518
   
The judges in Re A all took different approaches to reach the same conclusion that the twins 
could be separated and, of special relevance for the purposes of my thesis, they reached 
different answers to the question of best interests.
519
  Ward LJ set out the two issues requiring 
a decision.  The first stage was to determine whether or not it was in the best interests of the 
child.  Stage two then determined if it was lawful in terms of criminal law.
520
  The decision 
can be critiqued for lack of consistency at both stages.  At Stage One, the civil question of 
best interests, Johnston J (in the High Court), and Robert Walker LJ (in the Court of Appeal) 
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found that it was in both twins’ best interests to be separated.  Ward and Brooke LJJ in the 
Court of Appeal disagreed, and decided that separation was only in Jodie’s best interests, and 
was if anything contrary to Mary’s interests.   
In determining legality at Stage Two, the judges relied on different legal principles to find 
that the separation was legal.  Because Robert Walker LJ found that it was in both girls’ best 
interests he did not have to distinguish a separate claim for Jodie that would outweigh her 
sister’s.  Brooke LJ extended the doctrine of necessity, summarising the law from the past 
seven centuries.
521
  Ward LJ weighed up each girl’s right to life, and although he stated that 
these were equal, went on to say that Jodie could use a quasi self-defence plea (or, more 
accurately, that defence of another could be used by the doctors) to show her right was 
superior on the “scales of fairness and justice between the children”.
522
  He was employing an 
approach which recognised that there was a clearly dominant interest (determined by the 
deontological constraint of not deliberating killing) which was the right to life, but since both 
twins could claim this it could be distinguished at a lower level by advocating that Mary’s 
right to life could be defeated.  Why was this?  Because there were quality of life arguments 
made that supposedly justified this conclusion.   
Jodie’s Best Interests  
Putting aside the implications of the judges not only using different reasoning, but using 
different legal tests, how did the judges reach different conclusions regarding best interests at 
the first stage?  Brooke LJ agreed with Ward LJ’s conclusions in finding that the operation 
was only in Jodie’s best interests, and these will be discussed following section.
523
  There was 
little doubt that the operation could be in Jodie’s best interests, therefore the following 
section discusses how this decision was justified in relation to the position that both twins’ 
lives were of equal value. 
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In Re A, the neonatologist said that Mary’s quality of life would be so poor that it was 
appropriate to terminate her life.
524
  But all of the judges were careful not to state this so 
bluntly themselves, instead repeatedly stating that the twins’ lives were of equal value.  But 
how could the twins’ lives be equal in actuality?  Stating that he was not wading into the 
difficult waters of weighing up lives (that is avoiding stating that one twin’s life was worth 
more because they have a greater chance of long-term survival) Ward LJ appealed to 
Keown’s interpretation of sanctity of life and argued that he was weighing up the 
worthwhileness of the treatment.
525
  How did Ward LJ weigh up the worthwhileness of the 
treatment, not the worthwhileness of Mary’s life?  He did this by finding that the operation 
would restore to Jodie the “prospects of a normal expectation of relatively normal life” and, 
although the operation would shorten Mary’s life, “she remains doomed for death.”
526
  
Therefore he decided that the ‘survivable’ twin’s interests do outweigh the ‘non-survivable’ 
twin’s, and the following comment exemplifies an intra-personal clash as discussed 
previously in this chapter:   
“The conclusion that the ensuing months of Mary’s life are worth nothing brings the 
dichotomy between quality of life and sanctity of life into critical focus”.
527
 
This is an example of the judge conflating the deontological rule with the person’s interest.  
There is certainly a free standing deontological notion of sanctity of life, which is usually 
taken to mean a rule against intentionally killing or such like.  But this seems different from 
the patient’s own interest in continued life.  The latter is often presumed by the courts, but 
like other presumptions, may be rebutted by other evidence.  The sanctity of life doctrine, at 
least as articulated by Keown, (and subsequently used in Re A) does not rely on the quality of 
Mary’s life.  The deontological rule prohibiting killing would apply even if everyone were to 
concede that Mary did not have an interest in continued life, which Keown would attribute to 
her. 
In Re A, the medical condition of the twins was not as imminently serious as it was in Nolan, 
and the certainty of death for them both if they stayed conjoined, although high, was most 
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likely to happen in between three and six months.  The normality of how the girls could live 
seemed very important in respect to the idea of quality of life.  Becoming a single entity was 
seen as important enough to die for (the idea of bodily integrity is discussed below).  But as 
Dreger points out, this is a misconception.  Many conjoined twins cannot envisage life 
separate from their twin, and it was not until 2003 that Laleh and Ladan Bijani became the 
first adult conjoined twins to actively seek out, and therefore consent to, separation.
528
  As 
regards to the infant conjoined twins however, this perspective would only be a 
misconception if it relied on assumptions about what conjoined twins generally want and 
value.  It could be that bodily integrity, like the sanctity of life (and possibly dignity), has a 
value independently of what people actually want.  In Re A for the first twenty pages it is 
striking just how often the word ‘normal’ is used to describe what Jodie can become.  Not 
just by Ward LJ, but also in his selection of statements from medical professionals.  There is 
absolutely no contemplation of a life that could be led by both twins still conjoined.  
Although the medical prognosis was not promising, there have been numerous incidents of 
similar predictions being wrong.  And, putting aside this unlikely miracle, it still remains – 
was the quality of life (that may have been possible) so bad that Mary should die so Jodie 
could live ‘normally’?  Really the issue was that without the separation, Jodie would not be 
able to live at all, so any attempts to justify it on grounds that it would restore her to 
normality should be questioned.    
There was a case in the United States of conjoined twins, Amy and Angela Lakeberg, which 
highlights need for careful assessment.  The twins’ parents aggressively sought the 
separation, against the advice of the medical team that had delivered the babies (and that 
hospital’s ethics committee which recommended against it).
529
  Eventually, they found a 
surgical team who would perform the surgery.  Unlike the Commonwealth cases there was no 
blatantly weaker twin – Angela was chosen to live because her anatomy gave her a slightly 
better chance of survival.   
“Just before the operation, nurses painted Angela’s fingernails pink, in an effort to 
prevent the surgeons from being confused about which “half” was to be salvaged:  
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The outcome of this case was dire.  Angela did survive the operation but remained on 
ventilator support, and hospitalised, until her death about ten months later.  Aside from the 
apparent futility of the operation and Angela’s short, burdened life, another sad aspect of this 
case is that her parents visited her less than five times post-operation.  It was the medical staff 
who become her surrogate parents.  Dworkin has said of this case:   
“True respect for human life was sacrificed, in Philadelphia, to bad slogans about 
sanctity and rescue, and, perhaps, to a dangerous love for heroic medicine for its own 
sake.”
531
   
Perhaps if the courts had been involved in this case a different outcome may have been 
achieved – on face value it would be hard to argue that the operation was in either twin’s best 
interests.   
Mary’s Best Interests  
Robert Walker LJ decided that separation would be in Mary’s interests as it would restore her 
bodily integrity and dignity, and also used the doctrine of double effect to justify his decision 
at the second stage of the case.
532
  Bodily integrity is a concept that is linked to respecting a 
person’s autonomy; it is about a person’s right or interest in protecting their own self.  
The surgeon, who gave evidence on the operation to separate the twins, stated:  
“If you look at it in terms of Mary dying, no, there is not a therapeutic benefit.  If you 
look at it in terms of what Mary’s life would be like attached forever to her sister, then 
it is not a benefit for her to remain attached to her sister: she will be much happier if 
she is separate.”
533
   
This is an odd statement to make in light of the fact that there was zero chance of Mary 
surviving the operation. Indeed, as Ward LJ noted, given that the operation would 
presumably be performed under general anaesthetic, it is hard to see when it would afford 
Mary the chance to feel anything at all.  This argument could have been better made for Jodie 
(if she needed anything to support her interests) as Mary was likely to have very limited 
physical abilities, leaving Jodie to have to move her sister around with her.  For Mary, if she 
was not suffering (and part of the complexity of this case was that this was not known), then 
it is a hard argument to make that she would be happier dead.  Effectively what the surgeon is 
advocating here is bodily integrity for both twins.  Robert Walker LJ used this to justify the 
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operation, as it gave Mary bodily integrity and the doctrine of double effect meant that her 
death was not the purpose of operation but its inevitable consequence: 
“The surgery would plainly be in Jodie’s best interests, and in my judgment it would 
be in the best interests of Mary also, since for the twins to remain alive and conjoined 
in the way they are would be to deprive them of the bodily integrity and human 
dignity which is the right of each of them… Mary’s death would not be the purpose of 
the operation, although it would be its inevitable consequence.  The operation would 
give her, even in death, bodily integrity as a human being.  She would die, not 




Brooke LJ’s approach to the doctrine of double effect differed from Robert Walker LJ’s,
535
 
stating that Mary would be killed intentionally:  
“because by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the surgeons would be 
acting in good faith in Mary’s best interests when they prepared an operation which 
would benefit Jodie but kill Mary.”
536
   
Robert Walker’s conclusion that the twins had confluent interests was highly significant for 
his approach to the criminal law question, as it allowed him to rely on the doctrine of double 
effect.  According to most versions of the doctrine, it cannot be used to benefit one person at 
the expense of another; it could only be used where the intention of the operation was achieve 
an outcome which was in Mary’s best interests as well as Jodie’s.
537
   
Ward LJ, in contrast, agreed that the operation would give Mary bodily integrity – but found 
that this was an illusory goal as she would not be able to enjoy this state.   
“The only gain I can see is that the operation would, if successful, give Mary the 
bodily integrity and dignity which is the natural order for all of us.  But this is a 
wholly illusory goal because she will be dead before she can enjoy her independence 
and she will die because, when she is independent, she has no capacity for life.”
538
 
This is a crucial difference in approaches.  Is bodily integrity an interest that depends on you 
being aware of it?  On one reading, Robert Walker LJ ascribed to Mary an objective interest 
in bodily integrity; an objective interest that was used to justify the operation being in her 
best interests. On another reading, Robert Walker LJ’s approach advocated bodily integrity as 
being valuable insofar as it would make Mary “much happier”, which would seem to locate 
the bodily integrity interest in the category of experiential interests.  
                                                          
534
 Ibid at 258.   
535
 Ibid at 216.  
536
 Ibid at 218. 
537
 Ibid at 251. 
538




The latter reading accords with Ward LJ who found that bodily integrity is an experiential 
interest which is dependent on a person being aware of it.  If you are not aware of your body 
and what it means to be intact, then an interest in bodily integrity is a wholly illusory concept.  
In the way that it was discussed by Ward LJ, bodily integrity was only perceived as 
experiential, and yet one could imagine someone having surviving interests regarding his or 
her body to be buried intact, or people talking about wanting to die with dignity without tubes 
and other artificial apparatus going into the body.  These critical or far life-long interests 
could be predicated on a person’s previous values and preferences, something which cannot 
apply to infant such as Mary.   
This leaves the question of whether someone in that situation could still be said to have non-
experiential objective interests that exist independently of prior views or values.  In Chapter 
Three the taxonomy of interests was explored, and the interest of dignity was discussed.  The 
courts have fairly consistently applied dignity as an objective interest not dependent on 
awareness (the exception being Butler-Sloss LJ in NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H).
539
  In 
Bland, Hoffmann LJ describes the principle as an intrinsic value, not dependent on 
awareness.
540
  If the same could be said for bodily integrity, then perhaps it would make 
sense to attribute such an interest to someone like Mary.  
The reason for dignity being perceived as an objective interest may, however, explain why 
the two concepts can be distinguished.  Dignity is viewed as an interest accorded to everyone 
because of the importance it has to our community, as it explains many of the attitudes held 
towards the dying and the dead in our communities.  Other evidence for this is the existence 
of surviving interests, where society has both moral and legal consequences for disrespecting 
these.  Dignity is therefore not only for the incompetent person’s benefit, but also for others.  
Bodily integrity, however cannot be said to have similar implications.  It is much harder to 
claim that bodily integrity benefits everyone, as it is an individualistic concept.  Implicit in 
the concept of bodily integrity for the twins is the idea that ‘normal’ is not only an aim, but 
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that it is also an aspirational goal.  To introduce this interest as one that Mary would have is 
therefore based on false premises.  While it might be possible to argue that we each have an 
objective interest in bodily integrity, it seems more problematic to claim that it manifests in 
an interest in physical separateness.  Conventionally, the bodily integrity is seen as a right to, 
or interest in, non-interference.  Robert Walker LJ’s treatment of it as an interest in physical 
separateness seems idiosyncratic.  Furthermore, it may not accord with what we know of how 
older conjoined twins see their own situation.  Of course, an objective interest need not 
accord with anyone’s subjective views, but it would nonetheless seem strange to insist that 
other conjoined twins have an objective interest in being separated, even if they themselves 
insist that they prefer being conjoined (as in the example given earlier). 
That Re A is a difficult ‘uneasy’ case, both morally and legally, is undisputed.  The judges 
disagreed over the best interests of the twins, and also justified the legality of the separation 
by applying different tests.  The decision seems to fall back on an implicit reasonableness 
test.  In utilitarian terms, it seems counter-intuitive to let both girls die rather than taking the 
option of saving one.
541
  The other controversial aspect to the conjoined twins’ case was the 
fact that the judges overrode the parents’ wishes.  In the following section the extent to which 
parental views have been, and should be, taken into account in these difficult end-of-life 
cases is given consideration.   
Parental Views and Child’s Interests 
“The reasons offered in the Court of Appeal were so confused and mutually 




Parents are the de facto decision-makers for everything regarding their child.  What they eat, 
the clothes they wear, who they see, where they go to school, where they live … the list is 
endless.  Not all decisions that parents make are in the child’s best interests.  Often decisions 
will be made on the basis on familial interests.  Consider two sisters, Elizabeth and Laura.  If 
Elizabeth is enrolled in art classes, but Laura is not, then it is not in Laura’s best interests to 
be driven across the city to drop off Elizabeth.  But those kinds of pragmatic decisions are 
made daily, and the scale of them can vary.  Perhaps when Elizabeth is ready for high school 
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her parents will choose a school that is the best fit for her, and when it is Laura’s turn three 
years later she will be sent to the same school based on the reasoning “that it’s easier”.  It is 
not necessarily in her best interests, and could have lasting effects on her life, but it is 
unlikely to cause serious detriment.  The State only steps in as arbiter to parental decision-
making if: (1) the parents disagree over what decisions should be made (for example they 
have separated, and both want custody of the children); or (2) the decisions fall outside the 
scope of what is considered acceptable parental decision-making (for example they can 
choose what kind of school, but not whether the child receives an education or not).  In a 
medical context, perhaps the parents expose their child to a risk of serious harm, or perhaps 
they are subjecting the child to continued suffering.
543
   
Did the opposition to separate their daughters by the parents in Re A fall outside of this 
scope?  It is not difficult to understand their reasons for doing so, as explained in the 
following paragraph, as they perceived Mary’s death as deliberate, and they were also 
concerned about their limited resources if Jodie’s disabilities were severe: 
“We have of course had to give serious consideration to the various options as given 
to us by our daughters’ treating doctors.  We cannot begin to accept or contemplate 
that one of our children should die to enable the other to survive.  That is not God’s 
will.  Everyone has the right to life so why should we kill one of our daughters to 
enable the other to survive.  That is not what we want and that is what we have told 
the doctors treating Jodie and Mary.  In addition we are also told that if Jodie survives 
and that is not known at all, then she is going to be left with a serious disability.  The 
life we have ...  is remote ...  with very few, if any facilities would make it extremely 
difficult not only for us to cope with a disabled child but for that disabled child to 
have any sort of life at all.”
544
 
The judges did not give this view much credence, rather disingenuously it could be argued, 
since the basis for the operation implicitly invoked quality of life judgments itself.   
As discussed in regards to Elizabeth and Laura’s best interests, the State largely leaves 
parents to be sole decision-makers for their own children.  The two exceptions identified 
were when the parents disagree or when the decision falls outside what is considered to be the 
normal scope of parenting.  This is not, however, how the courts have approached parental 
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rights in end-of-life cases.  In these cases the act of an interested party, engaging the court’s 
jurisdiction for a minor, effectively overrides any parental control.
545
   
“As a dispute has arisen between the treating doctors and the parents, and one, and 
now both, parties have asked the court to make a decision, it is the role and duty of the 
court to do so and to exercise its own independent and objective judgment.”
546
 
This is a very important distinction, as the courts are not limited to reversing a decision if it is 
unreasonable in light of the parental scope of decision-making capacity; instead the court has 
a further obligation to exercise its own judgment.  The decision therefore becomes “what is in 
the child’s best interests”, not “was the parental decision reasonable”.  In these two questions 
are echoes of the Bolamising critique, where the decision the courts made was an independent 
one as to the best interests of the patient, not whether the medical opinion of best interests 
was the correct one.  It could therefore be considered a consistent stance of autonomous 
decision-making, not abrogating the decision to any person or profession.  But it may not be 
this simple.  Is it fair to compare a medical opinion of best interests to that of a parent?  A 
parent has a much higher stake in the outcome, in fact in almost all cases the only person with 
a higher stake is the child themselves.  The parent is the next most affected person.  Should 
this transfer into a greater claim in the decision-making process?  The courts have answered 
this firmly in the negative, and a common theme to their rejection of parental influence is the 
emotional attachment of parents, and the irrelevance this has to the best interests of the child: 
“Where, as in this case, the parents spend a great deal of time with their child, their 
views may have particular value because they know the patient and how he reacts so 
well; although the court needs to be mindful that the views of any parents may, very 
understandably, be coloured by their own emotion or sentiment.  It is important to 
stress that the reference is to the views and opinions of the parents.  Their own wishes, 
however understandable in human terms, are wholly irrelevant to consideration of the 
objective best interests of the child save to the extent in any given case that they may 
illuminate the quality and value to the child of the child/parent relationship.”
547
 
Consideration of this sentiment – that parental wishes are irrelevant to the consideration of 
best interests – is problematic with regards to the conjoined twins case.  The judges could not 
agree whether the operation was in both twins’ best interests, and on what grounds it was 
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legal, and therefore overriding the parents’ wishes with disagreement over such fundamental 
points is troubling. 
Where the child is experiencing or is going to experience pain, another dimension is added.  
While the decision in the conjoined twins case may be difficult to reconcile, where it is one 
child’s interests against parental views there may be some cases where this is easier.  In the 
New Zealand case of Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd v L, the parental wishes for their 
daughter’s continued treatment were deemed against her best interests:  
“We were satisfied, after considering Baby L’s right to life, when contrasted with her 
right to be free from discomfort and pain; when considering her parents’ deeply felt 
wish for her life to be prolonged as long as possible even if, as would be necessary, 
that be by artificial means which in part add to her discomfort, Baby L’s best interests 
would be promoted by granting the application… Sadly, this was a case in which we 
had to make the decision, notwithstanding the wishes of the parents.  To have abided 
by their wishes we would have had to require treatment to be given or continued 
irrespective of the clinical judgment of the doctors involved and, in our view, contrary 
to the best interests of Baby L.”
548
 
Baby L’s self-regarding interest in not experiencing prolonged pain was therefore considered 
more important than her interest in staying alive, and her parents’ wishes to keep her alive.  
Baby L’s best interests were in cessation of treatment, and the courts essentially held that her 
parents had failed to protect these interests properly when they wanted treatment continued.  
Is this something that could be alleged in the conjoined twins’ situation? Ward LJ’s 
observation that there was a parental duty to separate Jodie and Mary was not justified on the 
basis of their respective best interests in the way he framed them.  In comparison, Baby L 
was sensate, and – most importantly for the purposes of her best interests – was experiencing 
pain, and therefore this prompted consideration for her experiential interests which were 
deemed to outweigh parental views.  
The experiential interests of a minor were also the main consideration in an English case, 
NHS Trust v A, where the parents refused to consent to a bone marrow transplant for their 
daughter, citing the “lengthy, painful and distressing” treatment as their reason for 
refusing.
549
  There was a 50 percent chance that the transplant would succeed with a lasting 
cure, and Baby A would have a normal life span, a 30 percent chance of her dying from her 
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underlying condition, a ten percent chance that she would die from the treatment, and a ten 
percent prospect of surviving but with significant impairment.
550
   
“So the stark and awesome question for me is: should I approve and authorise this 
very significant invasive treatment which the doctors so strongly recommend; or 
respect and endorse the well informed and long considered judgment and decision of 
the loving parents?  The issues are truly ones of life and death, but the case also raises 
profound issues of parental autonomy in our society.”
551
 
An interesting aspect of this case is that bone marrow transplants require intensive ongoing 
co-operation.
552
  The judge recognised this from the outset: 
“There has been no suggestion whatsoever in this case that the court should positively 
order the parents to take her to the hospital for a BMT; still less that she should be 
removed from them for the purpose, under a care or similar order. So the parents do 
and will have the final control over whether A undergoes a BMT or not. But the 
parents are deeply law abiding people who clearly respect the authority of this court 
and, I hope, its objectivity and wisdom. And they have said that if I do grant the 
declaration which the hospital seek, then they will most probably feel that they should 
respect it and co-operate in the BMT taking place.”
553
 
The transplant process was horribly painful.  The parents had already witnessed their six 
month old daughter undergo intensely invasive painful treatments, and they had decided that 
she had had enough.  But the judge disagreed, making an independent decision that it was in 
the child’s best interests.  Her one in two chance at survival, regardless of the cost, was 
considered to outweigh her parents’ wishes that she be left to enjoy her life in the time that 
she had left.  It could be said that A’s self-regarding intra-personal interests clashed; she had 
both an interest in avoiding extended, invasive painful procedures and an interest in 
continued life.  What makes the judge the final arbiter in such a delicately balanced decision?  
If other-regarding interests are factored in, A’s parents are the ones with the closest ties to 
their daughter, and she to them.  Should they be able to decide which one of these self-
regarding interests (avoidance of pain and continuance of life) is the most important? 
Holman J presided on two other cases where parents disagreed with the medical profession.  
In both of those, NHS Trust v MB, and Central Manchester, he ordered that treatment should 
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be continued.  The same conclusion, regarding parental views being irrelevant, has now been 
articulated in three of Holman J’s judgments: 
“In this regard [that withdrawal of treatment goes against parents’ beliefs] I refer to 
what I said at paragraph 49 of my judgment in MB, and repeated at paragraph 41 of 
my judgment in The NHS Trust v A [2007] EWHC 1696 (Fam):  “This case concerns 
a child who must himself be incapable, by reason of his age, of any religious belief. 
An objective balancing of his own best interests cannot be affected by whether a 
parent happens to adhere to one particular belief, or another, or none. I have the 
utmost respect for the father’s faith and belief, and for the faith of Islam which he 
practises and professes. But I regard it as irrelevant to the decision which I have to 
take and I do not take it into account at all”.”
554
 
Parental views could be, and I argue should be, considered an other-regarding interest that a 
child has.  This does not necessarily mean that every child has this interest, although it is 
possible to start from a position that they do, but these are secondary interests.  If the case is 
made that children have shared interests in the collective flourishing of the family unit a 
further step is required to support the conclusion that they have an interest in parental views 
being followed.  By virtue of being a member in a family all children have interests that are 
intimately tied into parental wellbeing.  Parents may be considered as the custodians of that 
collective endeavour.  Overruling parental decisions in cases where a child’s best interests are 
extremely difficult to determine (for example Re A and NHS Trust v A) means ignoring these 
other-regarding interests.  It may be preferable in these more difficult cases for the courts to 
take a Bolamised approach, and make a decision on whether the parental decision is 
reasonable, rather than imposing the independent view of the court.  This is because it is 
difficult to argue that the decisions taken were unmistakably in the child’s best interests.  
Where the cause of conflict is continued suffering, such as Baby L, then there is a much 
clearer case for the decision to withdraw treatment being in her best interests.   
Prior Views and Other Interests 
Chapter Five identified different kinds of prior views, making a distinction between cases 
where there was an explicitly expressed prior view: explicit-general – a general comment 
made at T1 as to wishes at T2; and explicit-specific – a specific comment at T1 relating to 
their condition at T2.  There were also inferred views from the person’s previous self: 
inferred-general – a life story at T1 with no particular relevance to T2; and inferred-specific 
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– a life story at T1 that has some relevance to T2.
555
  It was argued that these distinctions 
should be material to the evaluation of how safely judges could rely on the decision being 
made in line with the patient’s views.  A proposal was then outlined to ascertain veracity and 
discussed it in reference to cases using the distinctions related to the previously competent 
patient, and what kind of wishes (if any) they had previously expressed.  This was a different 
enquiry to the one focused on in this chapter: where prior views are to be considered under 
the umbrella of a best interests test, what weight is, and should be, given to them?
556
     
Experiential 
The interests of anyone who can experience anything were discussed above in reference to 
quality of life.  While it seems reasonable to suppose that PVS patients, for example, have no 
experiential interests, the description of Mr James seems to place him on a very different 
point of the sentience spectrum from patients like Anthony Bland: 
“he recognised and was pleased to see his wife and his son when they visited; kissed 
his wife when she leaned into him; looked at her when she moved round the bed; 
mouthed what appeared to be words in answer to his wife, Ms Baker and nursing 
staff; turned the pages of a newspaper, smiling while he did so, although it was not 
clear to the doctor whether he was actually reading any of the articles or looking at the 
pictures; put on and took off his glasses while doing so; and appeared to enjoy 
watching videos on his son’s phone.”
557
     
Firstly, the description of Mr James as someone who was responsive, and had apparent 
enjoyment of visitors, leads to a query regarding the lack of discussion in any of the 
judgments to ascertain Mr James’ current views.  Also lacking is a discussion of the form of 
his incompetence: is it in terms of his cognitive abilities, his ability to communicate, his 
having values?  Obviously, Mr James’ case would have been treated very differently if there 
were questions over his competence.  If he could mouth words, put glasses on, and watch 
videos, surely some effort should have been made to ask him if he was in pain, or discomfort, 
did he mind being dependent, or even if he was happy.  Perhaps some form of effort was 
made to ascertain Mr James’ views, but if so, it is not documented.  Under s 4 of the MCA it 
is required so far as it is “reasonably practicable” for the substitute decision-maker to permit 
and encourage the person to participate in the decision-making process.  Perhaps it was not 
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possible with Mr James, but any attempts to do so should have been documented and any 
information gathered should have been utilised as appropriate.
558
   
Mr James’ condition did deteriorate between hearings, so the Court of Appeal was 
considering a patient who was much closer to a MCS label.  However, his inferred-specific 
view for treatment to continue, which Chapter Five discussed as a reasonably safe summation 
of what he would have wanted at T2 if asked at T1, was found to be subject to other 
considerations.  In the Court of Appeal, Sir Alan Ward separated patients’ views from the 
best medical interests that they may have, and went on to conclude: 
“The harsh reality, so harsh that it was understandably impossible for the family to 
accept it, was that his position was hopeless.  His wishes, if they were to be the 
product of full informed thought, would have to recognise the futility of treatment, 
that treatment would be extremely burdensome to endure, and that he would never 
recover enough to go home.  All this would be extremely distressing for his family.  
One is driven to conclude that his wish to survive was unattainable.  Miracles may 
happen but on the facts of this case the probabilities were overwhelming against a 
miracle happening in this case.  We had to act on the real possibilities not those which 
were fanciful.  In the overall assessment, therefore, of where his best interests lie, I 




Effectively, Sir Alan Ward found that his wishes would have to include the realisation that 
further treatment would not mean his recovery, and therefore should give way to his best 
medical interests.  It is, of course, entirely correct that any views of Mr James were part of 
the assessment of his best interests and not an overriding factor under the MCA.  However, 
Sir Alan Ward presumed that the objective medical situation should be seen as a part of what 
Mr James would want or should take into account, when trying to frame a view of what his 
prior views would have considered.  Is this a step too far?   As evaluated in Chapter Five, his 
inferred-specific view, based on what his family said, and a previously difficult health battle, 
favoured continued treatment. Should Sir Alan Ward have imbued this view with a 
reasonable person’s evaluation of the situation?  Do prior views include consideration of 
what the person should have considered?  This appears contrary to the purpose of any 
consideration of what the patient’s prior views were if they are then subjected to what any 
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reasonable person would conclude.  And Sir Alan Ward seems to acknowledge this, as he 
does accede that the prior views are “giving way” to his medical interests.   
Therefore, it could be argued that Sir Alan Ward did not properly apply the prior views when 
he considered the factors that Mr James would consider if he was able to do so, and in doing 
so emphasised the “harsh reality” that “his position was hopeless”.  He failed to discuss, or 
give weight to, Mr James’ previously held wishes, beliefs and feelings that all pointed to 
further provision of treatment.  It is also possible that Sir Alan Ward considered sufficient 
reasons why the previous ‘fight for life’ approach was reasonable, and perhaps why a 
reasonable person would abandon this fight when it was not for life, as life post cancer was 
diametrically opposed to that of a life in a MCS.  Because Mr James’ two situations were 
relevantly different this could justify Sir Alan Ward’s approach.  According to the proposal 
advanced in Chapter Five it should not be straightforwardly assumed that the wishes 
expressed in S1 (prior battle with cancer) should be applied in S2 (current MCS).  However, 
the basis for this should be any information gathered from Mr James.  Any reference to what 
the reasonable person would have wanted, as discussed in Chapter Six, should be treated with 
caution.   
In the same court, Arden LJ stated that her approach to assess best interests started with Mr 
James’ wishes, as required under the MCA.  Arden LJ inferred from Mr James’ current state 
– that he showed signs of happiness when he saw his family – that his present wishes would 
favour continuation of treatment.
560
  She also discussed his prior attitude to a distressing 
diagnosis:  
“DJ has approached life-threatening illness before with enormous courage and 
determination.  He has the great advantage of a devoted family and much to live for in 
that regard.  The inference which I draw from the evidence is that he would wish his 
life to be saved by all reasonable means, and that he would not be concerned by 
reduced enjoyment of life due to disability or by being in a state of complete 
dependence on others.”
561
   
After clearly setting out the starting point under the MCA as Mr James’ prior views, she 
decided that: 
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“Acting with humanity, and with respect for DJ’s autonomy, I consider in the light of 
DJ’s medical condition, his wishes would be unlikely to be to have the treatment of 
the kind in issue here, and that a reasonable individual in the light of current scientific 
knowledge would reject it.”
562
 
Arden LJ takes a different approach to her colleague regarding the question of how the prior 
views should be weighted, and instead of deciding that they can be outweighed by other 
interests (and aligning with Sir Alan Ward’s judgment) she decided that no reasonable person 
could have such a view.  In her estimation, Mr James’ prior views informed her judgment, 
but instead of this being in conflict with Mr James’ medical interests, which Sir Alan Ward 
found, she has inferred it to be what Mr James would want as a reasonable person.   
Despite the preponderance of clauses under the MCA which have regard to the patient’s prior 
wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, the Court of Appeal appears to have disregarded the 
intent of the legalisation and although they considered the prior wishes, these were not 
deemed sufficiently reasonable or rational to rule in favour of continued treatment.  If this 
case had stopped with the Court of Appeal, the best interests test outlined under the MCA and 
applied by the judiciary would have been very murky; reduced by Arden LJ to what the 
reasonable person would want regardless of their current or previously expressed wishes, and 
according to Sir Alan Ward reliant on medical interests that may overrule what a particular 
person may want.   
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Vice President, Lady Hale, handed down the judgment 
on behalf of all five judges.  The judgment was critical of the way that the Court of Appeal 
used Mr James’ prior views, and said that the best interests test was not to be interpreted 
objectively as they had done, but instead: 
“The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of 
view.  That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully 
capable patient must prevail.  We cannot always have what we want.  Nor will it 
always be possible to ascertain what an incapable patient’s wishes are.  Even if it is 
possible to determine what his views were in the past, they might well have changed 
in the light of the stresses and strains of his current predicament.  In this case, the 
highest it could be put was, as counsel had agreed, that “It was likely that Mr James 
would want treatment up to the point where it became hopeless”.  But insofar as it is 
possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the 
things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into account 
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Lady Hale’s judgment is a significant one for assessing the best interests of incompetent 
patients, not only because it was the first Supreme Court case to consider the MCA, but also 
because it sets the parameters.  Her judgment does three very important things: (1) notes that 
the best interests test is person-specific, but does not signify that their wishes should prevail; 
(2) acknowledges that prior views may not always be possible to ascertain and even if they 
are identified they may not apply to the current circumstances (this aligns with the proposal 
from Chapter Five); (3) emphasises the importance of the person’s previous self, their values 
and their prior self and other-regarding interests (effectively ss 6 (b) and (c) MCA), which 
provides a hierarchy for judges to consider when trying to weigh up the patient’s best 
interests.  Despite a clear hierarchy, it does not necessarily follow that the weighting of the 
prior views and how they fit with other interests is straight-forward.   
Although James was the first case to be considered under the MCA regarding future 
provision of treatment, it was not the first case to consider the best interests standard in the 
Court of Protection.  In the Matter of G (TJ) was considered in 2010, in reference to property 
and affairs, which, under the Act, are subject the same standard of best interests under s (1) 
5.
564
  Because the same provisions apply, it is useful to consider what other cases have 
discussed.  Morgan J summarised three other cases
565
 that had considered the best interests 
test under the MCA for various reasons, concluding: 
“The best interests test involves identifying a number of relevant factors.  The actual 
wishes of P can be a relevant factor: section 4(6)(a) says so.  The beliefs and values 
which would be likely to influence P’s decision, if he had capacity to make the 
relevant decision, are a relevant factor: section 4(6)(b) says so. The other factors 
which P would be likely to consider, if he had the capacity to consider them, are a 
relevant factor: section 4(6)(c) says so.  Accordingly, the balance sheet of factors 
which P would draw up, if he had capacity to make the decision, is a relevant factor 
for the court’s decision.”
566
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Tellingly for the subject of this thesis, there was disagreement amongst these cases as to the 
importance that the prior views has in this “balance sheet” approach of the best interests test.  
In Re S, Marshall J gave great weight to the person’s wishes: 
“The Act does not of course say that P’s wishes are to be paramount, nor does it lay 
down any express presumption in favour of implementing them if they can be 
ascertained.  Indeed the paramount objective is that of P’s best interests.  However, by 
giving such prominence to the above matters, the Act does in my judgment recognise 
that having his views and wishes taken into account and respected is a very significant 
aspect of P’s best interests.  Due regard should therefore be paid … when doing the 




Although Morgan J concluded that Marshall J had “slightly overstated the importance given 
to P’s wishes”,
568
 he decided that in the particular case before him, Mrs G’s prior wishes 
would define her best interests: 
“I recognise that this consideration is essentially a “substituted judgment” for Mrs G.  
I am also very aware that the test laid down by the 2005 Act is the test of best 
interests and not of substituted judgment. However, for the reasons which I have tried 
to set out earlier, the test of best interests does not exclude respect for what would 
have been the wishes of Mrs G.  A substituted judgment can be subsumed into the 
consideration of best interests.  Accordingly, in this case, respect for what would have 
been Mrs G’s wishes will define what is in her best interests, in the absence of any 
countervailing factors.  There are no such countervailing factors here.”
569
 
It is interesting that, despite referring to many other cases, Lady Hale did not discuss other 
cases that have dealt specifically with the provision of best interests under the MCA.  Does 
this mean that there is a significant difference in assessing the current views of an adult 
lacking capacity under the MCA, and the prior views of a permanently incompetent adult?   
In Re M, Munby J stated that the weight attached to the incapacitated person’s wishes is 
issue-specific:  
“the weight to be attached to P’s wishes and feelings will always be case-specific and 
fact-specific.  In some cases, in some situations, they may carry much, even, on 
occasions, preponderant, weight.  In other cases, in other situations, and even where 
the circumstances may have some superficial similarity, they may carry very little 
weight.  One cannot, as it were, attribute any particular a priori weight or importance 
to P’s wishes and feelings; it all depends, it must depend, upon the individual 
circumstances of the particular case.  And even if one is dealing with a particular 
individual, the weight to be attached to their wishes and feelings must depend upon 
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the particular context; in relation to one topic P’s wishes and feelings may carry great 
weight whilst at the same time carrying much less weight in relation to another topic.  
Just as the test of incapacity under the 2005 Act is, as under the common law, ‘issue 
specific’, so in a similar way the weight to be attached to P’s wishes and feelings will 
likewise be issue specific.”
570
     
Section 4 of the MCA states that current and prior wishes should be considered.  Where 
possible, current views should be ascertained, so in a case with facts similar to Re M, 
although the person lacks capacity, they may still be able to express some views, unlike 
David James in James.  But the MCA does not differentiate between these views; they must 
all be considered; s 4 (4) encourages as much participation as possible and, under s 4 (6), the 
substitute decision-maker must consider the person’s past wishes and feelings.  Therefore, 
although James is seen as the landmark case for best interests under the MCA, the extent to 
which the permanently incompetent’s previous self can be utilised under the Act it is yet to be 
resolved.  Munby J’s discussion of P’s wishes and feelings indicates that the weighting given 
to wishes is “case, fact and issue-specific” and is not to be given priority weighting over other 
considerations for the incapacitated person’s best interests.  Of course, in James, the wishes 
that should be considered deal with a very serious issue – whether or not future life-
prolonging treatment should be provided.  This is not the same level of decision-making as 
deciding what kind of sandwich he would prefer to eat (to give an example used by Lady 
Hale), but these two extremes are both subjected to the same best interests test under the 
MCA.
571
  There is little doubt that a person’s wishes regarding end-of-life treatment should 
be subjected to considerably more intense scrutiny than their sandwich preferences.   
Non-Experiential 
In cases involving PVS patients, there are no experiential interests that could contrast with 
any prior views.  In the case of Bland, there was also no safe inference as to what his prior 
views would be.  In this instance, if wanting to attribute him with a view, there are two 
options: presume he would not want treatment continued, or presume that he would.   
“Thus it seems to me that we are faced with conflicting ethical principles.  On the one 
hand, Anthony Bland is alive and the principle of the sanctity of life says that we 
should not deliberately allow him to die.  On the other hand, Anthony Bland is an 
individual human being and the principle of self-determination says he should be 
allowed to choose for himself and that, if he is unable to express his choice, we should 
try our honest best to do what we think he would have chosen.  We cannot disclaim 
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this choice because to go on is as much a choice as to stop.  Normally we would 
unquestioningly assume that anyone would wish to live rather than die.  But in the 
extraordinary case of Anthony Bland, we think it more likely that he would choose to 
put an end to the humiliation of his being and the distress of his family.  Finally, 
Anthony Bland is a person to whom respect is owed and we think that it would show 




This is in contrast to the approach in American courts.   
“The essential point here is that in America the courts have so far taken it for granted 
that life-support must be continued, unless there is evidence indicating that the patient 
would not have wished to be kept alive in the circumstances in which she now is.  In 
contrast, the British courts were quite untroubled by the absence of any information 
about what Bland’s wishes might have been.”
573
 
The general observation to be made here is that the starting point for these two positions are 
diametrically opposite.  Where there is an information void, what interests should count? 
In Chapter Six consideration was given to various implications of narrowly applying the best 
interests test.  One approach outlined was that of Lord Mustill in Bland who appeared to 
equate a lack of personhood with a lack of any interests.  Buchanan and Brock give an 
account which differs from Lords Mustill and Keith in one vital respect: they do not equate a 
lack of experiential interests with a lack of any interests: 
“It is nevertheless true that the permanently unconscious individual as such, that is, 
simply by virtue of his present condition of permanent unconsciousness, has no 
interests.  Whether or not a permanently unconscious individual has interests in virtue 
of having previously been conscious is a different matter and will depend upon what 
the individual’s values were when he or she was conscious.”
574
 
The interests that a permanently incompetent person may have, in their account, depend on 
those that they had when they were conscious.  For example, a person can have future-
orientated interests (they use the example of a religious view to have treatment continued for 
as long as possible).
575
  The contention that prior consciousness transfers into interests, 
effectively means that no young children could have any interests, since they could not have 
developed a sense of values yet.  They go on to argue that the best interests principle cannot 
be applied to those in a PVS: 
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“The best interest principle, however is a principle that expresses a positive 
obligation, a duty to do what best promotes someone’s interests or is most conducive 
to his or her good.  As such, the best interest principle does not apply to beings who 
permanently lack the capacity for consciousness and whose good can never matter to 
them, and this includes human beings who are in a permanent vegetative state.”
576
 
However, this is not how the legal test works.  As explained in Chapters Two and Four, best 
interests does not start from a neutral position; the default is that everyone has the right to 
refuse treatment, or not to be treated without consent.  Therefore, in law, best interests is a 
threshold test, to determine whether treatment can be justified, and according to most of the 
judges in Bland, this threshold was not met.   
In the Scottish case of Law Hospital, concerning withdrawal of treatment from Mrs Johnson 
who had been in a PVS for three years, Lord President Hope and Lord Milligan also agreed 
with the approach taken in Bland: 
“If it is possible to say that it can be of any benefit to her, then no doubt there is a 
balancing exercise to be done in order to assess whether it is in her best interests that 
the treatment should be discontinued.  But if it cannot be of any benefit to her – and it 
is her benefit alone which must be considered in order to decide how the jurisdiction 
is to be exercised in the light of the medical evidence – then there are no longer any 
best interests to be served by continuing it.  I agree with Lord Milligan that this is to 
view the question of best interests negatively.”
577
 
However, although there can be no medical benefit to Mrs Johnson, does this actually leave a 
conclusion that there are no interests that can be balanced?  Most characterisations of the 
interests that patients have, even in PVS, acknowledge a wider view: 
“… on this there is no dispute – that best interests go wider than medical interests and 
include religious views, the views of the family and, so far as they can be ascertained, 
what would be the views of Mr A himself.”
578
 
Balanced against all the possible interests that someone in a PVS may have, is the implicitly 
employed notion that they would not want to live in such a state.  This was shown in Bland.  
There has not been a case where someone clearly expressed a prior view to be kept alive in a 
PVS, but Leslie Burke did strongly express a wish for treatment to continue, knowing that he 
would be unable to communicate this wish in the future, when his degenerative condition 
progressed.
579
  In Burke, the courts still found that there was no onus to continue such 
treatment.  Perhaps one explanation is that the courts sought to avoid the consequences of the 
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hierarchy (clear prior views wanting continued treatment) by distinguishing differences at a 
lower level (not all competent adults can demand treatment).
580
  
What does the comparison here portray?  To some extent it can be argued that it shows how 
implicitly the idea of the reasonable view is imbued into the consideration of a patient’s prior 
views.  Perhaps there is even an argument that the family’s own view on what their loved one 
would want reflects not the individual’s actual thoughts, but instead a wider social norm.  In 
Chapter Five it was suggested that a conflation of the strength of evidence with the relevance 
of that evidence relating to the person’s individual values and beliefs.  This raises an 
important question: even if we know what someone did think individually, should the norms 
of society still be taken into account?  Should the proposal ascertaining veracity of the 
person’s views, as outlined in Chapter Five, be further qualified by linking it to an appraisal 
of how this view conforms to wider norms?  If so, to some extent this speculation would be 
congruent with Veitch’s speculations regarding autonomy, that despite what they say they are 
doing, courts are much more likely to find a patient to be competent if they are making a 
choice that seems, to the court, to be reasonable.
581
  This may also be true of best interests 
decisions.  The courts may be more willing to accept evidence of prior views, and value those 
views, where the views seem ‘reasonable’, but will be much more likely to be sceptical of 
those that they see as unreasonable.  If this thesis has demonstrated this – or even shown that 
it is possible – then it is a conflation of a subjective “what did this person want?” test, and an 
objective “what would a reasonable person want?” test.  Sometimes this may be appropriate 
where there is a void of information, as exemplified in the Bland case.  But the courts did not 
actually acknowledge that this is what they doing – instead they said it was likely that 
Anthony Bland would not have wanted treatment continued, and did not link this to 
reasonableness.  By comparison, in James there was reasonably good evidence of his prior 
views, but this contrasted with what was deemed a ‘reasonable’ view.  Therefore, the Court 
of Appeal (though not the Supreme Court) used reasonableness as a way to justify 
discontinuation of Mr James’ treatment. 
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Chapter Three advanced a position for acknowledging other-regarding interests, and further 
advocated that these can be attributed to individuals without any prior competence, or values, 
or awareness.  The following section will discuss how other-regarding interests can be 
applicable in cases of previous competency, and then consideration will be given to the more 
contentious claim that those without previous competence can also have other-regarding 
interests. 
Other-Regarding Interests of the Previously Competent 
As demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, there were varied opinions in Bland as to what 
interests Anthony Bland had, and not surprisingly the judge who found that Anthony Bland 
did not have any interests could not conceive of any wider conception of interests:  
“But it seems to me to be stretching the concept of personal rights beyond breaking 
point to say that Anthony Bland has an interest in ending these sources of others’ 
distress.  Unlike the conscious patient he does not know what is happening to his 




Other judges disagreed, and some discussed these other-regarding interests.  Thomas 
Bingham MR, Butler-Sloss and Hoffmann LJJ all found that Anthony Bland had interests in 
the way that his family would remember him.  As canvassed in Chapter Three, this can be 
interpreted in two ways: a self-regarding interest in how you are remembered, for your own 
sake, or an other-regarding interest in not wanting to be a burden on your whānau, such that 
they may then remember you in such a dependent state:  
“An objective assessment of Mr. Bland’s best interests, viewed through his eyes, 
would in my opinion give weight to the constant invasions and humiliations to which 
his inert body is subject; to the desire he would naturally have to be remembered as a 
cheerful, carefree, gregarious teenager and not an object of pity; to the prolonged 
ordeal imposed on all members of his family, but particularly on his parents; even, 
perhaps, if altruism still lives, to a belief that finite resources are better devoted to 
enhancing life than simply averting death.”
583
 
If a person has interests by virtue of being previously competent, for example the interest in 
having their prior self’s views robustly assessed, it follows that an integral part of their prior 
self is an interactive person with connections of numerous kinds with many people.  When a 
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loved one is in a condition such as PVS it is undoubtedly the whānau who are suffering more 
than the patient.  If the reasonable patient view is able to inform what the prior view of the 
patient may have been, surely it can be also used to identify that most patients would view 
their family’s suffering as an interest they cared about.  Again, the family is both a source of 
information and, where the patient has no experiential interests, the most affected by the 
grievous situation that the patient is in.  As such this thesis advocates that any sophisticated 
account of interests should consider the interests that the patient would have for their whānau.  
This is also applicable to a parent’s view for their child, and this aspect is discussed in the 
next section.   
Another difficulty with the argument that a person in PVS has no interests is the question of 
why it would therefore matter what happens to them.  Does it not follow that they can then be 
used as a ‘sideboard’?
584
  It is doubtful that Lord Mustill would have agreed with this 
rationale, but why not?  It is because society still maintains that patients in a PVS (or 
similarly vulnerable) should still be respected and that they are deserving of dignity.  This 
illustrates two important points.  The first is that there is a wider conception of interests; if 
society maintains that we should respect those in a PVS it is because we would want the same 
kind of respect.  Therefore an objectively applied interest in dignity and respect is allotted to 
everyone.  The second point is that societal values are implicitly invoked through concepts 
such as dignity.  Why do the judges not discuss such things as communitarian values?  If a 
person in a PVS is attributed with an interest in altruism, this then opens the door to difficult 
resource allocation discussions.  As already discussed in the above section, this is done 
implicitly when making quality of life judgments.   
“Threaded through the technical arguments addressed to the House were the strands 
of a much wider position, that it is in the best interests of the community at large that 
Anthony Bland’s life should now end.  … In social terms it has great force, and it will 
have to be faced in the end.  But this is not a task which the courts can possibly 
undertake.  A social cost-benefit analysis of this kind, which would have to embrace 
‘mercy killing’ to which exactly the same considerations apply, must be for 
Parliament alone, and the outcome of it is at present quite impossible to foresee.  Until 
the nettle is grasped, we must struggle on with the existing law, imperfect as it is.”
585
 
Consider, also, the problematic use of an objective interest in bodily integrity by Robert 
Walker LJ in Re A. Judges cannot unilaterally decide which notional ‘objective interests’ 
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should apply; presumably they have to relate objective interests to genuinely commonly 
shared values and notions.   
Other-Regarding Interests of the Not Previously 
Competent 
If the previously competent patient can have other-regarding interests, the next question is 
whether someone who has never been competent can also have other-regarding interests.  
Crouch and Elliott’s investigation into the interests of siblings is pertinent here.  In their 
article they looked at three American court cases which had allowed kidney transplants 
between minors (or mentally incompetent) siblings.  They found that, in all three cases, the 
courts based the decision on the “psychological benefits” that the donor sibling would 
experience, and determined that donating would, therefore, be in their best interests.  Yet, as 
they point out, these nebulous benefits surely cannot be outweighed by other, more serious 
(and more likely) harms that are associated with kidney transplantation.
586
  An English case, 
Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) is another example of using self-
regarding interests rather than the other-regarding interests that may have applied.  Y 
(described as severely mentally handicapped) was able to be a bone marrow donor for her 
sister.  The courts justified the decision on the basis that Y’s best interests were bound up 
with the welfare of her mother, who visited her regularly, which in turn was connected to the 
survival of Y’s sister.
587
   
One reason for this convoluted reasoning, suggested by Crouch and Elliott is that: 
“the courts may have had in mind a picture of moral agency that identifies the agent’s 
interests with self-interests, narrowly construed.”
588
   
Therefore, because the justification of the operation had to be in the best interests of the 
donor, and those interests were interpreted narrowly as self-regarding interests, the courts had 
to find a way that allowed the operation because they implicitly realised that the donor’s 
interests were intimately tied up with the interests of the families.
589
  Crouch and Elliott argue 
for a more transparent application of the best interests standard, one that recognises that the 
interests of another family member (or members) benefit more than the donor’s own. 
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“To attempt to cram a formal relation into an intimate context does violence to the 
morally significant aspects of the family relationship.”
590
 
Compare this to Robert Walker LJ’s approach to the best interests standard, when he used it 
to find that the operation would be in Mary’s best interests (though it would inevitably end in 
her death).  All of the interests that he attributed to her were self-regarding – an interest in 
continued living, an interest in bodily integrity and an interest in dignity.  As already 
discussed, the basis for these interests was perhaps disingenuous.  Would consideration of 
other-regarding interests similar to that argued by Taylor-Sands, Crouch and Elliott have 
helped the analysis in Re A?    
In Chapter Three Taylor-Sands’ argument that a child has “collective interests” by virtue of 
being part of the family unit was discussed.
591
  This stake (as discussed in relation to saviour 
siblings) was predicated on the benefit for the family unit in the future.  Although this was 
termed a “collective interest”, framed in this way it is essentially a self-regarding interest in 
their future life as a family member.  But, in end-of-life cases there is no self-regarding 
interest based on a future stake, because these infants are overwhelmingly likely never to  
grow up to be a stakeholder in the family.  Does this then preclude an other-regarding interest 
in family members?   Part of the reasoning from Taylor-Sands for saviour siblings having 
collective interests, was that merely by being part of a family this meant that you had a stake 
in it, a stake in something other than yourself.  This is an other-regarding interest.  The 
conjoined twins could be said to have such a stake in the family (an interest that could be 
considered self-regarding or other regarding) and each other (an other-regarding interest).  
The problematic part of applying her argument is the next step whereby part of the reason for 
having a stake in your family is that you are going to benefit from it.  Assuming that both 
twins have other-regarding interests, one of which could be deemed a familial duty to their 
twin that they survive also, should this argument apply?   Could it be argued that Mary had an 
interest in Jodie’s continued survival due to their familial ties?   If the medical advice is 
accepted (that both will die if they are not separated) then perhaps it is possible to say that 
Mary had an other-regarding interest in giving her sister an increased chance at life.  This 
would be even stronger in the Nolan case, as death for both was imminent.   
                                                          
590
 Ibid at 285. 
591




The child, in end-of-life circumstances, does not have a stake in the future of the family, but 
they will always be part of that family.  If we accept that everyone has an objective interest in 
such things as dignity, then this is also an interest that should be considered.  This is not in 
spite of their emotional connectedness, but it arises because of the closeness of the 
relationship.  Taylor-Sands’ and other accounts of other-regarding interests generally 
distinguish between the individual’s own interests and the interests they may have for others, 
concluding that the other-regarding interests are a secondary consideration.
592
  These interests 
exist in addition to self-regarding interests, not instead of them.  Does this exclude Mary, as 
she can only benefit from the family if she is attached to Jodie?  If separated, Mary will never 
experience life in the family and identify with that family.  Conversely, the family (parents, 
Jodie and others) will be able to make Mary and her short life a part of their family story.   
Essentially, assessment of the best interests of Mary were tied to views on whether she could 
continue living, and what quality of life she would have if she did live.  Although she may 
have been attributed with other-regarding interests, such as an interest in letting her twin live, 
it would be hard to debate that this could outweigh her own interests.  But, I argue, it still 
should have been considered explicitly not implicitly, as the judges were doing in these cases. 
Summary of Chapter Seven 
The conflicting and confluent nature of interests is why the balancing, weighting, and 
attribution of interests to an incompetent patient is so difficult.  Judges have used various 
means of evaluating interests, with inconsistent results.   
The inter-personal and intra-personal clashes identified in this chapter were discussed in 
relation to two instances.  The first intra-personal conflict that I discussed, between sanctity 
and quality of life as shown by Re A, found that there has been an implicit application of 
quality of life assessments.  Further exploration showed that evidence of sentience was a 
deciding factor in the continuation of treatment.  Cases where this was evident resulted in 
continued treatment, where the patient was not suffering.  Dignity and bodily integrity were 
distinguished from each other as dignity is an objective interest, something that is harder to 
argue for bodily integrity.   
                                                          
592




The second intra-personal clash between prior views and other interests (experiential and 
non-experiential) demonstrated a range of approaches to incorporating the patient’s prior self.  
One way that this manifested was in the Court of Appeal decision of James, where the 
patient’s medical interests and the view of a reasonable person outweighed Mr James’ prior 
view (argued in Chapter Five to be in favour of continued treatment).  The Supreme Court 
were critical of the Court of Appeal’s lack of consideration for the individual.  However, they 
left open the issue of whether the best interests test under the MCA can be used as a 
substituted judgment test as was done in In the Matter of G (TJ) in relation to property (but 
subject to the same test under the Act).  If the approach of substituted judgment rather than 
best interests is used, it effectively changes the guidance principle used to make decisions on 
behalf of incompetent patients.  The respect for, and inclusion of, prior views into the 
decision-making process should be clearly stated as upholding of precedent autonomy.  The 
reasonable person criterion has also been discussed, and, in an information void, where the 
legal test is a threshold for continued treatment, was found to be a useful consideration if 
used cautiously.   
Parental views and the child’s interests can sometimes represent an inter-personal clash.  Two 
cases, Re A and NHS Trust v A, have been highlighted since the decision by the courts 
overruled the parents’ view of their children’s best interests.  This chapter argued that, in 
such cases the question should be whether the parents were making a decision in their child’s 
best interests, rather than the courts being an independent decision-maker where the parental 
view is just another factor to be weighed into the best interests test.  This is predicated on the 
position that the parental stake is one that has been undervalued, and that this stake is one that 
could be an other-regarding interest of the child.   
A particularly difficult (but rare) example of an inter-personal conflict is that of conjoined 
twins.  A fundamental question – whether the proposed action is in the best interests of the 
child – is obviously exacerbated when there are two children, and one is sustaining the life of 
the other.  The judges could not agree on this issue, two finding that separation was in both 
twins’ best interests, and two finding that it was only in the stronger twin’s best interests.  
The reasons for these views varied also, and concepts such as bodily integrity were 
considered to be both experiential and non-experiential.   
Other-regarding interests are an important consideration of the interests of the incompetent 




account of interests, was developed.  Other-regarding interests depend heavily upon whether 
the patient had the opportunity to develop these.  The patient with other-regarding interests, 
who has had an independent self, with the ability to decide on their own relationships, has 
been able to engage and develop these interests.  For those patients who have never been 
competent, the notion of objectively attributing them with other-regarding interests is more 
controversial.  Taylor-Sands’ and Crouch and Elliott’s approaches show that awareness is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for other-regarding interests.  The difficulty lies in the connection 
between their contentions, which include a future stake in the families that they are 
attributing with these interests, and the incompetent patients in end-of-life cases who will 
(probably) never have this future.  The view is hereby advanced that other-regarding interests 
should be attributed to all groups of incompetent patients; however extra care should be taken 
with the assignment of these types of interests, including the proviso that they are secondary 






“[T]he enhanced biological knowledge and technological sk ill have served to 
make our dying all the more problematic: harder to predict, more difficult to 
manage, the source of more moral dilemmas and nasty choices, and spiritually 
more productive of anguish, ambivalence and uncertainty” 593 
Deciding the best interests of incompetent patients is an extremely difficult undertaking.  But, 
at various times, these tough decisions are the judges’ duty to rule upon.  These are decisions 
which can, and do, have life and death consequences.  In the introduction to this thesis it was 
stated that in no way was the intention to minimise the challenges that all of these judges 
have faced (and will continue to face).  This is one reason why the focus has been on the 
reasoning of the decisions, not the decisions that were made (although similar to assessments 
of competence it is difficult to always separate the decision from the reasons it is based on).  
More importantly, the purpose for this focus has been to contribute to the understanding of 
how the best interests test is used when making decisions for incompetent patients. 
It is commonly agreed that judges making decisions for the best interests of patients do this 
by focusing on the individual.  The best interests test relates an to evaluation of the best 
interests of that patient.  Two broad questions were identified relating to how this focus was 
applied: (1) the substantive question of what interests the courts take into account; and (2) the 
epistemic question of how the substitute decision-maker can know what is in the patient’s 
best interests.  The substantive question was initially canvassed in Chapter Two, where three 
themes common to the consideration of the best interests of incompetent patients in end-of-
cases were identified.  The complex relationship between law and ethics, the multi-faceted 
features of best interests, and the inadequacy of existing law, demonstrated that the decisions 
in these difficult cases are made using a myriad of concepts, which often results in similar 
outcomes being based on different reasoning.  To answer the question of what interests the 
courts are taking into account, an exploration of interests from three different authors, 
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Dworkin, Feinberg and Sperling, was undertaken in Chapter Three.  From these accounts a 
framework for the interests of incompetent patients was constructed.  By categorising the 
different interests referred to in the cases that are analysed in this thesis, the conclusion was 
arrived at that two broad categories of interests, self-regarding and other-regarding, are useful 
to this thesis.  The definition of self-regarding interests is consideration for one’s own 
interests, which has two categories (1) experiential and (2) non-experiential.  Examples of 
interests that patients may have and that they can experience include: quality of life and an 
interest in avoiding suffering and pain.  These can apply to both adults and minors.  
Experiential denotes that the patient is sensate and aware of the interests in some way.  There 
are other self-regarding interests that can be both experiential and non-experiential, 
depending on whether the incompetent patient is sensate or not, and these include: having 
their dignity maintained, avoiding medical invasions or humiliations, and the manner of their 
dying.  Lastly, but shown to be of importance in Chapter Five, there is also the self-regarding 
interest in having your prior views at the very least considered.  Self-regarding interests gives 
us the corollary other-regarding interests, which are defined as consideration for others’ 
interests.  The others of this definition have two categories: (1) those closest to the patient, 
namely family and friends who are collectively called whānau; and (2) society as a whole, 
usually the community that the patient is living in.  There are also interests that are both self-
and other-regarding; the way that you are remembered and your whānau’s views being 
considered.  The other-regarding interests for your whānau are that they are suffering by 
seeing you suffer or undignified, and the acknowledgement of being a burden and not 
wanting to be so.  The other-regarding societal interests that you may have include not 
wanting finite resources to be used, and having communitarian interests in contributing to the 
community that you live in.   
Chapter Four explored the relationship between interests and categorised the permanently 
incompetent patient into two critical groups: those who had been previously competent and 
those who had not.  Patients who had been previously competent were further categorised 
into two groups.  (1) Patients who had expressed a view, prior to their incompetence, on what 
they wanted to happen to them if they became incompetent in the future; this view was 
further differentiated in Chapter Five as (a) an explicit-general view or (b) an explicit-specific 
view.  (2) Patients whose previously competent views were not ascertainable were further 
characterised as having a prior self that could be characterised as either (a) inferred-general or 




epistemic question – how can the decision-maker know what is in an individual’s best 
interests?  The only possible way this can be answered, in regards to the previously 
competent patient, is by considering their prior views, values and beliefs.  This was shown in 
the significance problem that was addressed – why does a prior self matter?  The answer 
provided both moral and legal justifications for the consideration of a patient’s prior self.  
These justifications noted that there are two guidance principles that a substitute decision-
maker can utilise:  best interests and substituted judgment.  Whilst some jurisdictions clearly 
provided for a substituted judgment test if prior views were known, most had a best interests 
test where the prior views were considered to be a factor in the evaluation, not an overriding 
feature.  In England and Wales, under the MCA, the prior views are considered to be part of 
the consideration for best interests, not taking priority over other considerations, yet there is 
still some confusion over the application of these views.  There is also judicial acceptance 
that a person’s prior view can be a deciding factor, although this has yet to be determined in 
relation to a terminally incompetent patient.  However, in some of the states in Australia and 
Canada, the prior wishes do take precedence.  In Ontario there is a two-tier system for the 
consideration of prior wishes.  New Zealand has no clear policy as yet.  There is the common 
law precedent of Re G which recognises that a person’s prior views can be a part of the 
consideration for their best interests, and The Code of Patient Rights requires a substitute 
decision to be made in the patient’s best interests and with regard to their views under Right 
7.  This distinction was discussed in light of various narrow approaches taken to the best 
interests test, where an objective or subjective approach is favoured, and the argument has 
been advanced in Chapter Six that a qualified-objective approach, which includes a 
previously competent patient’s prior self, where that prior self has been evaluated for the 
veracity of views, should be the broad approach used in the best interests test.   
A proposal to ascertain the veracity of views was outlined in Chapter Five as a three-part 
process.  In Investigation I the content and source of the information is required – does it fit 
within the explicit or inferred category?  Investigation II evaluates four critical judgments: 
the evidence and its reliability, the strength of the view, the relevance of the view and the 
status of the view or inference.  Investigation III is a statement as to the veracity of the view 
or inference – how safely can the substitute-maker state what the patient’s view was at their 
previously competent time?  This wording reflects the answer to the epistemic question.  
There is no way of ascertaining the patient’s current view (hence the need for intervention to 




chosen for themselves is to scrutinise the information that can be gathered from their prior 
self.    
In many of the cases examined in this thesis, the whānau were convinced that their loved one 
“would not want to be like this” and the courts accepted these views with varying degrees of 
scrutiny.
594
  This is perhaps understandable, as the views fell into line with what everyone 
wanted – the medical profession and the whānau.  Nevertheless, it is troubling that the 
evidence of the prior views, or in some cases evidence of previous selves, were not properly 
assessed for their actual relevance.  Is it because the views fall into the category of what is 
considered to be the ‘normal’ view of what the reasonable person would want – because who 
would want to be ‘alive but not living’?  The proposal for veracity set out in Chapter Five is 
an attempt to address this problem: how good is the evidence that the person would not want 
to live like this?  This raises two questions: (1) should there be an implicit assumption that 
the more the prior self reflects the individual’s views and beliefs, the better it is as evidence?  
(2) Is it the case that, even if we know what someone did think individually, the norms of 
society should still be taken into account? In assessing what the person wanted (under 
Investigation I), should the extent to which this fits in with wider norms be assessed?  The 
courts may be more willing to accept evidence of prior views and values if those views and 
values seem ‘reasonable’, but will be much more likely to be sceptical of those that they see 
as unreasonable.  Therefore, there is a conflation of a subjective “what did this person want?” 
test, and an objective “what would a reasonable person want?” test.  Sometimes that may be 
inevitable, even appropriate (where the evidence for the former is not very compelling), but is 
this being done transparently?  In Chapter Six there was a discussion of these questions, with 
a conclusion being that incorporating a reasonableness component is justified, with certain 
qualifications.   
In Chapter Seven four inter- and intra-personal clashes of interests were discussed.  The 
importance of sentience emerged from the analysis of these clashes, and this was linked to the 
discussion of personhood in Chapter Six, whereby experiential interests were identified as 
one of the narrow approaches.  This focus on experiential interests ignored non-experiential 
interests, as it seemingly aligned these with personhood.  Although it challenged the 
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conclusion in Chapter Three that there was a consensus view that incompetent patients could 
have interests, this was argued to be false.  Other-regarding interests of the patients, whilst 
suffering from what Feinberg called a linguistic difficulty, can be attributed to the patient as 
interests that they legitimately hold.
595
  It is more problematic to claim that these are 
objective interests that everyone has, regardless of being able to form these relationships 
themselves, for example in cases with minors.  Therefore although it is argued that it can be 
an objectively applied interest, it must be secondary to any primary self-regarding interests, 
such as the avoidance of suffering. 
By using all the previously outlined categories a proposal is advanced by which all of the 
interests that an incompetent person may have can be identified and then appraised.  It is 
acknowledged that this task can not be considered easy, or even that the suggestions made 
here necessarily make the task any easier.  The view arrived at as an outcome of this study is 
that the decision-making process, and how judges reached their decisions, should be more 
transparent.  Hopefully, the table of recommendations in the next section is a step towards 
achieving this objective.   
Proposal for Weighting of Interests  
The following recommendations are not intended as an all-encompassing list, but rather as a 
guideline for the kinds of considerations that are likely to arise for the patients that are 
incompetent.  By categorising the patients in the previous chapters this study has developed a 
language and deepened the understanding of all the interests that may apply, particularly for 
the prior self and the other-regarding interests which appear at various times to have been 
used superficially in judgments.   
Not every incompetent person has the same interests, but they may have some of the same 
possible interests by virtue of their condition.  Three conditions relating to sentience have 
arisen from the end-of-life cases: (1) the patient has no sentience or awareness, for example a 
patient in a PVS; (2) the patient is sensate and can experience pain and other discomforts 
such as hunger, but is also capable of positive responses such as responding to whānau; (3) 
the patient may be sensate or they may not be, and there is no way of knowing which, for 
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example patients with Guillain-Barré syndrome and some minors.  Best interests is a 
guidance principle for substitute decision-making, and this evaluative property dictates that it 
is broad and flexible, in order to properly weigh the various interests that the incompetent 
person may have.   
 
Table 2 Proposal for Weighting of Interests 
IDENTIFYING INTERESTS SELF-REGARDING OTHER-REGARDING 
Sensate, previous self 
(adults, could also include 
older children) 
    James 
    Scardoni v Hawryluck 
 
 Experiential interest 
in not suffering 
 (Non)-experiential 
interest in prior self 
taken into account 
 (Non)-experiential 
interest in manner of 
death, dignity 
 Non-experiential 
interest in way that 
you are remembered 
 Whānau having their 
views considered 
 
 Way that you are 
remembered by 
whānau 
 Whānau having their 
views considered 
 Whānau’s suffering 
 Altruistic and 
communitarian values 
Sensate, no previous self 






Services v L 
 
 Experiential interest 
in not suffering 
 Non-experiential 
interest in manner of 
death, dignity 
 Familial interests, 
strongest link 





IDENTIFYING INTERESTS SELF-REGARDING OTHER-REGARDING 
Non sensate, previous self 








interest in prior self 
taken into account 
 Non-experiential 
interest in manner of 
death, dignity 
 Non-experiential 
interest in way that 
you are remembered 
 Whānau having their 
views considered 
 
 Whānau’s suffering 
 Altruistic and 
communitarian values 
Non sensate, no previous self 
(minors, adults with life-long 
incapacity) 
 Non-experiential 
interest in dignity 
 Familial interests, 
strongest link 
probably to parents 
 
Not known if the patient is 
sensate or not, no previous 
self 
Mary in Re A 
 
 Consider all possible interests, and in most cases 
assume that the patient is sensate (as that gives rise to 
more possible interests) 
Not known if the patient is 
sensate or not, previous self 
Auckland Area 
Health Board v 
Attorney-General 
 
 Consider all possible interests, and in most cases 
assume that the patient is sensate (as that gives rise to 









Sensate With a Prior Self  
Adults, could also include older children. 
This group of patients have the most interests to consider, as they have current experiential 
interests as well as the prior self’s interests.  They have also developed other-regarding 
interests by virtue of being part of some kind of whānau.   
If someone can experience anything this must be taken into account.  In fact it should be the 
first thing to consider in any account that weighs up interests.  The importance of assessing a 
patient’s self-regarding, experiential interests has manifested in judgments in different ways.  
Examples of this include: the consideration of medical interests, only taking experiential 
interests into account, and the confusion between a best interests test that is objective or 
subjective.  Complicating the decision is that if they have experiential interests this makes 
consideration of their quality of life even more problematic.  Whilst judges have ostensibly 
not made quality of life decisions, implicitly they have as discussed with Bland, when 
statements such as “living death” were made.   
Current interests in not experiencing pain, or enjoying visits with loved ones, can clash with 
the incompetent person’s prior self.   Both a prior view and a previous self can be (and are) 
used by judges to determine ‘what the person would have wanted’.  In Chapter Five the 
importance of the veracity of these views and how this can then inform the decision-making 
process was discussed.  If the strength of view is found to be in a very safe range then this 
could perhaps override any other interests.  The best interests test would then become a 
substituted judgment test, or as argued in Chapter Six a qualified-objective test where the 
prior self is taken into account at the first stage.   
Because this patient has a prior self, all of the other interests can be referenced to that prior 
self.  However, as previously argued, this should not be done without discrimination, but 
there will undoubtedly be a wealth of information that is just not available for an infant or 
adult who has never expressed a previous self.  There can be an assessment of the 
relationships that the person did have, and currently has, with their whānau; the weight placed 




CW’s prior view was held to be strong, and the relationships with his twin brother and other 
family members would probably be considered to be so too.
596
   
As the scale developed in this thesis demonstrates, the relevance of the patients’ particular 
views, and what evidence that they are based on, is of great importance.  It is crucial how 
closely the prior views expressed are reflected in the person’s current circumstances.  As 
indicated in Part Two, this will predominantly occur in cases where the now incompetent 
patient has a condition that was diagnosed when they were competent.  While competent, 
they made either an advanced directive or had extensive advanced care planning, and their 
prior wishes pertain to their condition as closely as possible.   
Sensate With No Prior Self  
Minors, adults with life-long incapacity. 
Decisions about children who have self-regarding experiential interests are difficult because 
they have to be made using assumptions.
597
 Gathering the best clinical data possible 
regarding exactly what the child is feeling is the first step.  This is not an exact science and it 
is only possible for medical advice to give a clinical assessment which reflects this 
uncertainty.  Whilst the technology is becoming increasingly advanced (for example, being 
able to use scans to determine deliberate thought) this will not help in regards to infants’ 
making their own choices.  It could, however, help with determining the levels of pain, 
discomfort or happiness that the child is feeling.   
With this group of patients it was argued that parental interests should be considered as other-
regarding interests that they would have, independent of the non-existent future stake that 
they have in that family.  In this way, relatively greater weight should be given to parents’ 
views the more difficult the decision is.  After the child themselves, it is the parents who will 
be the most affected by the decision.  However, the child’s self-regarding experiential 
interests must factor into this and be given the most weight.
598
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Some of the cases examined in this thesis dealt with minors who were wards of the Court.  
What action should be taken in such cases?  Is there an overall state interest in protecting the 
vulnerable?  Alternatively should a more controversial model be applied whereby resources 
should factor into the decision-making?  Working from a premise that prioritises any 
experiential interests, these should be given priority over any other considerations.   
Non-Sensate With Prior Self  
Adults, could also include older children. 
The incompetent patient with a prior self has all the same considerations as a sensate patient, 
except of course for the fact that there are no current experiential interests to consider.  This 
may make the decision slightly easier in this regard as there is no potential clash of what they 
may have wanted and what it seems they may want now.   
Non-Sensate With No Prior Self  
Minors, adults with life-long incapacity. 
The child who has no experiential interests and no prior self can obviously only be assumed 
to have objective interests.  These are interests that apply to any vulnerable patient in our 
society as there are no subjective interests that they can possess.  Without a prior self or 
experiential interests it is hard to argue for an objectively applied interest in the manner of 
death, however an interest in dignity is less problematic to accept.  As already discussed, the 
interest in dignity can be both for the person themselves and for the importance placed in 
living in a society that treats its most vulnerable with respect – and an infant with no 
cognitive awareness or ability to feel surely fits within this description.  
Deciding in the Best Interests of Incompetent 
Patients 
Judges deal with extremely difficult end-of-life decisions; decisions that have been 
demonstrated in this thesis to involve a multitude of complex interactions, terminology, 
concepts, and implicitly held ideas.  The judiciary, as substitute decision-makers for 




decisions.  Added to the complexity (from the perspective of this thesis, not necessarily for 
the judges) is the fact that different jurisdictions have different interpretations of how to best 
adhere to the general application of best interests, which is very much a person-centred 
principle.  Confusion has, however, been pervasive despite the single statutory and common 
law precedent that they are working under.  Where the patient’s previously competent self is 
prioritised there are various ways in which this is upheld.  Overall, there is little consideration 
of the other-regarding interests that can be attributed to the patient; interests that in this thesis 
are held to better inform the best interests test.  To make decisions for the permanently 
incompetent patient is to traverse a complex, multi-faceted, multi-disciplined area which is 
fraught with the difficulty of ascertaining the best interests of the patients and also 
acknowledging the emotional impact on their whānau.  The difficulty that the judiciary have 
in finding a way through this mire of obstacles is understandable, but can be improved with a 
best interests test which is transparent in its approach to a wide set of interests. 
The final word is appropriately a postscript itself, as this is the tragic reality after the judges’ 
decision in most end-of-life cases: 
“Note added by the judge when approving this transcript: I have been informed that 
… the ventilation was withdrawn from both boys, at the hospital, about five days after 
this judgment.  They died and have been buried.  May they rest in peace.”
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Appendix Two: Chart Outlining Reasoning  
The following flowchart shows the justification for the inclusion of one of the five themes 
discussed in Chapter Two.  The claim is that best interests, as employed in end-of-life cases, 
frequently contain the same conclusions reached via different reasoning.   
 
 
All cases refers to the collected set of data; all the cases that fit into the prospective end-of-
life criteria from the four countries that evaluated in this thesis.
1
 
Same Case.  Many cases go to appellate courts and therefore there is more than one judge 
adjudicating on the same case.  Therefore, one case can be looked at as an example in itself 
by comparing the opinions or rulings of different judges.  The judges are discussing the same 
person’s circumstances, with the same legal question.  When analysing these cases the 
comparison is between different courts of the same jurisdiction, for example judges from the 
High Court, compared to judges from the Court of Appeal or higher appellate courts.  
Different judges are also compared from the same court – in the Court of Appeal for instance 
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there could be up to nine judges sitting on the bench.  These judgments can be compared and 
analysed with respect to the reasoning used. 
So if within these same cases, the judges have similar or the same reasoning, and reach the 
same conclusion this is not worth investigating further.  But if there are different conclusions 
with the same reasoning this raises questions.  If their reasoning is the same, how did they get 
to different conclusions?    
In the remaining cases however, they use different reasoning.  In this instance judges are 
deliberating on the same case, so there are identical facts, but they identify different issues to 
base their conclusions on.  Alternatively, they have interpreted existing law differently.  
Judges reaching the same conclusion using different reasoning is obviously not unique to 
these particular cases, however the frequency of its occurrence amongst the many cases 
analysed justifies the identification of it as a theme.  If judges reach different conclusions 
based on different reasoning this is a logical outcome, so these cases can be discarded from 
further investigation.  On the other hand if multiple judges reach the same conclusion in the 
same case, but get there via different reasoning – this points to an anomaly which is worth 
investigating further.  How can different reasoning with the same conclusion be justified?  
Bland and Re A are examples of this type of case.
2
  Under the same cases umbrella this is the 
far more common occurrence.   
On the other side of the flow chart is different cases, similar facts.  These are cases that are 
about different individuals and have different proposed or disputed actions, but have enough 
similarity factually to reasonably be compared.  Obviously any difference in the patient’s 
clinical circumstances needs to be separated from any reasoning based on these differences.  
Examples of factually similar cases are those where the patients are in a PVS, or conjoined 
twins where an operation is required to separate them.  In both instances the legal question is 
the same.  “Can we withdraw treatment from a patient in a PVS which will result in their 
death”; “can we separate conjoined twins where one will definitely die as a result of the 
operation?”.  As with same cases the cases worth investigating are those with same reasoning 
and different conclusions; as well as cases with different reasoning and same conclusions.  Re 
A illustrates this, where different reasoning was used by different appellate court judges to 
arrive at the same conclusion.  At this stage only cases that have different reasoning to get to 
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the same conclusion have been identified, so only these are examined, within the same case 
and different case scenarios.  Even though only this criterion has been fulfilled it is important 





Appendix Three: Précis of Cases 
New Zealand Case Law 
Adults 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993]3  
Doctors at Auckland Hospital, together with the Auckland Area Health Board, applied for a 
declaration clarifying whether in law they would be guilty of culpable homicide if they 
withdrew ventilator support from a 59 year old man, Mr L, suffering from Guillain-Barré 
syndrome.   
“The disease affected the nervous system of the patient by destroying the conductivity 
of the nerves between the brain and the body. The result was to leave the brain, 
though still living, entirely disengaged from the body. The patient survived in a state 
of “living death”, totally unable to move or communicate and there was no prospect 
of recovery. However, because the brain, though damaged, was not dead, the patient 
was not medically brain-stem dead pursuant to the medical definition of “death”. The 
patient had existed in that condition for 12 months. Eight specialists who had 
examined the patient and undertaken extensive testing were unanimous that the 
ventilatory support of the patient could not be medically justified.”
4
 
Thomas J issued a declaration that ss 151 and 164 of the Crimes Act 1961 would not apply if: 
doctors agreed that there was no reasonable possibility of Mr L recovering; there was no 
benefit medically or therapeutically for Mr L to remain on a ventilator and to remove it fitted 
within the medical profession’s exercise of good medical practice; and Mr L’s family agreed 
with the decision and it received approval from an ethics committee.   
Re G [1997]5 
Mr G was 69 when he was injured in a car accident, and had been in Dunedin Public Hospital 
for eighteen months when his case came before the Court.  His condition was such that he 
was totally immobile, unable to communicate at all, incontinent, and scans showed severe 
brain injury.  Every effort for rehabilitation had failed.  He was being kept alive by ANH.  All 
medical specialists agreed that withdrawal of treatment was in Mr G’s best interests.  The 
issue before the Court was: (a) should the Court use its parens patriae powers?   And, if so, 
                                                          
3
 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
4
 Ibid at 235. 
5




(b) should that consent be by way of substituted judgment or best interests?   Fraser J decided 
that: (a) parens patriae powers should be used and (b) the best interests test would be applied 
but with regard to Mr G’s likely wishes and the views of family and friends.  Although he 
also issued declaratory orders to the effect that nobody would be criminally liable for ceasing 
to treat Mr G, he only did so for the benefit of the medical staff, not because he thought they 
were needed.   
Minors 
Auckland Healthcare Services v L [1998]6 
In 1997 Baby L was born with severe neurological abnormalities and was on a ventilator in 
intensive care.  The muscles of her face were paralysed, she could not swallow, she was deaf 
and there were signs that she was developing cerebral palsy.  There were also indications that 
her condition was deteriorating.  The medical prognosis was that further treatment was futile 
and causing Baby L pain, and that it was in her best interests that treatment be withdrawn.  
Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd made an application under section 10B of the 
Guardianship Act 1968 seeking orders to put Baby L under the guardianship of the Court and 
appointing Dr Knight of the National Women’s Hospital to be the Court’s agent in respect of 
medical decisions.  Cartwright and Paterson JJ placed Baby L under the guardianship of the 
Court and found that it was in her best interests to issue orders to the effect that treatment 
could be stopped.  Therefore parens patriae jurisdiction was not used in the Baby L case 
either, the jurisdiction to consent on her behalf being clearer under the Guardianship Act 
1968.  The judges decided that Baby L’s interest in not suffering was enough to outweigh the 
presumption in favour of preservation of life.   
Hutt District Health Board v B [2011]7 
B was seven years old with a terminal genetic condition (the specifics were redacted from the 
judgment).  He received almost all of his dietary needs from a PEG tube which had become 
dislodged four days previously.  The unanimous clinical view, which was shared by B’s 
mother, was that it should not be re-inserted.  An urgent court hearing was then held four 
days later to seek a declaration that the health professionals, acting on the decision of B’s 
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 Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd v L [1998] NZFLR 998. 
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mother, would have a lawful excuse under ss 151 and 164 of the Crimes Act 1964.  Mallon J 
decided that it would not be in B’s best interests for the tube to be re-inserted, and that this 
would fit within the scope of good medical practice.  Although there was some discussion 
regarding the necessity for declaratory orders, reliance on precedent being put forward as 
sufficient, it was deemed prudent for a range of reasons.  These were: the child’s age, that the 
father’s views could not be ascertained, B’s death was not going to be immediate (perhaps 
months) and that there was unanimity amongst all parties.   
Australia Case Law 
Adults 
Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Board [2000]8 
Northridge was the first case in Australia to deal with an incompetent patient and withdrawal 
of ANH.  The judgment was written following an emergency application for orders in the 
Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction.  John Thompson, 37 years old, was admitted to Royal 
Alfred Hospital in March 2000 following cardiac arrest brought on by an overdose (probably 
of heroin).  Within four days the hospital had labelled him DNR and stopped his nastogastric 
feeding and ceased administering him antibiotics.  This was despite his family’s objections to 
these measures being taken.  Ten days after he was admitted Mr Thompson’s sister applied to 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales to get treatment to re-instated.  An order was issued 
by the Court using its parens patriae jurisdiction that Mr Thompson should continue to be 




Re BWV; Ex parte Gardner [2003]10 
BWV was 68 and suffered from severe dementia, probably Pick’s disease, and was being 
kept alive by being fed via a PEG tube.  For at least two years her husband had tried to get 
doctors to withdraw her PEG tube; he finally approached the Public Advocate of Victoria and 
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 Northridge v Central Sydney Service [2000] NSWSC 1241. 
9
 Interestingly it seems that Mr Thompson made an “almost complete recovery” according to this online source: 
Alex Perrottet "Turning Off to Life Support "www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2751 2004.   
10




they were appointed BWV’s guardian and filed a motion on her behalf.  The court ruled that 
the PEG tube could be removed.
11
 
Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] 12 
Mr Messiha was in a deep coma as a result of an asystolic cardiac arrest which deprived him 
of oxygen for at least twenty five minutes.  His treating doctor wanted to withdraw Mr 
Messiha from ventilator support and treat him with palliative care as she had concluded that 
there would no improvement in his condition.  Similar to Northridge the family disagreed 
with the withdrawal of treatment, but unlike that case the judge, Howie J, found that there 
was no evidence to suggest any prospect of recovery in the condition of Mr Messiha.
13
  The 
decision was made that the treatment was burdensome and therefore Howie J declined to 
exercise the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to protect Mr Messiha.   
Minors 
Queensland v Alyssa Grace Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) 
and Bethany Rose Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) [2001]14  
Alyssa and Bethany Nolan were born on 3 May 2001.  They were conjoined craniopagus 
twins (joined at the head).  Alyssa only had one kidney whereas Bethany did not have any 
kidneys or a bladder.  Although the medical carers were hopeful of waiting some months 
before trying to separate them, Bethany’s rapid deterioration of health prevented this.  Three 
weeks after they were born the prognosis was that Bethany would die imminently, which 
would lead to the death of her sister soon after.  The only medical option to try to prevent 
Alyssa’s death was an operation to separate the girls; Bethany had a 100% chance of dying 
from this procedure, whereas Alyssa’s chances of death were rated as 60-80%.
15
  The State of 
Queensland applied to the court for an order permitting the urgently required operation that 
would give Alyssa a chance for life but would result in Bethany’s death.
16
  The operation was 
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 Michael A Ashby and Danuta Mendelson "Gardner;  re BWV:  Victorian Supreme Court makes Landmark 
Australian Ruling on Tube Feeding" (2004) 181 (8) MJA 442. 
12
 Isaac Messiha (by his Tutor Magby Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061. 
13
 Ibid at 4. 
14
 Queensland v Alyssa Grace Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) and Bethany Rose 
Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) (2001) QSC 174; [2001] 122 ACR 517. 
15
 Ibid at [8] per Chesterman J. 
16
 Interestingly, on a simple Google search (I wanted to see if Alyssa had survived, which she did) little seems to 
have been said of the controversial aspects of this case in the popular media.  In fact it is the opposite – I found 





supported by the girls’ parents.  Chesterman J heard the application at 11pm on 25 May and 
gave orders that night declaring that the operation could be lawfully carried out in an attempt 
to save Alyssa’s life; and ordering Alyssa and Bethany be permitted to undergo, and medical 
practitioners be permitted to perform, surgery that would separate the twins.
17
 Chesterman J 
allowed the operation to go ahead deciding that it was in both of the girls’ best interests.   
Canada Case Law 
Adults  
London Health Sciences Centre v K  (R) (Litigation Guardian of) [1997]18  
RK was 83 when he was admitted to London Health Care Sciences Centre following a 
seizure.  At first he was conscious and alert but his condition deteriorated and a month later 
he was diagnosed as being in a PVS.  The application to the court was for a declaration to 
discontinue treatment and withhold life sustaining measures.
19
  At first RK’s wife, LK, 
refused to give consent for withdrawal of treatment, but she later changed her mind after the 
application to the Court had commenced.
20
  Because LK now consented to the cessation of 
treatment the application was amended.  London Health Care Sciences Centre sought 
immunity from civil and criminal prosecution if treatment was withheld following a cardiac 
arrest.  This was the first time a Canadian court was being asked to consider this issue.
21
   
McDermid J held that immunity from prosecution is the role of the prosecutors, not judges.  
An order would either interfere with prosecutorial discretion, or be unenforceable which was 
pointless.
22
  Furthermore, ventilators were being withdrawn on a daily basis, with no criminal 
or civil consequences for those withdrawing the treatment which showed the prosecutors 
were acting in a responsible way.
23
  The necessity for proceeding with the application after 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
acknowledgement of the fact that she was never going to survive:  For example: People's Daily Online "Siamese 
Twin Dies After Surgery in Australia" 28 May 2001: “An emergency operation to separate Siamese twins failed 
to save the life of the weaker girl, who had heart trouble and other complications, doctors in Australia said 
Sunday.” AAP General News (Australia) 27 May 2001: “After a brave fight, three-and-a-half-week-old Bethany 
Rose Nolan, died from heart and lung failure 16 hours into the 20-hour operation.” 
17
 Queensland v Alyssa Grace Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) and Bethany Rose 
Nolan (an Infant, by her Litigation Guardian Shaun Nolan) (2001) QSC 174; [2001] 122 ACR 517 at [28].  
18
 London Health Services Centre v K (R) (Litigation Guardian of) (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 724. 
19




 Ibid at 727. 
22
 Ibid at 733. 
23




LK consented was questioned, because under s 21 (2) of the HCCA LK could consent on 
RK’s behalf which she had done.
24
   
Interestingly the declaratory judgment in Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General 
was discussed.
25
  The judge concluded that New Zealand was able to declare withdrawal of 
treatment was not culpable homicide by virtue of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 which 
binds the Crown by the Crown Proceedings Act 1950.  No similar legislation exists in Canada 
for judges to make similar declarations.
26
     
Sawatzky v Riverview Health Centre Inc [1998]27  
This case also deals with a DNR order.  Mr Sawatzky suffered from Parkinson’s disease and 
other ailments, and had been a resident at the Riverview Health Centre for six months at the 
time of the hearing.  Dr Engel issued a DNR order in respect to Mr Sawatzky which he 
reversed after the patient’s wife, Mrs Sawatzky, objected.  The Public Trustee was appointed 
as Mr Sawatzky’s guardian following a later dispute between Mrs Sawatzky and Dr Engel, 
regarding a procedure for a cuffed tracheotomy tube.  The procedure was carried out contrary 
to Mrs Sawatzky’s wishes.   
The application was from Mrs Sawatzky wanting an interlocutory injunction for the DNR 
order to be removed until trial.  Beard J granted the application based on the following 
reasons: (1) treatment at issue was basic resuscitation which may mean the difference 
between life and death; (2) there was no consent from patient or substitute decision-maker to 
not treat; (3) the ethical dilemma for the doctors was a serious concern, but Dr Engel did live 
with it for five months prior to application; (4) disagreement as to appropriateness of DNR is 
rare; (5) dispute over the exact nature of Mr Sawatzky’s condition; (6) Mrs Sawatzky was not 
given any warning about the DNR order which raises the issue of possibility of unfair 
treatment; (7) the Public Trustee’s refusal to participate was unacceptable.
28
  “I find her 
refusal to become involved to protect Mr Sawatzky’s interests incomprehensible and 
inexcusable.”
29
  The Public Trustee’s refusal to participate was based on the decision in Child 
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 London Health Services Centre v K (R) (Litigation Guardian of) (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 724 at 736. 
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 Sawatzky v Riverview Health Centre Inc (1998) 167 DLR (4th) 359. 
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 Ibid at 372. 
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and Family Services of Central Manitoba v RL which Beard J stated should not be used to not 
consider the issue of DNR orders.
30
   
Re Durksen [1999]31 
Robert Durksen was 47 when injuries suffered in a light plane crash put him in a PVS.  The 
office of the Public Guardian was appointed his guardian and the application was initiated by 
them to lawfully discontinue Mr Durksen’s treatment.  Mr Durksen’s family were in 
agreement that withdrawal of treatment was in his best interests.  The judge held that the 
Public Guardian was correct in making application as they had no power to make such a 
decision without the Court intervening.  The Dependent Adults Act RSA 2000, which 
conferred the power to be Mr Durksen’s guardian, did not extend to consenting to withdrawal 
of treatment.
32
     
Scardoni v Hawryluck [2004]33 
Joyce Holland had advanced Alzheimer’s disease, and opinions differed with regards to the 
way that she responded to those around her.   
“She is unable to communicate verbally. The appellants believe that she recognizes 
them and is aware of their presence. The physicians and the nursing staff have not 
observed this and have had no similar experiences. They agree that Mrs. Holland is 
capable of hearing and that she will open her eyes when her name is called and look at 
the speaker. While the appellants believe she watches television, Dr. Hawryluck 
thinks it is not clear whether this is really the case. However, it is agreed that she is 
conscious and is not in a coma, or vegetative state.”
34
 
Mrs Holland’s daughters, Patricia Scardoni and Margaret Holland, had been appointed her 
personal care attorneys, and they refused to consent to withhold treatment from their mother.  
All parties did agree that she was conscious, repeatedly got infections which led to painful 
bedsores, she needed a tracheotomy and was on intermittent ventilation.  Mrs Holland’s 
doctors wanted to withhold certain life-prolonging treatments from her as the treatment was 
not believed to be in her best interests.
35
  Cullity J overrode the decision made by the CCB 
ordering Mrs Holland’s daughters to consent to the treatment plan outlined by the medical 
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 Re Durksen (1999) CarswellAlta 1672. 
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 Ibid at [14].  
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 Scardoni v Hawryluck (2004) 69 OR (3d) 700. 
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 Ibid at [6]. 
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practitioners, finding that the board had erred in law when applying her specific beliefs under 
the HCCA.   
Re LIC [2006]36 
The Public Guardian had been the guardian for the Dependent Adult for 24 years.  The 
Dependent Adult had suffered a brain injury and been a spastic quadriplegic all her life, and 
at the time of the application was 47 years old and in a PVS.  The Public Guardian was 
applying to the court for directions and advice regarding consent for withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment, pursuant to a guardianship order under the Dependent Adults 
Act RSA 2000. 
Although the hearing was in 2004 the written judgment was issued two years later.  Acton J 
held that the Public Guardian could consent to withdrawal of treatment.  Under the HCCA:  
“10 (3) (sets out potential powers and authority to be given to the guardian, 
including): 
(h) to consent to any health care that is in the best interests of the dependent adult”. 
“1 (j) “health care” includes 
(iv) any medical, surgical, obstetrical or dental treatment”. 
The use of the term “includes” indicates that health care should be interpreted as broadly as 
possible.
37
  Additionally, under s 7 (2), guardianship is intended to provide a substantial 
benefit to the Dependent Adult, as well as be in their best interests.  Withdrawal could 
support this aim, as set out by Lord Goff in Bland.
38
  This case is interesting as it differs from 
the earlier ruling in Re Durksen which held that the Public Guardian did not have the power 
to consent to withdrawal of treatment.
39
  In considering Re Durksen Acton J stated that there 
was little analysis in that case to guide the decision, and it was not binding.  It was 
emphasised that although the Public Guardian did have the power to consent to withdrawal of 
treatment, this should not restrict that office’s ability to seek advice from the court, especially 
where doctors and family disagreed about proposed treatment.  The decision was instead 
intended to indicate that it was reasonable for the Public Guardian to rely on advice from 
doctors but where there were conflicts it was appropriate to seek the court’s guidance.
40
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Mr Rasouli had suffered a catastrophic event whilst undergoing surgery for a benign brain 
tumour.  His physicians wanted to withdraw ventilation and ANH but his substitute decision-
maker, his wife, Ms Salasel, refused consent, stating their beliefs as Shia Muslims required a 
person to be kept alive as long as there were any signs of life.  The case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, with all three judgments ruling that doctors cannot unilaterally withdraw 
treatment from a patient without consent; where there is disagreement the case needs to go to 
the CCB. 
Rasouli v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre (March) [2011]41 
The treating physicians diagnosed Mr Rasouli as being in a PVS, but his family disagreed 
with the diagnosis, stating he was in a MCS.  Ms Salasel had been a physician in Iran before 
moving to Canada the year before the case came to court, so she would have understood the 
medical intricacies better than most in her position. 
“Counsel for the physicians takes the position that, in accordance with the common 
law, it is not necessary to take a doctor's proposal to withdraw treatment to the 
Consent and Capacity Board as the physician is not obliged to offer treatment that will 
not be of benefit to a patient and where continuing the life-sustaining treatment falls 
outside the standard of care”
42
 
Himel J found that withdrawing Mr Rasouli from the ventilator constituted treatment; 
statutory consent under the HCCA applies to the withdrawal of treatment, and therefore the 
matter should go to the CCB where there was disagreement. 
Rasouli v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre (June) [2011]43 
All three Court of Appeal judges upheld the earlier decision, although their reasons differed 
somewhat from Himel J.  Essentially they decided that palliative care included withdrawal of 
treatment: 
“Interpreting end-of-life palliative care to include the withdrawal of life support 
measures where those measures are in place and must be terminated before end-of-life 
palliative care can begin simply means that in cases like the one at hand, treating 
physicians will have to obtain the substitute decision-maker’s consent to the entire 
treatment package. Where consent is withheld, and the treating physician is not 
satisfied that the substitute decision-maker has complied with the requirements of s. 
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Cuthbertson v Rasouli [2013]45 
The Supreme Court decision was a 5-2 majority opinion dismissing the appeal.  The 
judgment nuanced the approach regarding the Court of Appeal’s “palliative treatment 
package”, and stated: 
“The simple fact is that appropriate medical care at the end of life, including palliative 
care, is closely tied to the withdrawal of life support.”
46
  
Where there is disagreement between the appointed substitute decision-maker and the 
medical care providers, the following six-step approach was set out by the Supreme Court: 
“1. The health practitioner determines whether in his view continuance of life support 
is medically indicated for the patient; 
2. If the health practitioner determines that continuance of life support is no longer 
medically indicated for the patient, he advises the patient’s substitute decision-maker 
and seeks her consent to withdraw the treatment; 
3. The substitute decision-maker gives or refuses consent in accordance with the 
applicable prior wishes of the incapable person, or, in the absence of such wishes, on 
the basis of the best interests of the patient, having regard to the specified factors in s. 
21(2) of the HCCA; 
4. If the substitute decision-maker consents, the health practitioner withdraws life 
support; 
5. If the substitute decision-maker refuses consent to withdrawal of life support, the 
health practitioner may challenge the substitute decision-maker’s refusal by applying 
to the Consent and Capacity Board: s. 37; 
6. If the Board finds that the refusal to provide consent to the withdrawal of life 
support was not in accordance with the requirements of the HCCA, it may substitute 





Re SD [1983]48 
S, aged seven, had severe brain damage which required a shunt to be implanted in his brain to 
drain off excess cerebro-spinal fluid.  The shunt malfunctioned and S’s parents refused 
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consent for surgery to fix it, as they wanted him to be allowed to die with dignity.  The State 
intervened on the basis that the child was being deprived of the necessaries of life.  S was 
apprehended under s 1 of the Family and Child Service Act 1980 because he was “in need of 
protection”, as under s 1 (d) he was being “deprived of necessary medical attention”.  The 
British Columbia Provincial Court dismissed the application, granting interim custody to the 
Superintendent of Child Services, saying the operation was “extraordinary surgical 
intervention” not “necessary medical intervention” and consequently the child was returned 
to his parents.  The issue was whether an order be made under s 11 (2) (c) Family and Child 
Service Act 1980 as requested by the Superintendent, or s 11 (2) (b) as requested by the 
parents.
49
  The Provincial Court recognised two competing rights S had under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act 1982.  Under s 7 S has a right to life and 
under s 12 S has the right not to be submitted to any cruel and unusual treatment.
50
  The judge 
decided that s 7 was outweighed in this case by s 12 and that S should not be subjected to the 
operation which would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.  There was also two schools 
of thought canvassed in American cases: (1) decisions should be made primarily within the 
doctor-patient relationship; (2) judicial intervention was required every case involving 
withdrawal or withholding life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent person.
51
  However, 
the British Columbia Supreme Court reversed the Provincial Court’s decision.  Interim 
custody was granted to the Superintendent and surgery was ordered to be carried out while S 
was in custody: “It was too simplistic to say that he should be allowed to die in peace.”
52
 
New Brunswick (Minister of Health & Community Services v B (R) (1990)53 
This case concerned an application by the Minister of Health and Community Services for the 
temporary care and custody of a child, as well as authorisation for medical treatment.  The 
girl was ten years old at the time of the application, and had just contracted meningitis as well 
as being severely mentally disabled as a result of encephalocele.  The neurosurgeon treating 
the child described her as having no quality of life, and believed that “further medical 
treatment will serve only to prolong (her) suffering.”
54
  Her parents agreed and thought it 
would be in her best interests to die.  However the child’s paediatrician disagreed and thought 
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she should be treated with antibiotics.  McLellan J found that the neurosurgeon was 
discriminating against her due to her mental and physical disability which contravenes s 15 
(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The judge also found that she had a 
right to life under s 7 of the Charter and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment, under s 12.
55
  “However reasonable or rational their discrimination may appear 
to them to be, it contravenes the Charter and is thus illegal and wrong.”
56
  Custody, care and 
control was transferred to the Minister for six months as the Court was satisfied the child was 
in danger because her parents refused to provide her with medical treatment.   
Child and Family Services of Central Manitoba v RL  and SLH [1997]57  
A child, D, was admitted to hospital at just three months old following a brutal attack.  
Nobody was arrested but following it D was apprehended by the Child and Family Services 
of Central Manitoba and remained under their care.  Due to the injuries he sustained D was in 
a PVS, and eight months after the attack the Child and Family Services petitioned the Court 
to be allowed to direct D’s carers to issue a DNR order.  D’s doctor recommended such a 
course of action but D’s parents opposed it.
58
  Section 25 (3) of the Child and Family 
Services Act 1985-86 states that: 
“25 (3) An agency may apply to court for an order 
(b) authorizing medical ...  treatment for an apprehended child where 
(i) the parents ...  of the child refuse to consent to such treatment.” 
Cumming J at the lower court granted the order sought, holding that the court had jurisdiction 
under the Act to authorise a negative action as well as a positive one.  However the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal decided that “treatment” in the provision could only be interpreted in a 
positive sense.
59
  Therefore doctors do not need consent from anybody to refrain from taking 
active measures:  
“… neither consent nor a court order in lieu is required for a medical doctor to issue a 
non-resuscitation direction where, in his or her judgment, the patient is in an 
irreversible vegetative state.  Whether or not such a direction should be issued is a 
judgment call for the doctor to make having regard to the patient’s history and 
condition and the doctor's evaluation of the hopelessness of the case.  The wishes of 
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the patient’s family or guardians should be taken into account, but neither their 
consent nor the approval of a court is required.”
60
   
England and Wales Case Law 
Adults 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]61  
 “Thousands of words have since been written about the case, eight judges gave 
opinions, moral philosophers and law experts discussed the judgments, religious 




On 15 April 1989 an eighteen year old young man called Anthony Bland set out with two 
friends to watch Liverpool play Nottingham Forest in a semi-final match at the Hillsborough 
Football Stadium.  94 people died that day when severe overcrowding led to them being 
crushed to death.  Anthony Bland survived – but was later diagnosed as being in a PVS, in a 
condition that meant that he was not reliant on a ventilator, he could breathe unassisted, but 
had no other abilities or awareness and was reliant on ANH.  The Hillsborough tragedy 
created a maelstrom of controversy which was still being felt acutely just three years after the 
event, and which continued for many years.
63
  This obviously increased scrutiny on Anthony 
Bland and his condition, and so the doctor caring for him, Dr Howe, proceeded with caution:  
“I decided to inform the Sheffield Coroner, Dr Popper, of our plan to withdraw all 
treatment, including ANH.  It is difficult now to convey my shock on receiving his 
intimidating reply.  Having stated that he had no jurisdiction over any living person, 
he advised that I would risk a murder charge should I withdraw treatment.  He made it 
clear that he “...  could not countenance, condone, approve or give consent to any 
action or inaction which could be, or could be construed as being, designed or 
intended to shorten or terminate the life of this young man.  This particularly applies 
to the withholding of the necessities of life, such as food and drink”.  He requested a 
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This led to an application by the Airedale NHS Trust applying to the Court that ANH could 
be withdrawn from Anthony Bland.  The case was appealed twice, eventually to the House of 
Lords, who upheld all the lower court decisions that treatment could be lawfully ceased.  
Essentially Bland signalled the first time in England where treatment was allowed to be 
withdrawn from a patient, with court approval that death would not only be the result, but the 
desired effect.  This case obviously raised very complex moral and legal issues about how 
death fitted in with Anthony Bland’s best interests.  The House of Lords found that sanctity 
of life was not absolute, and was not violated by ceasing to give invasive medical treatment 
that Mr Bland had not consented to and which conferred no benefit on him.   
“… the question is not whether it is in the best interests of the patient that he should 
die.  The question is whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his life should 
be prolonged by the continuance of this form of medical treatment or care.”
65
   
Bland is one of the most influential cases in the Commonwealth; its importance is hard to 
overstate.  One of the major reasons this case is so revolutionary is that all of the judges 
expressly acknowledged that this is what they were doing – Anthony Bland would die as a 
result of the withdrawal, and that this was the desired effect.   
“The decision of the House of Lords forms an important part of international 
jurisprudence on this subject.”
66
 
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994]67  
S was 24 and had been in a PVS for three years.  His gastrostomy tube became removed so 
the hospital applied for a declaration authorising them not to replace it.  S’s mother agreed, 
but his father was more equivocal.  The Court of Appeal applied Bland: the test is whether 
the treatment is in the patient’s best interests, for S this meant treatment should not be 
resumed. 
W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2004]68  
KH had suffered from multiple sclerosis for approximately thirty years and required constant 
care.  She was incapable of making any decisions for herself, and her health had deteriorated 
to the point where she was doubly incontinent, found it hard to swallow and was constantly 
disorientated as to the time and place.  Although she was conscious, she could not recognise 
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anyone, including members of her own family.  She had also required feeding by a PEG tube 
for five years.  Her family did not want the tube to be re-inserted after it fell out; her medical 
carers unanimously thought that it should be.  Following the disagreement W Healthcare 
NHS Trust sought a declaration that re-insertion of the tube was in KH’s best interests.  
Coleridge J permitted it to be re-inserted.  KH’s brother and daughter appealed, but the 
appeal was dismissed.  The Court of Appeal found that there was no sufficiently clear 
advance directive established from KH with regard to deprivation of food and water, and 
furthermore KH was conscious enough to suffer by starvation and would therefore receive 
benefit from ANH. 
Burke 
This case is different from all of the other cases about incompetent adults because the adult is 
actually competent, however it fits within this category because it does deal with issues 
regarding incapacity.  Leslie Burke, 44, suffered from a congenital degenerative brain 
condition.  He had serious physical disabilities but was fully competent.  He sought 
clarification as to when ANH could be withdrawn: specifically judicial review of guidelines 
issued by General Medical Council (GMC).  He did not want treatment withdrawn, preferring 
to die of natural causes.  In the words of the High Court judge he did not want doctors to 
make a decision that his life was no longer worth living.   
R (Burke) v General Medical Council (Official solicitor intervening) [2005]69 
Munby J in the High Court held that the guidance was amenable to judicial review on four 
grounds: (1) that there was emphasis on the right of a competent patient to refuse, not require, 
treatment; (2) that there was a duty on a doctor to find another who would treat if they would 
not; (3) the guidelines failed to acknowledge the heavy presumption in favour of life-
prolonging treatment; and (4) the guidelines also failed to recognise the legal requirement for 
judicial sanction of withdrawal of treatment in some circumstances. 
R (Burke) v General Medical Council (Official solicitor intervening) [2006]70 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by the GMC.  Lord Phillips MR emphasised that 
caution should be exercised by the courts when dealing this type of issue:  
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“The court should not be used as a general advice centre.  The danger is that the court 
will enunciate propositions of principle without full appreciation of the implications 
that these will have in practice, throwing into confusion those who feel obliged to 
attempt to apply those principles in practice.  This danger is particularly acute where 
the issues raised involve ethical questions that any court should be reluctant to 
address, unless driven to do so by the need to resolve a practical problem that requires 
the court’s intervention.”
71
     
It was also held that the best interests test, regarding whether treatment should be provided, 
should be applied depending on the particular circumstances of the patient.   
Burke v The United Kingdom (2006)72 
The European Court of Human Rights also dismissed Mr Burke’s appeal.  They found a 
sufficient emphasis on prolonging life existed in British law, and subsequently there was no 
real risk that ANH would be withdrawn.  Additionally they were reluctant to compel doctors 
to treat:  
“In the present case, the Court notes that neither a competent nor an incompetent 




W v M [2011] 74 
M was diagnosed with viral encephalitis, aged 43, in 2003.  Her family applied for treatment 
(ANH) to be withdrawn from her.   
“M’s family feel strongly that she would have rejected her current treatment and the 




In 2007 she had been diagnosed as being in a PVS, however this was later changed to MCS 
which proved significant for the application: 
“this case has demonstrated the crucial role played by the formal assessment tools... 
The history of this case shows how cases may be misdiagnosed if these tools are not 
used. M was initially diagnosed as being in a VS. That led the family, advised by the 
very experienced clinicians and the independent expert instructed at that stage, to 
make this application. It was only some time after this application was launched that 
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the SMART [Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique] test was 




On 5 May 2012, David James aged 68, was admitted to hospital due to complications with his 
stoma.  His stoma had been fitted as a result of colon cancer eleven years previously.  The 
complication got sorted, however he developed an infection and, on 24 May, his condition 
deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to the hospital’s critical care unit.  He had 
multi-organ failure, respiratory failure, cardiovascular failure and renal failure. On 27 May, 
he was placed on (intermittent) ventilator support.  Mr James’ family disagreed with his 
clinicians that if his condition deteriorated certain treatments should be withheld.  
An NHS Trust v DJ [2012]77 
David James’ medical team applied for certain procedures to be withheld in the event of their 
patient’s clinical deterioration: cardiopulmonary resuscitation, invasive support for 
circulatory problems, renal replacement therapy, and intravenous antibiotics if further 
infectious complications arose.  Mr Justice Peter Jackson refused the application for the 
following reasons: 
“(1) Although DJ’s condition is in many respects grim, I am not persuaded that 
treatment would be futile or overly burdensome, or that there is no prospect of 
recovery. 
(a) In DJ’s case, the treatments in question cannot be said to be futile, based upon the 
evidence of their effect so far. 
(b) Nor can they be said to be futile in the sense that they could only return DJ to a 
quality of life that is not worth living. 
(c) Although the burdens of treatment are very great indeed, they have to be weighed 
against the benefits of a continued existence. 
(d) Nor can it be said that there is no prospect of recovery: recovery does not mean a 
return to full health, but the resumption of a quality of life that DJ would regard as 
worthwhile. The references, noted above, to a cure or a return to the former pleasures 
of life set the standard unduly high.”
78
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Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James (CA) [2013] 79 
Mr James’ condition had deteriorated in the two weeks between hearings, and he was now 
completely dependent on ventilation.  Sir Alan Ward (with whom Laws LJ was in agreement 
with) and Arden LJ allowed the application by the NHS Trust to withhold treatment from Mr 
James.  In doing so they differed in their approaches, but agreed that further treatment would 
be unduly burdensome.
80
  Mr James passed away soon after the Court of Appeal hearing.   
Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James (SC) [2013]81  
This case was the first time the Supreme Court had considered under the MCA whether 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment was in a patient’s best interests.  Lady Hale delivered 
the judgment for the Supreme Court; the Court of Appeal decision was upheld but only 
because of the deterioration of Mr James’ condition.  The reasoning from the Court of Appeal 
was criticised for requiring too high a threshold for futility, and for incorporating a 
reasonable person standard.  
“It follows that I would dismiss this appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeal 
reached the right result but for the wrong reasons, while the trial judge had reached a 




Re B (A minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1982)83 
This is the earliest prospective end-of-life case examined.  A newborn baby with Down 
syndrome needed an operation to relieve intestinal blockage.  Her parents refused to consent 
to the operation as they thought it kinder to allow her to die.  Her doctors then contacted the 
local authority.  She was subsequently made a ward of the court, but the surgeon thought that 
the wishes of the parents should be respected.  An application for an order directing treatment 
was sought and refused; the judge agreeing that the parents’ wishes should be respected.  The 
local authority appealed successfully.  Templeman and Dunn LJJ decided that it was in the 
best interests of the child to have the operation – the case was not about whether parents’ 
wishes should be respected.  The life of a child with Down syndrome was not so bad that the 
child should be condemned to die. 
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R v Cambridge Health Authority, Ex parte B [1995]84 
B was eleven years old and had acute myeloid leukaemia.  Her father sought direction from 
the court ordering doctors to treat her with chemotherapy and, if this was successful, a bone 
marrow transplant for her.  Each had a 10-20% chance of success and a significant cost 
(chemotherapy would cost £15,000 and the bone marrow transplant would cost £60,000).  
Thirteen months before the application B had had a bone marrow transplant and two courses 
of chemotherapy, but she subsequently relapsed which is why her father sought further 
treatment.  However B’s doctors would not treat her, they said that more chemotherapy and 
another transplant would not be in her best interests.  A medical school professor 
recommending further chemotherapy acknowledged the therapy to be more experimental than 
standard.  Treatment was denied on basis that it was not in B’s best interests and not an 
appropriate use of limited resources, but the lower court judge directed Cambridge Health 
Authority to reconsider.  The appeal from the Authority was upheld.  The Court of Appeal 
stated that the proposed treatment had limited chance of success and it was for Cambridge 
Health Authority, not the court, to allocate their limited budget for the maximum benefits. 
Re C (A minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990]85 
C, a newborn baby with congenital hydrocephalus, was already a ward of the court (unrelated 
to her condition).  An application was made for direction regarding her future care should she 
contract a serious infection, or should existing feeding methods became problematic.  The 
lower court judge issued an injunction containing specific instructions as to the type of 
treatment C could be administered:  
“it shall not be necessary either, (a) to prescribe and administer antibiotics … or (b) to 
set up intravenous fusions or nasal gastric feeding regimes for the minor.”
86
   
The Court of Appeal deleted these directions from the lower court judge’s direction.  They 
deemed them inconsistent with the general recommendation that treatment to relieve 
suffering rather than prolong life was appropriate.  They did uphold the recommendations 
that, with consideration to C’s best interests as paramount, the court was entitled to approve 
treatment to ease her suffering rather than prolong her life.   
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Re J (A minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991]87 
J was also already a ward of the court unrelated to his condition.  He was born prematurely 
and as a result was severely brain damaged.  The grim prognosis was that he would be 
unlikely to develop even limited intellectual abilities.  He was also likely to develop serious 
spastic quadriplegia, and it was likely that he was both deaf and blind.  Unfortunately he 
probably had a normal pain threshold, and was suffering from his various ailments.  When he 
was five months old an application was made regarding J’s future care, especially regarding 
ventilator support.  Scott Baker J approved the neonatologist’s recommendation that J should 
not be revived by mechanical ventilation in the event of further convulsions, and the Court of 
Appeal upheld this decision.  They found that the presumption in favour of sanctity of life did 
not displace the paramount consideration of the child’s best interests – the court can consent 
to withhold life-saving treatments even where the condition is not terminal. 
In Re A (Children) [2001]88 
Jodie and Mary were born on 8 August 2000 as ischiopagus tetrapus conjoined twins.  This 
meant that they were joined at the pelvis and had four limbs.  Jodie sustained the life of Mary, 
and an operation to separate them was required or they would both die.  Just how much 
longer they would live was uncertain – but estimates were put at between three and six 
months.  The operation would give Jodie a 60-80% chance of living, but Mary would 
definitely die as her blood supply would be cut off.  Jodie and Mary’s parents refused to 
consent to the operation.  The Court of Appeal found that the operation was an act of 
necessity and its purpose was to prolong Jodie’s life, but not to cause the death of Mary.  
Article 2 of the Human Rights Act did not prohibit the operation because “intentionally” only 
applies to cases where the purpose of the prohibited action was to cause death.  The 
separation of the twins were held to be in both of their best interests, despite only one of them 
having any chance of survival. 
Wyatt 
This is a complicated case that had three hearings at the High Court level, and one at the 
appellate level.  It also generated a lot of public interest and debate, and even several 
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  The cases all centred on the appropriate treatment for Charlotte Wyatt, who was 
born at 26 weeks with serious medical problems.  She had severe brain damage, was blind, 
deaf and incapable of voluntary movement, and she also had chronic kidney and respiratory 
problems.  Consequently she had not left hospital since birth.  Her parents, Deborah and 
Darren Wyatt, and her medical carers disagreed about her treatment, and the extent of 
aggressive treatment that should be given to her.  Charlotte’s doctors were of the opinion that 
minimal intervention should be practiced, but her parents disagreed with this approach.  The 
acrimony between the parties was bitter.  At one stage the parents reported Charlotte’s 
doctors to the police, and it even reached the point that for significant periods of time the 
parents could only visit Charlotte accompanied by security personnel. 
 Portsmouth NHS Trust and Wyatt, Southampton NHS Trust Intervening [2004] (7 October 2004)90 
The first time the parties went to court Charlotte Wyatt was nearly twelve months old.  She 
had minimal cognitive function but did experience pain and distress.  Her prognosis was 
poor; it was considered very unlikely that she would survive past her first birthday.
91
  The 
issue was whether or not artificial ventilation should be given to Charlotte.  Doctors 
disagreed with her parents about whether intensive ventilation should be given, saying it was 
not in her best interests.  Hedley J, using the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court over 
children, upheld the application by the Trust, and granted permissive relief to not treat 
Charlotte with intensive ventilation.  Furthermore he held that aggressive treatment, even to 
prolong her life, was not in Charlotte’s best interests.   
Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt (January 2005)92 
This is an oral judgment given by Hedley J.  It was in response to an application by 
Charlotte’s parents to stay the order given in the previous October because Charlotte’s 
condition had improved.  Hedley J refused the application on two grounds: (1) the 
declarations did not interfere with the practitioners’ duty to exercise their judgment in 
Charlotte’s best interests; and (2) there were no clear grounds for varying the orders. 
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Wyatt v Portsmouth NHS Trust [2005] (21April 2005)93 
Charlotte was now eighteen months old, and against the odds had survived through the 
winter.  Her oxygen dependency had been reduced from 100% to 50%, and she was more 
responsive.  Her parents applied to have the declarations that had been issued in the October 
2004 judgment discharged.  Hedley J declined to do so but held that all treatment but 
intubation and ventilation should be used in event of respiratory collapse.  He gave three 
reasons for this decision: (1) Charlotte was unlikely to survive a respiratory crisis no matter 
what interventions were given; (2) if she did survive it her condition would have severely 
deteriorated; and (3) such an invention “would imperil a peaceful death.”
94
  A review of the 
declarations was tabled for October 2005.   
Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] (12 October 2005)95  
Hedley J granted permission to the Wyatts to appeal on the issue of whether the court should 
have continued the declarations, and whether they should have been issued ahead of a 
particular medical crisis.  They also wanted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the judge 
applied the best interests test appropriately.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 
regarding continuance of declarations and refused them permission to appeal on the issue of 
best interests.  It was, however, referred back to the High Court for a review in September not 
October. 
Portsmouth NHS Trust v W [2005] (21 October 2005)96 
Charlotte was now two years old, and it was four court cases later.  The physicians treating 
her wanted a declaration, given the difficulties in the relationship so far, stating that they 
could overrule her parents on medical decisions.  Such a declaration would be unprecedented 
but Hedley J did grant the treating clinician veto over Charlotte’s parents although their 
wishes were not inconsequential: “parental wishes should be accommodated as far as 
professional judgment and conscience will permit, but no further.”
97
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An NHS Trust v MB [2006]98 
M was 18 months old and had spinal muscular atrophy.  The NHS Trust applied for a range 
of measures, but preferred an option to remove M’s endo-tracheal tube and provide the child 
with palliative care.  His parents opposed this, wanting his life to be prolonged for as long as 
possible.  Holman J agreed, and decided against the advice of the medical profession and M’s 
guardian that the current treatment should continue.  The material finding was that in his 
present condition M could still gain benefit from the continuation of his life: 
“I must proceed on the basis that M has age appropriate cognition, and does continue 
to have a relationship of value to him with his family, and does continue to gain other 
pleasures from touch, sight and sound.”
99
 
Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v A [2015]100 
Identical twins, aged fourteen months, both suffered from the same progressive neuro-
degenerative disorder.  Both twins were on ventilation and had been for some months.  The 
NHS applied to the court for a declaration that it was both boys’ best interests to have 
treatment withdrawn.  The twins’ parents refused to consent: 
“The father stressed again how offensive it is to the Muslim beliefs of himself and his 
wife that life support should be withdrawn before the brain of the respective child 
“has stopped working finally” in accordance with the resolution of the Islamic Fiqh 
Council.  He said, most eloquently, “I have respect for the law of the United 




However, Holman J was satisfied with medical evidence that showed no prospect of recovery 
from the severe brain damage both boys had suffered, and granted the application for 
withdrawal of treatment. 
“But it seems to me that artificially to prolong their lives in this particular case lacks 
any purpose, confers no benefit at all apart from the fact of physical survival, and 
involves perpetuating the infliction of pain and discomfort for no gain or purpose. It is 
not in the best interests of either boy that the process be artificially prolonged, and it 
is in their best interests that nature should now be permitted to take its inevitable 
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